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Summary and conclusions
In 2008, inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in Latin America and the Caribbean rose to a new 
record high despite slowing with respect to the previous year, and the region’s outward foreign 
direct investment (OFDI) reached its second highest level ever.1 Considering the economic and 
financial turmoil of the times, these results are surprisingly positive, but caution needs to be exercised 
in their interpretation. Many of the investments carried out in 2008 reflected the inertia effects 
of pre-crisis market trends, and capital flows in 2009 are in fact expected to fall, as discussed in 
chapter I of this document. Focusing on the impact of the global economic and financial crisis on 
FDI flows is unavoidable in the present circumstances, but the analysis of the short-term situation 
should not relegate the issue of long-term development. Chapter II examines investment in offshore 
business services in the region, a sector that holds promising prospects in the medium and long 
runs, not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative terms. Chapter III analyses investment in 
large coastal hotel and real estate complexes in tropical countries, a segment whose growth had 
been fuelled by the United States real estate boom and which has consequently been hit hard by 
the current crisis. Despite the difficulties they are facing now, these types of investment projects 
are an interesting example of a new model for tourism development that could be adopted by 
several countries in the region.
1
 FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus 
disinvestments (repatriation of capital) by foreign investors. 
OFDI figures indicate outflows of direct investment by residents, 
minus disinvestments abroad by those investors. The FDI figures 
do not include the flows received by the main financial centres 
of the Caribbean. The OFDI figures do not include the flows 
originating in these financial centres. These figures differ from 
 those contained in the editions of Economic Survey of Latin 
America and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of 
the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean published 
in August and December 2008, respectively, as the latter show 
the net balance of foreign investment, that is, direct investment 
in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward foreign direct 
investment (OFDI).
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A.  An overview of FDI in Latin America and  
 the Caribbean
1.  FDI inflows and the activities of transnational  
 corporations in the region
Despite the global financial and economic crisis, FDI 
flows to Latin America and the Caribbean reached a 
record high in 2008: excluding the financial centres, the 
region received US$ 128.301 billion, surpassing by 13% 
the record level observed in 2007. This is an extraordinary 
performance considering that FDI flows worldwide shrank 
by 15% in the same period. 
The onslaught of the economic and financial crisis 
in 2008 affected FDI around the globe in three ways: it 
dampened the prospects of economic growth, the main 
engine of FDI; it limited access to domestic financial 
resources (corporate profits are down) and external financial 
resources (credit is tighter and more expensive); and it 
increased uncertainty and, consequently, worsened the 
risk outlook. As a result, FDI in developed countries, the 
epicentre of the crisis, fell 25% with respect to 2007. 
By contrast, FDI flows to developing countries and 
economies in transition remained relatively stable and even 
rose slightly to reach new record levels. This increase can 
be largely attributed to commodity prices which remained 
high for most of 2008 and to the growth posted by some 
of these economies despite the international crisis. Also, 
there is the delayed impact of investment decisions taken 
in boom times that resulted in investments actually being 
made in periods of economic turmoil.
The growth rate of FDI to Latin America and the 
Caribbean was above the world average and above the 
average for developing countries in general. The record high 
posted in 2008, however, conceals marked differences at the 
subregional level (see figure 1). While FDI to South America 
climbed 24% to US$ 89.862 billion, FDI to Mexico and 
the Caribbean Basin (Central America and the Caribbean 
countries and territories) fell 5% to US$ 38.438 billion. 
The different trends in FDI are largely explained by 
the differentiated effect that the international crisis has 
had on efficiency-seeking FDI and on market-seeking 
FDI, as well as by the extent to which the financial crisis 
has spread to each of the region’s countries. 
Figure I
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT 






















































South America Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean Basin Total
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a 
 Excludes investment received by the main financial centres. These FDI figures differ 
from those published by ECLAC in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, published in August and December 2008, respectively, because those 
studies show the net balance of foreign investment, in other words, direct investment 
in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). 
FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus distinvestments 
(repatriation of capital) by foreign investors.
The rise in FDI flows to South America was fuelled 
mainly by commodity prices, which remained high for 
most of 2008 and attracted investment in the natural 
resources sector (mainly hydrocarbons and metal 
mining). Robust economic growth in this subregion 
(5.5% compared with 2.5% worldwide) also boosted 
market-seeking FDI. Brazil, Chile and Colombia were 
the main FDI recipients in South America and accounted 
for 80% of the subregion’s FDI inflows.  Brazil in 
particular received copious volumes of FDI and became 
the largest recipient in the whole of Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Flows into the country were 30% higher 
than in 2007, when they had already reached record 
levels, thanks to investments in the natural resources 
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sector, especially in mining and natural-resource-based 
manufacturing, such as steel. 
The close ties of Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
countries with the United States economy explain the 
drop in FDI flows to that subregion. The recession in the 
United States slowed activity among the export platforms 
located in the subregion, which had been set up mainly to 
serve the United States market, and this stemmed the flow 
of export-oriented FDI. At the same time, the downturn in 
local economic growth had a negative impact on domestic-
market-seeking FDI. Mexico was the worst hit in this regard, 
and its FDI intake fell 20% with respect to 2007. Meanwhile, 
investment flows to Central America rose 7%. In contrast, 
FDI flows to the Caribbean climbed 42% thanks to the rise 
in FDI in the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago, 
which offset the decline in the other countries in the area. 
Mexico, the Dominican Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Panama and Costa Rica were the main recipients in the 
subregion and accounted for 83% of inward FDI. 
Ratios of FDI to GDP, which indicate the weight of 
FDI in national economies, were higher in the countries 
of the Caribbean and of the Eastern Caribbean Currency 
Union in particular in the last few years. Much of the FDI 
received by these countries was in the tourism sector, 
which is analysed in chapter III.
The distribution of FDI by sector and by country of 
origin has not varied notably (see figure 2). The main 
destination for FDI in the region as a whole is the services 
sector, basically telecommunications, financial services 
and public utilities. In South America, FDI in natural 
resources, as a proportion of total FDI, continues to be 
greater than in manufacturing, while the opposite tends to 
be the case in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin countries. 
By country of origin, the United States continues to be 
the region’s principal source of FDI, followed by Spain 
and then Canada. 
The effect of the international crisis on the different types 
of FDI (which are classified into natural-resource-seeking, 
market-seeking and efficiency-seeking FDI according to the 
investment strategy pursued by transnational corporations) 
has varied. Flows of natural-resource-seeking FDI remained 
strong thanks to high commodity prices and the fact that 
mining, metallurgy and hydrocarbon projects take years 
to come to fruition and investments in them tend to focus 
on the long term rather than on immediate circumstances. 
As the international crisis deepened and spread, however, 
companies in the sector were forced to take measures to 
mitigate the effects of the turmoil. These have largely consisted 
of production stoppages, reductions in the workforce, 
strategic partnerships to obtain financing and the revision 
of investment plans, among other steps. After a period of 
major expansion, these firms are now revising and cautiously 
adjusting their investment plans and strategies. 
Figure 2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISTRIBUTION OF 








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Natural resources Manufacturing Services Other
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
Note:  The data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia represent net flows as it is 
not known in which sectors the divestments carried out by the Central 
Bank occurred. 
Efficiency-seeking FDI has been the hardest hit by the 
crisis. The slowdown of the United States economy, the main 
destination of exports from Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, 
has plunged some of the largest manufacturing industries 
in the subregion, namely the automobile, electronics and 
textiles and apparel industries, into dire straits. All of them 
laid off workers, temporarily stopped production or closed 
plants in 2008, which has deterred FDI. The automobile 
industry is in the most critical situation and is undergoing 
the most radical restructuring process at the global level. It 
remains to be seen how this will affect the region, however. 
The international crisis may encourage companies to shift 
production to developing countries that can offer relatively 
lower costs, which could stimulate FDI, but this does not 
seem likely to happen in the short term. Restructuring and 
reorganizing production takes time and is considerably 
difficult when credit is tight. 
Market-seeking FDI remained buoyant thanks to its 
main driver, regional economic growth. Latin America 
and the Caribbean posted its sixth consecutive year of 
economic growth in 2008 which, together with lower 
unemployment and better poverty indicators, increased 
the population’s disposable income and boosted domestic 
demand. Market-seeking FDI became more buoyant in 
South America, driven by GDP growth of 5.5% in 2008. 
Even the automakers continued to invest in the subregion: 
the developed countries’ markets may be highly saturated, 
but opportunities and unmet demand still exist in emerging 
economies, including Brazil. Also, the huge battle between 
the two regional leaders in the telecommunications market 
(Telefónica and Telmex-América Móvil) is still raging, 
spurring not only technological development, but also FDI 
in the industry regionwide. There was heavy investment in 
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the banking and financial services sector in 2008, but some 
of the largest financial entities in the region will probably 
change hands or undergo restructuring given the difficult 
situation that Citigroup is facing and the emergence of 
the Brazilian banking giant Itaú-Unibanco. The struggle 
for dominance of food distribution channels in the region 
is also ongoing. Major investments were carried out in 
the retail sector, including Wal-Mart’s investment in 
the Chilean market as part of its strategy to increase its 
presence in South America. The international financial 
crisis has, meanwhile, affected the region’s countries 
in different ways, gradually shutting down the engines 
of growth, and the increasing constraints on consumer 
credit could put off market-seeking FDI. The region’s 
governments have taken various steps to prop up aggregate 
demand. How these policies will affect FDI flows is still 
uncertain, however.
As the fall-out of the international crisis spreads across 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the economic conditions 
that generated the FDI boom of the last five years have 
begun to change. Faced with meagre growth prospects, 
financing constraints and greater uncertainty, it is reasonable 
to expect that FDI flows to the region will decline in 2009. 
The boom has nevertheless underscored the importance of 
continuing to build and strengthen the production capacity 
of the region’s national economies so as to maximize the 
benefits of not only inward, but also outward, FDI. Pursuing 
such a strategy could place countries in a better position 
to withstand periods of economic turmoil such as the one 
affecting the region at present. 
2.  Outward foreign direct investment and the internationalization  
 of the trans-Latins
The upward trend in outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI) by the countries of Latin America and the 
Caribbean continued in 2008, with OFDI reaching 
US$ 34.561 billion, 42% above the level recorded in 
2007 (see figure 3). Brazil, the region’s leading foreign 
investor, spearheaded the increase, with investments of 
US$ 20.457 billion (61% of total OFDI), followed by 
Chile and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela with 
US$ 6.891 and US$ 2.757, respectively.
Figure 3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET OUTWARD FOREIGN 















































Net flows of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a 
 Figures for outward foreign direct investment do not include flows from financial 
centres. OFDI figures indicate outflows of direct investment by residents, minus 
sales of assets abroad by those investors. 
A combination of factors was behind the region’s 
notable OFDI performance, including:
The largest investments in 2008 were generally the • 
result of corporate decisions taken before September 
2008, the point at which the crisis worsened. The 
sectors in which trans-Latins are most active, in 
particular the natural-resource-based production 
sectors, performed favourably for the first two thirds 
of the year. In addition, some companies —in the 
petrochemical and the meat-producing sectors— 
continued with the internationalization processes 
they had embarked on in 2006 and 2007.
A substantial portion of the investments were made • 
in markets that have been less affected by the crisis 
or were impacted only later, particularly in the region 
and in other developing countries, or in sectors with 
a low income elasticity, such as bread-making. In 
fact, some companies’ investments have been driven 
by the need to diversify and increase their presence 
in markets that have better growth prospects.
Some investments, especially in the hydrocarbon • 
and mining sectors, where projects have a long 
maturation period, have been made in anticipation 
of a recovery in the global economy.
Despite the good results, starting in the fourth 
quarter of 2008, many trans-Latins were forced to curb 
their operations and revise their investment plans. Some 
enterprises were severely hampered by past international 
acquisitions —such as the Mexican firm Cemex’s purchase 
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2008 11
of Rinker of Australia and the acquisition by Argentine 
firm Tenaris, which is part of Techint, of Maverick of the 
United States— that, in addition to sharply increasing their 
debt levels, made them more sensitive to fluctuations in the 
United States market. 
The behaviour of OFDI flows from the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009 will depend largely 
on the evolution of the international economic and financial 
crisis and the extent to which it affects global demand for 
natural resources and the economic performance of the 
markets of Latin America and the other economies in which 
the trans-Latins operate. Given the current situation, the 
international expansion of Latin American and Caribbean 
enterprises is expected to be less dynamic in 2009, although 
the crisis could create new opportunities for solid firms that 
have access to financing. 
B.  Foreign direct investment in offshore business  
 services in Latin America and the Caribbean
An increasingly broad range of services fall into the 
category of offshore business services (offshoring),2 
including contact centres, business processes, information 
technology (IT) services, and knowledge-intensive, 
analytical services. What they have in common is that 
their use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) makes it possible to overcome barriers imposed by 
the distance between the demand and supply of labour. 
Companies can therefore provide lower-cost services to 
their customers or provide a higher-quality service by 
drawing from a global pool of skilled workers. By taking 
part in the offshore business services market, developing 
countries have benefited from the creation of jobs that are 
usually better remunerated than alternatives for similarly 
skilled persons, as well as from the skills-upgrading 
generated by on-the-job experiences and training and from 
exposure to global standards in management practice, ICT 
tools, and technology, among other factors. Hence FDI 
in remote business services have great potential to boost 
the development of recipient countries.
The offshore business services industry is very dynamic. 
Despite difficulties and discrepancies in quantification, 
estimates generally coincide in predicting high growth rates 
for the coming years (see figure 4). A slowdown may occur 
in the short run due to the current international economic 
2
 Offshoring refers to the provision of services from a location outside 
the country where the customer is located. By using information and 
communication technologies (ICT), firms can overcome barriers 
imposed by the distance between the demand and supply of labour 
in some activities. The scope of services offshored is broad and 
in constant expansion through innovative uses of information and 
communication technologies (ICT). A related concept is outsourcing, 
in which one firm lends services to another, regardless of location. 
Some, but not all, offshore business services are outsourced, since some 
can be provided in-house (which is known as captive offshoring).
and financial crisis but, as has occurred elsewhere, the 
pressure to reduce costs because of the crisis may actually 
lead more firms to offshore. There is great potential for 
growth, given that offshore services still represent only a 
fraction of the global business services market.
Figure 4
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Boston Consulting Group (BCG), “Estudios de competitividad en 
clusters de la economía chilena. Informe final” [online] http://www.economia.cl/ 
1540/articles-187159_recurso_1.pdf, 2007.
a Estimates.
Globally, two forces have driven the development 
of remote business services. First, competition increased 
among outsourcing players in the traditional functions, such 
as contact centres, business process outsourcing (BPO) and 
IT services. This drove profit margins down and increased 
the pressure to offshore to low-cost destinations. Second, the 
upgrading of ICT and the body of accumulated experience 
have prompted firms to offshore a broader array of services, 
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including higher-skilled and higher-value-added services 
that involve fewer standardized procedures and greater 
analysis and industry-specific knowledge. Firms providing 
those services gain a comparative advantage from having a 
global presence, operating in different time zones (allowing 
for 24/7 services) and being able to draw upon a multilingual 
staff. Global networks also help to offset the risks involved 
in concentrating key operations in a single location.
Although India dominates the offshore business 
services industry, investors in the sector have been turning 
their attention to Latin America and the Caribbean in the 
last few years. United States clients looking to offshore 
traditional functions tend to prefer to work with service 
providers who are physically closer, a shorter journey time 
away and in the same time zone, among other benefits 
of what has been named “nearshoring”. Firms running 
worldwide integrated operations in higher-value-added 
services have been using the Latin American and Caribbean 
region to complement other destinations.
The Latin American and Caribbean region still plays a 
relatively small role in the global offshore business services 
industry. In 2007, it accounted for 3% of payments by 
United States companies to companies abroad (affiliated 
and unaffiliated) for computer and information services, 
compared to India’s 27%. In total business and professional 
services (which include management consultancy, public 
relations, R&D, testing, advertising, construction, 
architecture, engineering, legal and equipment support 
services), the region’s share is about 7%. Nonetheless, 
world rankings based on investor perception indicate that 
interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is growing. 
As a region, Latin America and the Caribbean presents 
a range of advantages for offshoring, among which are: 
geographical and cultural proximity to the United States; 
time zone advantages; destinations with relatively low 
political, economic and natural risks, providing a good 
hedging alternative; talent and technology hubs with 
lower attrition rates (making it safer for operations 
involving knowledge transfer), multilingual capacities 
and established markets (highly influenced by the 
presence of transnational corporations and the growing 
internationalization of local companies).
The English-speaking Caribbean has hosted United 
States-oriented call centres and data-entry centres since 
the 1980s. The industry has boomed since 2005, however, 
fuelled by the preference for nearby destinations and by the 
upgrading of the local telecommunications infrastructure. 
Although the Caribbean can compete with Asia on a 
cost basis in some services, its main advantages lie in 
operations that require frequent interaction and those in 
which scale is non-critical. Low staff attrition has also made 
the English-speaking Caribbean attractive for offshoring 
in segments that require a relatively high investment in 
human resources training, such as medical informatics. 
For the economies of the English-speaking Caribbean, this 
industry is particularly important because it complements 
the fairly volatile and cyclical tourism industry. 
Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic have also benefited from nearshoring. Although 
only a fraction of the population in these countries speaks 
English fluently, the number is significant in absolute terms, 
allowing for the establishment of larger centres than in 
most of the English-speaking Caribbean. The bilingual 
contingent has grown in recent years through educational 
efforts and through the return of people who had previously 
worked or studied in the United States or grown up there. 
Moreover, the growth of the Hispanic community in the 
United States and of the markets of Latin America and 
Spain has created demand for Spanish-speaking operators, 
to the benefit of these countries that stand at the intersection 
of North and South. Governments have actively supported 
FDI generally and most have taken measures to promote 
the offshore service industry. In fact, as the apparel industry 
started suffering from competition from China and other 
Asian countries, especially from 2001 onward, the Central 
American countries and the Dominican Republic took 
steps to diversify their economies and have targeted the 
offshore business services industry in particular. From 
the perspective of United States clients, the Dominican 
Republic - Central America - United States Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) has also made these countries 
more attractive for offshore operations.
The larger markets, Mexico and Brazil, host service 
centres in virtually every major segment of offshore 
business services. Although they are relatively recent 
offshore destinations and export a relatively small share 
of those services, they represent a large share of the 
region’s total services exports. Part of the attractiveness 
of both countries for offshore operations stems from 
their large local markets and solid industrial sector. The 
strong presence of transnational corporations in multiple 
industries resulted in the establishment of in-house service 
centres for engineering and R&D, regional headquarters 
and shared service centres. It also led to the presence of 
outsourcing vendors that cater to both global and local 
clients. In addition, the existence of sizeable IT hardware 
manufacturing industries in both countries helped create 
a pool of engineers and other professionals employable 
in the IT services industry. 
Other South American countries have focused on 
specific niches of offshoring, based on their comparative 
advantages. Argentina has competed well both in segments 
where cost is the critical factor, such as call centres, and 
in higher-skilled industries, such as IT. Chile has taken a 
cluster approach to the development of a global services 
industry, which today includes operations in shared service 
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centres, software development and knowledge process 
outsourcing (KPO). Uruguay has been stronger in the 
software product industry but has expanded in services, 
especially since Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) of India 
established its global delivery centre in 2005. Colombia 
has a large business services industry which, like that of 
its larger neighbours, caters largely to the local market.
Given that the offshore business service industry is seen 
as crucial for attracting FDI, countries have taken specific 
steps to foster it, alongside horizontal business climate 
policies, country image promotion and other initiatives 
directed at attracting FDI generally. The most common 
specific measures fall into two categories: tax-related 
instruments and free zones, and skills development. In 
fact, one of the major bottlenecks for the expansion of the 
offshoring industry in Latin America and the Caribbean 
lies in the availability of skilled human resources. Other 
initiatives include the establishment of technology 
parks and grants for pre-investment assessments and for 
setting-up costs.
As well as the public policy measures already being 
taken to help the industry realize its potential, other steps 
will be needed to overcome the region’s main limitations, 
including the size of the pool of workers with adequate 
technical and language skills. Local and foreign companies 
and industry specialists and governments that are already 
engaged in promoting this industry in their respective 
countries have stressed the need for five main groups 
of policy actions: expand and improve the skills base; 
specialize in niches in which the country has comparative 
advantages; act collectively to market and promote the 
region and facilitate the integration of regional operations; 
develop local companies; and target higher-value-added 
and higher-skilled segments.
C.  Integrated hotel and real estate complexes:  
 investments and business strategies
Tourism grew strongly in the second half of the twentieth 
century and has become one of the most internationalized 
industries in the global economy. Many different economic 
activities involving a wide range of agents, from transnational 
corporations to very small firms, interact in this industry, 
offering diverse services in different parts of the world. 
Although Europe and North America continue to account 
for the bulk of tourist arrivals, other destinations have gained 
prominence, many of them in emerging economies, which 
has spread the potential benefits of tourism to practically 
every corner of the globe. The Latin American and Caribbean 
region is the destination for just over 8% of international 
journeys, and this share has remained relatively stable for 
the last few decades (see figure 5).
Changes have been coming ever faster in the industry 
recently, in response to shifts in economic, cultural, 
political, technological and demographic patterns, and 
it is becoming increasingly segmented. Accordingly, 
tourism companies have begun to outsource many of 
their activities, which has brought related firms —real 
estate and construction businesses, financial entities and 
so forth— into the sector. As in other service industries, 
the leading firms have been able to hold on to their 
competitive edge by entering into different types of 
contractual arrangements —management, leasing and 
franchising— without having to make conventional capital 
investments in order to embark on new initiatives. As a 
result, many global brands in the tourism industry have 
established an international presence without pouring 
large amounts of FDI into securing control of physical 
assets, such as real estate. As tourists become better 
informed and more selective and demanding, many 
developing countries have made it a priority to capture 
FDI and attract global brands in order to gain a foothold 
in international tourism circuits.
Figure 5
INTERNATIONAL TOURIST ARRIVALS, 1950-2008
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
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With the rise of mass tourism, growing numbers of 
international travellers were drawn to coastal locations: 
those commonly known as “sun and sand” destinations. 
Mounting competition and over-exploitation of the natural 
environment, however, forced the major tour operators 
to seek out new destinations to meet the expectations 
of an increasingly demanding clientele. Thanks to their 
proximity to the United States, Mexico and the countries of 
the Caribbean Basin developed into increasingly attractive 
hubs for this type of vacation tourism and now account 
for almost 70% of all international arrivals in the Latin 
American and Caribbean region (see figure 6).
Figure 6
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
A heavily price-driven type of tourism based on 
the all-inclusive model spread rapidly in the region. But 
volatile demand and the problems caused by issues of waste 
disposal, beach pollution and the provision and delivery of 
drinking water began to erode the competitive advantages 
that sustained the industry. In these circumstances, the 
major tourism companies embarked on massive upgrades 
of their facilities in an effort to capture higher-income 
travellers. The region also began to see new ventures on 
a much larger scale involving local and international real 
estate developers. Spurred by the real estate boom in the 
industrialized countries and taking advantage of the lower 
prices prevailing in the Latin American economies, developers 
began to offer a high-quality product aimed at the flourishing 
vacation-homes market, both for occasional travellers and for 
those seeking a more permanent residence, such as retirees 
from Canada and the United States. The combination of 
high-end hotels and real estate developments has enabled 
investors to increase their cash flow through home sales 
and to prorate the costs of building and maintaining shared 
leisure facilities, such as golf courses, among the owners of 
the residential units. These mega-projects have been highly 
successful in Mexico and are beginning to spread to other 
countries, such as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, 
Panama and, more recently, the North-East of Brazil.
Construction companies, real estate developers and 
financial entities, many of them locally-owned, are the 
main drivers of these mega-projects, while the hotel chains 
contribute their business know-how and customer management 
experience, all vouched for by the prestige of their brand 
name. This model seems to have stronger linkages with 
the local economy than the all-inclusive scheme, which 
tended strongly towards enclave-type operation. 
Lastly, investors’ expectations may be severely dented 
by the repercussions of the global financial crisis and of 
fears over influenza A (H1N1). In fact, not only have 
visitor numbers dropped, but the sales of several of these 
real estate developments have plummeted in the last few 
months, which has complicated the financial management 
of the mega-projects.
D.  Conclusions and implications
In a highly volatile climate, levels of FDI flows into the 
Latin American and Caribbean region reached a fresh high 
in 2008, drawn mainly by the sound performance of the 
region’s domestic economies and of the industries linked 
to natural-resource extraction and processing, especially 
in the first three quarters of the year. As conditions have 
become increasingly challenging, many countries of the 
region have taken steps to diversify their FDI priority 
areas, in order to maintain and augment their presence in 
the international economy. In particular, strenuous efforts 
are being made to develop offshore business services 
and the new integrated hotel and real estate complexes. 
Offshoring may not attract huge volumes of FDI, but 
it does create a number of benefits in terms of jobs, 
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training, technology transfer and assimilation and local 
business development. Large-scale tourism projects have 
helped to create economic activities in little-developed 
areas and seem to be reshaping business models in over-
exploited locations. They also provide an important 
source of employment for unskilled workers and have 
created interesting synergies between local and foreign 
businesses and investors. 
The increase in FDI flows into the region in recent 
years has been advantageous. Yet the potential benefits 
of this increase and of the greater presence of TNCs have 
not always been fully realized. Resource-seeking FDI has 
contributed to higher exports and has generated employment 
and fiscal revenue. TNCs in the natural-resource sector 
often continue to operate as enclaves in isolation from 
the domestic economy, however, with very limited local 
processing operations and risks in terms of pollution and 
environmental degradation.
Efficiency-seeking FDI in export sectors has helped to 
transform the industry in a number of economies, mainly 
in Mexico and some Caribbean Basin countries, by making 
their manufactures more internationally competitive. It 
also helps to transfer knowledge and technology and so 
contributes to enhancing human resources. But efficiency-
seeking FDI is not without its attendant difficulties. This 
type of investment can risk being trapped in low-value-
added activities, which generate few production linkages 
and are based on static comparative advantages (low cost) 
rather than on dynamic advantages (innovation) in the 
host economy. Scaling up the value chain of efficiency-
seeking FDI remains a challenge for the region.
Domestic-market-seeking FDI has fostered new 
economic activities in host economies, increasing local 
content, developing production linkages and local business 
and improving the standard of services. In the absence of 
sound institutions or in the presence of regulatory gaps, 
however, this type of FDI can lead to the crowding out of 
local companies or the production of goods and services 
that are uncompetitive on international markets. 
The strong FDI flows into the region in the last five 
years show that the volume of such investment does not in 
itself guarantee the realization of all the potential benefits 
of the presence of TNCs.
OFDI flows from the countries of the region have 
also continued to increase. As the trans-Latins have 
globalized, they have become more competitive, but this 
does not automatically feed through into industry-wide 
competitiveness or efficiency gains. The potential benefits 
of knowledge- or technology-transfer may be diluted by 
constraints on absorptive capacity.
All this indicates the need to formulate and 
implement policies that can increase the absorptive 
capacity of the region’s economies. So the key question 
is not only how much FDI is received, but what is 
achieved with it. As part of the response to the current 
economic crisis, the production capacities of domestic 
economies must be built up and strengthened in order to 
maximize the benefits not only of FDI, but also of these 
economies’ investment abroad. Taking full advantage 
of FDI flows and the presence of the TNCs making 
those investments may be one of the keys to increasing 
the share of technology- and knowledge-intensive 
sectors in the production structure. The realization 
of that potential depends heavily on the action of a 
production development policy that is strongly centred 
on innovation and local capacity-building.
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Chapter I
Foreign direct investment and transnational 
corporations in Latin America and  
the Caribbean
A.  Introduction
Foreign direct investment (FDI) levels in Latin America and the Caribbean reached US$ 128.301 
billion in 2008, 13% above the record volume posted in 2007. This was a notable result 
considering that the international financial and economic crisis triggered a 15% contraction of 
FDI flows worldwide. FDI in the region did not escape the crisis unscathed, however: growth 
in FDI in 2008 was below the 52% rate witnessed the year before.
The resilience of FDI flows to the region is noteworthy, 
but the record high conceals marked differences at 
the subregional level. FDI to South America soared to 
US$ 89.862 billion in 2008, 24% higher than in the 
previous year. Brazil, with a 30% increase in FDI inflows, 
became the main FDI recipient in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and accounted for most of the increase 
recorded by the region as a whole. Meanwhile, FDI to 
Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean Basin fell 5% 
in comparison with 2007, to US$ 38.438 billion. Mexico 
remained the main recipient in this subregion, but its FDI 
inflows dropped 20% in relation to 2007.
The increase in FDI to South America was fuelled 
by two factors: commodity prices, which remained high 
through most of the year and attracted natural-resource-
seeking investment, and the solid economic growth of the 
subregion, which encouraged market-seeking investment. 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Colombia recorded the largest 
increases in FDI. In contrast, the recession in the United 
States had a direct negative impact on the economies of 
Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, because it removed the 
incentive for efficiency-seeking investors to set up export 
platforms in the subregion. The close ties between these 
economies and the United States market led to a slowdown 
in economic growth in the subregion, which also resulted 
in market-seeking FDI being less buoyant. 
On the other hand, the region’s outward investment 
flows continued to climb despite the financial crisis and 
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reached US$ 34.561 billion, which represented a 42% 
increase with respect to 2007. This was largely on account 
of the major investment plans of trans-Latin corporations 
which, in many cases, were executed in 2008, and to the 
fact that these companies’ investments in the natural-
resources sector are less sensitive to the current situation 
because they correspond to long-term projects. The largest 
investor in Latin America and the Caribbean was Brazil, 
which accounted for almost 60% of the region’s total 
outward investments in 2008.
Given the magnitude and spread of the international 
financial and economic crisis, this chapter examines 
the main effects of that crisis on current and future FDI 
flows to Latin America and the Caribbean. The chapter 
is divided into three sections: section B provides a 
broad overview of the situation of FDI worldwide to 
give a global context to the examination of FDI in Latin 
America and the Caribbean; section C examines how 
the countries of the region have fared as FDI recipients; 
and section D looks at how they have performed as 
foreign investors themselves. The analysis is based on 
balance-sheet data and information on the activities 
and strategies of the main transnational and regional 
corporations in Latin America and the Caribbean, the 
so-called trans-Latins. 
Figure I.1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: INWARD FOREIGN 
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Net flow of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates made on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a  The FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus disinvestments 
by foreign investors. The OFDI figures indicate outflows of direct investment by 
residents, minus disinvestments abroad by those investors. The FDI figures do not 
include flows received by the main financial centres of the Caribbean. The OFDI 
figures do not include flows originating in these financial centres. These figures are 
different from those contained in the editions of Economic Survey of Latin America 
and the Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America 
and the Caribbean published in August and December 2008, respectively, as the 
latter show the net balance of foreign investment, that is, direct investment in the 
reporting economy less outward foreign direct investment.
B.  An overview of investment flows worldwide
The global boom in FDI, which started in 2003 and 
peaked in 2007, was brought to a halt by the international 
financial and economic crisis (see figure I.2). In 2008, 
global FDI flows totalled US$ 1.7 trillion, a figure that, 
despite being 15% lower than in 2007, was still above 
the average for the previous five years.
What started out as a crisis in the United States 
real estate market in mid-2007 soon turned into an 
upheaval that shook the financial systems of most of 
the developed countries and exposed major cracks in 
the global financial market.
Increasing financial deregulation and a flurry of 
new instruments (such as mortgage-backed securities 
and collateralized debt obligations) encouraged a 
massive accumulation of financial assets supported by 
mounting levels of debt in the developed countries. For 
consumers, this meant that financing could be obtained 
to buy consumer goods, but the drop in share and 
housing prices slashed the value of their assets, which 
curtailed their purchasing power and drastically altered 
expectations. Companies reacted with measures to curb 
supply, which contributed to the slowdown in economic 
growth. Meanwhile, rising levels of debt (particularly 
off-balance-sheet debt) in certain financial institutions 
pushed leverage ratios to extraordinary highs in some 
cases. The deleveraging of these institutions widened the 
cracks that had appeared earlier in the financial system 
and tumbled several established financial institutions 
in the third quarter of 2008, which lead to the rapid 
evaporation of global liquidity. 
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Figure I.2
GLOBAL FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  





















































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2008. Transnational Corporations and 
the Infrastructure Challenge, Geneva, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.08.II.D.23; estimates for 2008 based on projections obtained from United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Assessing the Impact 
of the Current Financial and Economic Crisis in FDI Inflows, April 2009.
The crisis which had started in the developed countries 
gradually spread to the developing ones, both through 
the real economy (the slowdown in exports, the fall in 
commodity prices, the decline in remittances) and the 
financial market (less access to financing and at higher 
costs). And the crisis became a global one.1 
This gradual deterioration of the economic situation 
completely altered the outlook for FDI in 2008. The 
negative impact of the international crisis on FDI flows 
made itself felt in three ways: 
(1) Through the worsening of the prospects for economic 
growth, which is the single most determinant factor 
of FDI (Sauvant, 2008a). The present situation with 
its bleak growth prospects (see table I.1) has lowered 
the incentives to step up production capacity, which 
has triggered a sharp contraction in FDI flows. 
(2) Through the more limited access to resources to finance 
investments. The international crisis has limited access 
to financing in two ways: the contraction and increased 
cost of commercial credit is forcing companies to 
rely on their own resources to finance investments 
(Sauvant, 2008a); and the economic crisis is eroding 
corporate profits. This combination of factors has 
placed constraints on companies’ capacity to finance 
new investments or mergers and acquisitions with 
their own funds (UNCTAD, 2009).
1
 For a more detailed discussion of how the crisis was passed on 
to the developing and transition economies, see United Nations, 
2009, and for Latin America and the Caribbean in particular, see 
ECLAC (2008c).
Table I.1
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT GROWTH AND GROWTH PROSPECTS 
IN THE WORLD AND BY TYPE OF COUNTRY, 2007-2010
(Percentages)
2007 2008 2009 2010
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
World 5.2 3.2 -1.3 1.9
Advanced economies 2.7 0.9 -3.8 0.0
Emerging and developing economies 8.3 6.1 1.6 4.0
World Bank
World 3.7 2.5 -1.7 2.3
High-income countries 2.6 1.3 -2.9 1.6
Developing countries 7.9 6.3 2.1 4.4
United Nations
World 3.8 2.5 1.0 …
Developed economies 2.5 1.2 -0.5 …
Developing economies 7.2 5.9 4.6 …
Economies in transition 8.3 6.9 4.8 …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Update, 
Washington, D.C., 28 January 2009; United Nations, World Economic Situation 
and Prospects, New York, January 2009 and World Bank, “Global Economic 
Prospects 2009. Forecast Update March 30, 2009” [online] http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTGEP2009/Resources/5530448-1238466339289/GEP-update-
March30.pdf. and for 2007 and 2008, World Bank, Global Economic Prospects 
2009: Commodities at the Crossroads, Washington, D.C., December, 2008.
Note: The United Nations projection for 2009 reflects the base scenario. A more optimistic 
and a more pessimistic scenario are also taken into consideration. 
(3) By raising perceptions of risk and uncertainty. 
Companies have taken various measures (restructuring, 
divestment, plant closures, pay roll reductions) to 
prepare themselves for the possible turmoil ahead. 
One of these is to revise their investment plans. Many 
companies have postponed or suspended some of 
their investment projects.2 
On the other hand, in this context, certain factors 
could stimulate FDI:
(i)  the impact of the measures taken by countries to 
tackle the crisis;
(ii) asset prices might encourage mergers and aquisitions, 
and
(iii) the reestructuring of sectors and companies might 
require heavy new or additional pro-environment 
investment (for example, in the automobile and 
renewable energies sectors).
2
 For example, in the face of plummeting commodity prices and the 
turmoil in world markets, BHP Billiton (Australia) withdrew its bid 
for Rio Tinto (United Kingdom), and the mega-deal between the 
two companies is now on hold (Expansión, 2008). Another example 
in the mining sector was the withdrawal of the bid made by Xstrata 
(Switzerland, United Kingdom) for Lonmin (United Kingdom) on 
the grounds that it was having difficulty obtaining credit to finance 
the transaction (Financial Post, 2008). The world economic situation 
and its prospects led Samsung (Republic of Korea) to withdrew 
its US$ 5.9 billion takeover bid for SanDisk (United States), and 
Huawei (China) had to suspend the sale of its mobile devices unit 
after several possible buyers pulled out (New York Times, 2008). 
Other examples and their impact on Latin America are described 
in the next section.
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1.  The crisis is reducing foreign direct investment in the developed 
 countries and causing an uneven slowdown in flows to  
 developing and transition economies
Having been the epicentre of the financial crisis, the 
developed countries have been the worst hit by it: the 
slowdown in their economies meant that FDI inflows 
there fell 25% in 2008 with respect to the previous year. In 
comparison, FDI flows towards developing countries and 
transition economies increased 7% and 24%, respectively 
and reached a new record high. This was achieved thanks 
to high commodity prices, the solid economic performance 
of some of developing economies and the inertia of certain 
large investment projects which were already under way 
and were not suspended.
Although developed countries are still the largest 
recipients of global FDI, their share fell from 69% in 2007 
to 60% of world FDI flows in 2008, offset by the rise in 
the share of the developing and transition economies from 
31% to 40% over the same period. The share of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in global FDI increased from 
7% in 2007 to 8% in 2008 (see table I.2). The recipients 
of the most FDI among the developed countries in 2008 
were the United States, France and the United Kingdom, 
Table I.2
FLOW, GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION OF NET FDI INFLOWS IN THE WORLD, 
BY GROUPS OF RECIPIENT COUNTRIES, 2007-2008






2007 2008 a 2007 2008 a 2007 2008 a
World 1 940 900 1 658 500 38 -15 100 100
Developed countries 1 341 800 1 001 800 43 -25 69 60
Developing countries 512 200 549 100 24 7 26 33
Latin America and the Caribbean b 127 300 139 300 37 9 7 8
Africa 53 500 72 000 17 35 3 4
Asia and Oceania 331 400 337 800 21 2 17 20
South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth 
of Independent States 86 900 107 600 52 24 4 6
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
World Investment Report, 2008. Transnational Corporations and the Infrastructure Challenge, Geneva, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.II.D.23; estimates 
for 2008 are based on the projections obtained from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and 




 Includes financial centres.
while the main recipients among developing countries 
were the BRICs (Brazil, the Russian Federation, India 
and China) and Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of China. 
Inward FDI in developing and transition economies 
increased, but the international crisis curbed their growth 
also, albeit to different degrees in different regions. 
The extent of the slowdown depends on the economic 
vulnerability of each country or region and on how far 
the effects of the crisis have spread. 
In every region except Africa, FDI growth rates were 
lower than in 2007. FDI in the developing economies 
of Asia and Oceania grew only 2% with respect to the 
previous year, and although flows to the Asia-Pacific 
region rose slightly (6.4%), FDI to Western Asia fell by 
18.6% as a result of the slowdown in global demand for 
oil.3 FDI flows to Africa remained steady owing to the 
high commodity prices recorded during most of the year. 
Flows to Latin America and the Caribbean are analysed 
in greater detail in the next section.
3
 Western Asia includes: Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, 
Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, 
United Arab Emirates and Yemen.
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In terms of FDI as a proportion of GDP, the regions 
with the highest indicators were South-Eastern Europe, 
the Commonwealth of Independent States and Africa.4 
By the same measure, FDI in developing countries fell 
in relation to the previous year (see figure I.3).
Figure I.3
DEVELOPING REGIONS: INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT 













































Latin America and the Caribbean
Developing countries of Asia and Oceania
South-Eastern Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States
Africa
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2008. Transnational Corporations and 
the Infrastructure Challenge, Geneva, 2008. United Nations publication, 
Sales No. E.08.II.D.23; International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic 
Outlook, Washington, D.C., October 2008; estimates for 2008 are based 
on projections obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Assessing the Impact of the Current Financial and 
Economic Crisis in FDI Inflows, April 2009.
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions also provide 
an indication of how the current situation is affecting 
FDI flows. These transactions tend to follow the same 
pattern as total FDI flows and are one of the most common 
means that transnational corporations use to penetrate 
foreign markets. 
The volume of mergers and acquisitions announced 
in 2008 was well below the volume recorded in 2007, 
mainly due to the growing limitations on financing (see 
figure I.4). Announced cross-border transactions fell 
4
 The objective of this indicator (FDI/GDP) is to normalize FDI figures 
according to the size of the economy. It has several flaws, however: 
given that the GDP figures used are based on current prices, some 
factors, such as inflation or exchange rate fluctuations, can have 
a strong effect on the FDI/GDP ratio, which makes it difficult to 
compare one period or one region with another. 
27% in number and 40% in value with respect to the 
previous year. National mergers and acquisitions (between 
companies in the same country), meanwhile, fell 24% in 
number and 36% in volume.5 This decline may signal 
the end of what could be considered the sixth wave of 
mergers and acquisitions (see box I.1).
Figure I.4





























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Bloomberg.
a
 The data on mergers and acquisitions refer to concluded or pending operations 
announced each year. Bloomberg does not report on the value of all the transactions; 
the aggregated data therefore only correspond to transactions whose values are 
made public.
It should be noted that the financial crisis triggered a 
major drop in share prices and consequently in the value 
of companies’ assets. This makes the same merger or 
acquisition worth less in monetary terms than before the 
crisis, which means that FDI in cross-border transactions 
also declines in value terms during the crisis. 
Despite the world economic situation, several large 
transactions announced prior to the crisis did still go 
ahead in 2008. A list of the cross-border transactions 
involving amounts above US$10 billion that were 
announced or concluded in 2008 is provided in table 
I.A-1 of the annex.
5
 Information based on Bloomberg. The value of all the transactions 
was not given; the aggregated data therefore corresponds only to 
transactions for which this information was available. 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Martine Lipton, Merger Waves in the 19th, 20th and 21st Centuries. The Davies 
Lecture, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 14 September 2006, and F.M. Scherer and D. Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990.
2.  The developed countries continue to be the main source of FDI,  
 but developing and transition economies are increasing  
 their share
Box I.1
THE END OF ANOTHER WAVE OF MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS
Economists and historians generally identify 
five waves of mergers and acquisitions.
The first wave (1887-1904) led to the 
creation of the principal steel, telephone, oil 
and other giants of the manufacturing and 
transportation industries in the United States. 
The main motivation of companies during 
this wave was to monopolize markets.
The second wave (1916-1929), which 
ended with the 1929 stock market crash 
and the Great Depression, saw further 
consolidation in the industries involved in 
the first wave, as well as mergers leading to 
greater market concentrations and between 
companies seeking greater diversification 
or vertical integration. The major United 
States automobile manufacturers emerged 
during this period. 
The third wave (the 1960s) involved 
diversification and the creation of conglo-
merates. Companies such as IT&T, LTV and 
Litton were created during this period. Those 
companies that diversified, however, never 
reaped the benefits of this process.
The fourth wave (the 1980s) was 
mainly characterized by hostile takeovers, 
junk bond financing and the increase in 
the volume and size of leveraged buyouts. 
This wave ended with the leveraged buyout 
of RJR Nabisco, the collapse of the junk 
bond market and serious capital and 
credit portfolio problems in commercial 
banks. Towards the end of the 1980s, 
European companies sought to prepare 
for the European Common Market through 
cross-border horizontal mergers. 
The fifth wave (1993-2000) is known as 
the era of the mega-deal. During this period 
companies of unprecedented global size 
and scale were created. The widespread 
belief that size was key to competing 
in global markets motivated mergers 
between such companies as Chrysler and 
Daimler-Benz, Exxon and Mobil, Boeing 
and McDonnell Douglas, as well as AOL 
and Time Warner. At the beginning of the 
new millennium, however, the bursting of 
the dot-com bubble, the fall of Nasdaq, 
the tightening of banking standards on 
issuing credit and the fact that merger 
announcements were not well received by 
the stock markets put an end to the fifth 
wave of mergers and acquisitions.
The sixth wave (2003-2007) saw 
record numbers of cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. This wave was spurred by 
sustained global economic growth, pressure 
on transnational firms to improve their 
competitiveness through the acquisition 
of foreign companies, globalization, the 
availability of low-cost financing, the rise 
in commodity prices, increased hedge 
fund activity and notable growth of private 
equity funds.
In economic literature on the subject, 
particularly neoclassical works, waves of 
mergers and acquisitions are held to be 
the result of changes in the economic, 
technological or regulatory environment 
within an industry (Mitchell and Mulherin 
1996) which induces the large-scale 
reassignment of assets. These shocks 
alone, however, are not sufficient to produce 
a merger wave. Capital must be available 
and there must be fewer restrictions on 
financing for changes to become a wave 
(Harford, 2004).
The current financial crisis, uncertainty 
and lack of liquidity have been negative 
factors which slowed the process of 
mergers and acquisitions both domestically 
and internationally in 2008. This could 
signal the end of the wave that began 
only five years ago. 
The developed countries, spearheaded by the United 
States, continue to be the main sources of FDI. Their 
investments have accounted for between 80% and 
90% of total outward FDI in the last two decades (see 
figure I.5).
The volume of outward FDI originating from 
developing and transition economies has continued to 
climb, however. In the 1990s, this upward trend remained 
constant, driven by buoyant outward FDI flows from Asia. 
After being brought to an abrupt halt by the Asian crisis 
in 1998, FDI from developing and transition economies 
picked up again in 2003 and grew steadily to reach a 
historic high in 2008, once more thanks to FDI from 
Asia, in particular from China and Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region of China, which have accounted 
for over half the FDI flowing out of Asia over the last 
five years.
Figure I.5
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND ECONOMIES 













































Developed countries Developing countries and economies in transition
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD), World Investment Report, 2008. Transnational Corporations and 
the Infrastructure Challenge, Geneva, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales 
No. E.08.II.D.23; estimates for 2008 based on projections of the Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Rio Tinto, whose debts are estimated at around US$ 40 
billion. China Minmetals tendered a bid of US$ 17 billion 
for the Australian firm OZ minerals, which also has debt 
problems (The Economist, 2009b and 2009c).
Sovereign wealth funds are another significant source 
of financing originating from developing countries and 
they have a large potential to generate FDI.7 These funds 
have an estimated value of US$ 5 trillion in assets. Only 
0.2% of this amount (US$ 10 billion), however, is allocated 
to what could be considered FDI (UNCTAD, 2008a).8 
Some recent changes in the developed countries’ national 
policies have made the investment climate less friendly, 
especially towards certain mergers and acquisitions and 
sovereign wealth funds (Sauvant, 2008a y 2008b).9 The 
possibility of transnational corporations from emerging 
economies and sovereign wealth funds playing a larger 
role as investors in developed countries will depend not 
only on their skills and strategies, but also on the openness 
of the receiving countries. 
7
 Sovereign wealth funds are investment funds that are financed by the 
accumulation of international reserves that are managed separately 
from official reserves handled by the country’s monetary authorities. 
They are directly or indirectly managed by Governments, which 
has aroused concern in several recipient countries, leading some 
to establish ceilings and much more demanding review procedures 
for investments. Sovereign wealth funds are found in Chile, Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region of China, Kuwait, the Russian 
Federation, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela 
(Bolivarian Republic of).
8
 FDI implies a long-term relationship that reflects a lasting interest 
in a company located in a different economy than that of the foreign 
investor. 
9
 Several examples of this phenomenon have been cited in the press. 
In 2004, Lenovo acquired the computer division of IBM in an 
operation that aroused national security concerns in the United 
States based on fears that the deal would enable the company to 
transfer advanced technology to the Government of China. When 
the United States Department of State wanted to purchase Lenovo 
computers, it could only acquire those that would be used in what 
are considered non-classified situations. In 2006, DP World (United 
Arab Emirates) tried to buy six ports in the United States that were 
owned by P&O, and although the deal was initially approved by the 
Foreign Investment Committee, it was blocked for national security 
reasons during a second review by the United States Congress. For 
more details on these cases, see Goldstein (2008). 
Although cross-border mergers and acquisitions have 
declined, an analysis of the 100 largest operations in 2008 
shows that there was an increase in mergers undertaken 
by companies from developing countries and transition 
economies in industrialized countries. This could reflect 
the increasing international presence that transnational 
corporations from emerging economies are building, as 
well as the important role of FDI in mobilizing capital 
from the regions where capital abounds to the ones where 
capital has become relatively scarce during the economic 
crisis (OECD, 2008a).6 The more solid financial position 
of some companies from emerging economies has enabled 
them to inject capital into others that are facing greater 
financing constraints. Recent examples are the transactions 
carried out by Aluminium Corporation of China (Chinalco) 
and the Chinese mining firm China Minmetals. In one 
operation involving joint ventures in aluminium, copper 
and iron ore and the purchase of convertible bonds, 
Chinalco invested US$ 19.5 billion in the mining company
6
 This is also a result of how the crisis played out. First it affected 
the transnational corporations of the developed world and then 
the companies of the developing and transition economies whose 
financial situation had been boosted by high commodity prices, 
at least those that export commodities.
3.  FDI as a stabilizing influence on capital flows in times of crisis
FDI is still the most important source of financing for 
developing and transition economies and has proven to 
be the most resilient in the current context.
 Although in absolute terms FDI has increased 
over time, in relative terms, it has lost ground to other 
capital flows, such as portfolio investment flows and 
commercial bank funding (see figure I.6). The increase 
and diversification of capital inflows in developing 
countries has been unquestionably positive. The world 
economic crisis, however, caused a sharp contraction in 
portfolio investment and private lending, which suddenly 
cut off capital flows to developing countries (see box 
I.2). FDI might therefore have a stabilizing influence 
on those flows. 
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In short, global FDI shrank by 15% with respect 
to 2007. The worst hit were the developed countries, 
which saw their inward FDI flows fall by 25%. Flows 
towards developing and transition economies, on the 
other hand, increased 7% and 24%, respectively. FDI 
in Latin America and the Caribbean (including the 
financial centres) withstood the first onslaught of 
the economic crisis and actually rose 9%. Despite 
this positive performance, FDI flows are expected 
to subside in 2009 in the developing and transition 
economies unless the world economy starts to show 
signs of recovery. 
The following sections analyse the performance of 
Latin America and the Caribbean both as a recipient and 
as a source of foreign investment.
Box I.2
AN X-RAY OF CHANGE: COMPOSITION OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS 
TOWARDS DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2001-2008
Capital flows towards developing 
countries have increased significantly 
in recent years (from US$ 224 billion 
in 2001 to US$ 1.16 trillion in 2007 to 
then fall to US$ 727 billion in 2008 as 
a result of the global financial crisis). 
Although foreign direct investment (FDI) 
has been one of the most important 
sources of financing for developing 
countries, the composition of international 
capital flows has changed significantly 
in recent years. 
The proportion of FDI in total private 
capital inflows declined over the decade 
to less than 50%, while flows from 
portfolio investment and private lenders 
increased their prominence as sources 
of financing. With the unfolding of the 
world economic crisis, however, these 
latter flows, which are highly sensitive to 
changes in the global situation, contracted 
sharply. FDI flows, by contrast, remained 
extremely steady and even increased in 
absolute terms. 









2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
FDI inflows Portfolio investments
Commercial bank loans Offical flows
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of World Bank, Global Development Finance, Washington, D.C., 2009.
Figure I.6





















































Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) for 1990-2000 and from the World Bank, Global 
Development Finance, Washington, D.C., 2009, for 2001-2008.
a
 Defined as net liabilities with terms of over one year.
b
 The World Bank’s country classification scheme is used rather than the UNCTAD one 
because it includes the countries of Central and Eastern Europe among developing 
countries.
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2008 25
C.  FDI inflows and transnational corporations  
 in Latin America and the Caribbean
1.  Trends and characteristics of FDI flows to Latin America and  
 the Caribbean in 2008
Despite the international crisis, FDI flows to Latin America 
and the Caribbean continued to climb in 2008. Excluding 
the main financial centres,10 US$ 128.301 billion in FDI 
poured into the region, 13% more than the record high 
posted in 2007. In aggregate terms, despite the volatile 
global situation, FDI kept growing. This increase was not 
evenly distributed across the region, however. While the 
FDI received by South America rose 24% to US$ 89.862 
billion, the FDI received in Mexico and the Caribbean Basin11 
fell 5% to US$ 38.438 billion, basically as a result of the 
enormous drop in FDI flows to Mexico (see figure I.7).
Figure I.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT 






















































South America Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean Basin Total
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a 
 Excludes investment received by the main financial centres. These FDI figures differ 
from those published by ECLAC in the Economic Survey of Latin America and the 
Caribbean and the Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the 
Caribbean, published in August and December 2008, respectively, because those 
studies show the net balance of foreign investment, in other words, direct investment 
in the reporting economy (FDI) minus outward foreign direct investment (OFDI). The 
FDI figures indicate inflows of foreign direct investment, minus divestments (sales of 
assets) by foreign investors.
10
 The financial centres included Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, 
Cayman Islands and United States Virgin Islands.
11
 The Caribbean Basin includes the countries of Central America 
and the countries and territories of the Caribbean.
The different trends in FDI in these two subregions 
reflect the different effects that the international crisis has 
had on efficiency-seeking and natural-resource-seeking 
investments and how much the crisis has impacted each 
of the region’s countries.12 The strong ties that Mexico 
and the countries of the Caribbean Basin have with the 
United States economy explain the sharp fall in FDI to 
that subregion. The economic recession in the United 
States produced a slowdown in the activity of the export 
platforms that were mainly set up in the countries of this 
subregion to supply the United States market, and this had 
a negative impact on efficiency-seeking FDI. At the same 
time, the slowdown in the economies of the subregion 
itself deterred market-seeking investment. Meanwhile, 
the rise in FDI to South America was driven mostly by 
commodity prices, basically metal and hydrocarbon prices, 
which remained high for most of the year and attracted 
natural-resource-seeking investment.13 Robust economic 
growth in the subregion (5.5% compared with 2.5% 
worldwide) also boosted market-seeking FDI (United 
Nations, 2009). 
Analysis of inflows of individual countries show that 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico receive 
80% of the region’s FDI. 
Brazil accounts for the bulk of the rise in FDI in the 
region: FDI inflows in that country reached a new high of 
US$ 45.058 billion in 2008, 30% above the record posted 
in 2007. Of that, about 50% was in the natural-resources 
sector and natural-resource-based manufacturing,14 
mainly mining.15 These sectors also account for 80% 
of the increase in FDI in the country. Economic growth 
12
 For a detailed explanation of how the financial and economic crisis 
was transmitted to the region’s countries, see ECLAC (2008c).
13
 For a broader discussion of the factors behind the rise in commodity 
prices, see ECLAC (2008e).
14
 This includes primary activities, metallurgy, the production of 
petroleum derivatives, non-metallic mineral production and the 
paper and pulp sector.
15
 For further details on what triggered this boom in Brazil, see part 
(a) of section 2.
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(5.1%) and favourable demand indicators (employment 
rate, consumer confidence and retail sales) up to the 
third quarter of the year (Mesquita, 2008), fuelled the 
rise in market-seeking FDI, especially in the automobile, 
electronic, public services (telecommunications, electrical 
energy, water distribution and treatment, among others) 
and retail trade sectors. Nevertheless, growth in this type 
of FDI was not as buoyant as in natural-resource-seeking 
FDI. Other factors underpinning the continued rise in FDI 
in Brazil up to the end of 2008 despite the crisis are the 
large size of the domestic market, a lower dependence on 
exports than in other emerging economies and the lower 
exposure of the Brazilian banking system to the financial 
crisis (SOBEET, 2009). 
Table I.3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT INCOME BY RECEIVING COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, 1994-2008
(Millions of dollars and percentages)







South America 34 657 43 365 57 297 72 520 89 862 17 342 23.9%
Brazil 14 139 22 109 26 328 34 585 45 058 10 473 30%
Chile 4 051 4 936 10 552 14 457 16 787 2 330 16%
Colombia 2 784 2 068 7 907 9 049 10 564 1 515 17%
Argentina 6 529 8 075 5 874 6 462 7 979 1 517 23%
Peru b 2 620 1 477 3 413 5 343 4 079 -1 264 -24%
Uruguay 148 283 1 188 1 223 2 044 821 67%
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3 034 2 819 1 169 646 1 716 1 070 166%
Ecuador 624 871 554 193 974 781 404%
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 535 663 190 366 512 146 40%
Paraguay 193 64 124 196 150 -46 -24%
Mexico 11 034 20 374 22 616 27 278 21 950 -5 329 -19.5%
Central America 1 774 2 134 5 296 7 045 7 554 509 7.2%
Panama 708 565 1 756 1 907 2 402 495 26%
Costa Rica 417 545 1 372 1 896 2 016 120 6%
Honduras 79 320 705 816 888 73 9%
Guatemala 195 216 422 536 838 302 56%
El Salvador 240 256 684 1 509 784 -724 -48%
Nicaragua 135 232 357 382 626 244 64%
Caribbean 1 615 3 067 5 997 6 314 8 935 2 621 42%
Dominican Republic 368 980 1 605 1 579 2 885 1 306 83%
Trinidad and Tobago 580 751 1 231 c 830 2 500 c 1 670 201%
Bahamas 119 218 745 854 886 4 0%
Jamaica 207 562 769 c 867 810 c -56 -6%
Suriname -6 22 334 c 316 346 c 30 9%
Antigua and Barbuda 24 98 269 358 302 -56 -16%
Belize 33 31 138 148 189 42 28%
Saint Lucia 43 75 167 248 186 -62 -25%
Guyana 67 48 108 152 178 26 17%
Grenada 28 58 114 186 147 -39 -21%
Barbados 14 26 104 c 233 133 c -100 -43%
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 60 41 87 119 97 -21 -18%
Saint Kitts and Nevis 25 81 106 164 94 -70 -43%
Anguilla 22 38 113 120 90 -30 -25%
Dominica 24 22 42 61 60 -1 -1%
Haiti 5 13 59 75 30 -45 -60%
Montserrat 3 3 3 6 2 -4 -68%
Total 49 080 68 939 91 207 113 157 128 301 15 144 13.4%
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a
 Annual averages. 
b
 Figures based on the balance of inward and outward foreign direct investment published by the Central Bank of Peru.
c
 Estimates of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Mexico, the second largest recipient of FDI in the 
region, was hit hard by the crisis and saw its FDI inflows 
fall 20% from 2007 to US$ 21.950 billion in 2008. 
Much of this drop can be attributed to the decline in FDI 
in the services sector, where FDI fell by 16%, and the 
manufacturing sector, where FDI fell by close to 50%, 
especially in activities geared towards producing exports 
for the United States market. 
FDI flows to Central America remained stable, 
increasing 7% to US$ 7.554 billion. Costa Rica and 
Panama were the main recipients. El Salvador was the 
worst-hit. FDI in the country plummeted 48% with 
respect to the previous year to US$ 784 million. This 
drop should be analysed in context, however; acquisitions 
in the banking sector in 2007 generated an unusually 
high level of FDI, and the volume received in 2008 
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represented the second largest amount ever observed 
in the country.
In the Caribbean, FDI rose 42% to US$ 8.935 
billion. FDI shrank in most countries in the subregion, 
but this decline was offset by the increases recorded in 
the Dominican Republic and Trinidad and Tobago. In the 
Dominican Republic, FDI soared 83% to reach US$ 2.885 
billion. This was largely on account of FDI in the trade 
and industry, telecommunications and mining sectors. The 
mining sector in fact received the largest investment ever 
made in the country: US$ 3 billion dollars in the Barrick 
Gold project. This offset waning investment in tourism 
and real estate development, which have been the main 
sources of FDI in the past few years (see chapter III). In 
Trinidad and Tobago, FDI is estimated to have increased 
by 200% to about US$ 2.5 billion thanks to Royal Bank 
of Canada’s buy-out of RBTT Financial Holdings Limited 
in what has been one of the largest transactions in the 
region (see box I.A-7 in the annex).
In South America, the increase in FDI flows to 
Argentina, Chile and Colombia was strongly driven by 
the rise in natural-resource-seeking FDI, especially in 
the mining industry in Chile and Colombia. In Chile, 
most of the growth in FDI can be attributed to mining 
investments, most notably, the purchase by the Japanese 
group Marubeni of a 30% stake in the La Esperanza mine 
owned by Antofagasta Minerals, for US$ 1.3 billion. 
Investments in the natural-resources sector, especially 
in petroleum and mining activities, accounted for 54% 
of FDI in Colombia. In Argentina, major investments 
were announced in the mining and hydrocarbons sector, 
with the Spanish firm Repsol YPF leading the way, while 
General Electric concluded its purchase of Hidryl from 
the Argentine firm Tenaris, which is part of the Techint 
group, for US$ 1.15 billion.16 Foreign corporations also 
showed interest in the country’s telecommunications 
sector, with Telefónica (Spain), Telecom (Italy) and 
Claro (owned by the Mexican company América 
Móvil) announcing large investments. The countries 
that recorded the largest relative increase in FDI were 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and Ecuador. In 
the case of Ecuador, approximately 80% of the rise 
was generated by investments in the transportation, 
warehousing and communications sectors, mainly 
those made by América Móvil and Telefónica, which 
offset the decline in FDI in the natural-resources and 
public services sectors (electricity, water and gas). 
Although FDI expanded in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (mainly in services), major divestments also 
16
 See the Investment and Enterprise Observatory Programme, National 
Investment Promotion Agency of Argentina (ProsperAr) [online] 
at http://www.prosperar.gov.ar/home.php?page=programas_10.
took place in one of this economy’s most important 
sectors, the hydrocarbon industry, in the face of a rising 
risk of nationalization, the sword of Damocles that 
hangs over transnational corporations operating in the 
country.17 FDI flows to Peru, on the other hand, fell 
24% to US$ 4.079 billion, largely owing to the loans 
that subsidiaries made to their parent countries during 
the fourth quarter of the year (BCRP, 2009).18
One aspect of the study of investment flows in 
the region that could be improved is the production of 
statistics on the sectoral distribution of FDI. At present 
some countries do not report FDI by sector, which limits 
the analysis of the effect of FDI on the productive sectors 
of the economy. 
Figure I.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: DISTRIBUTION OF 








1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Natural resources Manufacturing Services Other
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a
 The data for the Plurinational State of Bolivia represent net flows as it is not known 
in which sectors the divestments carried out by the Central Bank occurred. 
According to the data available, the economic 
crisis did not substantially alter the sectoral distribution 
pattern of FDI in 2008. FDI in services still accounts 
for the largest proportion of FDI in the region, although 
over the last year, investments in natural resources have 
climbed just as investment in manufacturing has fallen 
(see figure I.8). For more information on the sectoral 
distribution of FDI by country, see the tables in annex 
I.A-2. Most FDI in South America, especially in Brazil, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) and Colombia, continued 
to be in the natural-resources sectors, while FDI in 
manufacturing continued to predominate in Mexico and 
17
 For more information on these sectors in the countries mentioned, 
see part (a) of section 3.
18
 The FDI figures reported by Peru are net figures, in other words, 
direct investment in the declaring economy less direct investment 
abroad, which means that the decline is also the result of the increase 
in Peruvian companies’ investment abroad.
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the Caribbean Basin countries. Heavy worldwide demand 
for natural resources meant that large investments were 
made in the primary sector of the economies that are 
more manufacturing-oriented. The Canadian company 
Baja Mining Corp. and a consortium of Asian firms, for 
example, invested in El Boleo, one of the largest mining 
projects in Mexico, and another Canadian company, 
Barrick Gold, spearheaded the largest investment ever 
in the history of the Dominican Republic.
Another way to examine the dynamics of foreign 
capital flows by sector is to analyse the composition 
of the sales of the 500 largest non-financial companies 
operating in the region. Immediately prior to the crisis, 
transnational corporations accounted for 29% of sales, 
slightly above the 26% share recorded in 2006 (see figure 
I.9). The market share of transnational corporations varies 
from sector to sector: they account for 13% of sales in the 
primary sector, 31% in services and 42% in manufacturing. 
This represents an increase in all sectors since 2006: from 
6% to 13% in the primary sector, 29% to 31% in services 
and 37% to 42% in manufacturing. 
Figure I.9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SALES OF THE 500 





























































Transnational corporations State companies Local private companies
Primary sector Manufacturing ServicesTotal
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of the América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2008.
Figure I.10 shows the sectoral distribution of the 
largest transnational corporations in the region just before 
the financial crisis broke out. 
Total sales by the largest transnational corporations 
in the region are distributed as follows: 52% in the 
manufacturing sector, 36% in services and only 12% in 
the primary sector (see figure I.10). The low proportion of 
sales in the primary sector is the result of the predominance 
of State companies in the hydrocarbon industry. The 
large proportion of sales in manufacturing and services 
accounted for by transnationals, however, shows that 
these are the sectors that are most likely to receive FDI 
in the region. For more information on the 60 largest non-
financial transnational corporations in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, see table I.A-5 of the annex.
Figure I.10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: SECTORAL 

























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information provided by the Special Studies and Projects Department 
of the América economía magazine, Santiago, Chile, 2008.
By country of origin, the United States continues to 
be the region’s largest source of FDI, followed by Spain, 
Canada, the Netherlands and Japan (see figure I.11). The 
increase in FDI from Canada and Japan, driven by natural-
resource-seeking investment, is especially noteworthy. For 
more details on the geografic origin of FDI by country, 
see table I.A-3 in the annex.
Figure I.11














2007 2008 1999-2003 2004-2008
United States Spain
Canada Netherlands
Japan Latin America and the Caribbean 
(excluding the financial centres)Financial centres of 
the Caribbean Other countries
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
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The countries of the Caribbean, and of the Eastern 
Caribbean Currency Union in particular, have the highest 
FDI/GDP ratios, which reflects how important FDI is as a 
source of financing in these countries. The average FDI/
GDP ratio in the subregion in 2008 was 3.4%, slightly 
below the 3.6% ratio recorded in 2007 (see figure I.12).
Figure I.12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
RATIO BETWEEN NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT  
INCOME AND GDP, 2008 a
(Percentages)





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a
 The ratio shown in the figure is obtained on the basis of each year’s FDI and the 
three-year moving average of GDP for each country. 
Finally, as mentioned in the previous section, cross-
border mergers and acquisitions constitute a indicator of 
FDI trends complementary to the information obtained 
from central bank data. Cross-border transactions in 
the region increased almost hand in hand with FDI. 
Despite slowing down at the global level, the pace of 
mergers and acquisitions did not slacken in the region. 
In fact, the operations concluded up to November 2008 
amounted to US$ 119 billion, more than the US$ 110 
million recorded in the same period the previous year 
(Latin Finance, 2008). 
The largest operations undertaken in 2008 in the 
financial and mining sectors include: the acquisition of 
Iron X from the Brazilian company MMX by the United 
Kingdom firm Anglo American for US$ 1.923 billion; 
the purchase of a 40% stake in Namisa, a subsidiary 
of the Brazilian firm Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN), by a consortium of firms from Japan and the 
Republic of Korea for US$ 3.008 billion; the acquisition 
of a 20% holding in Grupo Financiero Inbursa, by 
the Spanish company La Caixa Corp., for US$ 2.469 
billion; and the purchase of the largest financial group 
in Trinidad and Tobago, RBBT Financial Holdings 
Limited, by Royal Bank of Canada for US$ 2.187 
billion. For a list of the largest transactions carried out 
in Latin America and the Caribbean in 2008 see table 
I.A-7 of the annex.
Box I.3
INVESTMENT PATTERNS IN THE COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN CARIBBEAN CURRENCY UNION (ECCU)
The Eastern Caribbean Currency Union 
(ECCU) is made up of eight economies: 
Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, 
Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, 
Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines. Although the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) received by these countries 
is relatively low when compared with FDI 
to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin, it 
represents a larger proportion of GDP. 
FDI to the ECCU has increased 
significantly since 2004. It peaked in 2007 
and then fell in 2008 to US$ 978 million. 
For 2000-2008 statistics are available 
on country of origin for only 42% of all 
investments received. This information 
suggests that the United States is the 
largest investor (23%), followed by the 
United Kingdom (13%) and the Caribbean 
countries (5%). 
In terms of sectoral composition, 
tourism is the main focus of FDI. In the last 
three years, the sector has received more 
than 50% of all FDI entering ECCU.
In short, FDI in the region increased 
on account of the rise in flows to South 
America and to Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Colombia in particular. This offset the 
fall in FDI to Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin countries. The contrasting situations 
are explained by the patterns of FDI 
inflows in each subregion and the fact 
that the international crisis has affected 
the different types of FDI in different 
ways. The next section examines the 
impact of the economic crisis on the 
different types of investment and on the 
strategies of some of the largest investors 
in the region.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)30
Box I.3 (concluded)
FLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT TO THE EASTERN 










2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Capital Reinvestments Land sales Others
Note:  The investment categories shown are those used by the Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank. The land sales category may include FDI in the tourism or 
real estate sectors.
2.  Effects of the crisis on corporate strategy
FDI flows are the result of the actions and strategies adopted 
by investors. Therefore, in order to understand the dynamics 
of FDI in the present situation, it is essential to understand 
how the international crisis has affected the engines that 
drive each type of investment. Foreign direct investment 
analyses usually classify investment into four categories 
according to the motives or strategies of the investor: 
(1) natural-resource-seeking investment, which taps natural 
resources in third countries; (2) market-seeking investment, 
which produces and sells products and services in local or 
regional markets; (3) efficiency-seeking investment, which 
produces goods at low cost for export to other markets; 
and (4) strategic-asset-seeking investment, which pursues 
access to certain assets, such as knowledge, cutting-edge 
technology or skilled human resources (ECLAC, 2004, 
on the basis of Dunning, 1993). Only the first three types 
of FDI will be examined in this section as strategic-asset-
seeking FDI flows are minimal in the region. 
Market-seeking FDI is highly important throughout 
the region and especially so in the countries with large 
domestic markets. Natural-resource-seeking FDI still 
continues to account for the largest proportion of FDI in 
South America, while efficiency-seeking FDI has more 
weight in FDI flows to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
countries. Each of these types of FDI has been affected 
in different ways by the crisis.
(a) Foreign direct investment in natural resources
Natural-resource-seeking FDI remained buoyant in 
the region despite the drop in commodity prices in the 
second half of 2008 (see figure I.13). Mining projects take 
time to bear fruit and investments in the sector therefore 
tend to focus on the long term. This makes natural-
resource-seeking investment less sensitive to changes in 
circumstances than efficiency- or market-seeking FDI.
The effects of the international crisis and the fall 
in commodity prices are beginning to resonate in the 
sector, however, and some companies have already 
cut back production, laid off workers and postponed 
investment projects. After a period of robust expansion, 
the firms operating in the natural resources sector are 
now cautiously revising their plans and adjusting their 
investment strategies (ECLAC, 2008a). 














2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Tourism Manufacturing Others
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data provided by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank.
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Figure I.13
HIDROCARBONS PRICE INDEX AND MINERALS AND METALS  
PRICE INDEX, 2004-2008





























































































































Minerals and metals Hydrocarbons
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates made on the basis of official figures.
Note:  The price index for both sectors is calculated on the basis of the region’s main 
exports in these sectors. In the case of energy, the basket includes crude oil, 
petroleum derivatives, coal and natural gas, and in the case of minerals and 
metals, it includes steel, copper, iron, aluminium, silver, zinc, tin, nickel, lead 
and gold.
(i) Mining
Investment in mining in the region was still forthcoming 
in 2008, but mainly in South America. As a result of the 
consolidation witnessed in the industry over the last few 
years, the large mining companies continued to pursue 
expansion strategies in 2008. The goal has been to attain 
economies of scale and scope and to ensure availability 
of, and access to, the minerals that constitute the basis 
of their net worth (ECLAC, 2008a). Barrick Gold (of 
Canada) and Gold Fields (of South Africa), for example, 
invested in their gold mines in the Dominican Republic 
and Peru, and Rusoro Mining acquired assets owned by 
Hecla Mining Co. in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
to take advantage of regional synergies. 
The relatively low volatility and high price of iron ore 
in comparison with other products (see figure I.14) spurred 
FDI especially in Brazil, which has large iron deposits. 
In the first half of 2008, Rio Tinto (United Kingdom/
Australia)announced plans to expand for its La Corumba 
mine, and the United Kingdom firm Anglo-American 
purchased the Brazilian firm Iron X (of the MMX group) 
to broaden its iron ore operations in the country. 
The price of iron ore was kept high by huge demand 
in the manufacturing industry during the economic boom 
that lasted through 2007 and into the beginning of 2008. 
Iron and steel companies pursued vertical integration with 
the mining sector to ensure themselves a steady supply 
of the inputs they need. The Argentine firm Technint, for 
example, announced plans to invest in the development of 
its iron and tin deposits in Mexico. Arcelor Mittal (India/
Luxembourg) bought the assets of London Mining, an iron 
ore producer, in Brazil in 2008. A consortium of companies 
from Japan and the Republic of Korea acquired a 40% 
stake in the mining arm of Compañía Siderúrgica Nacional 
(CSN) of Brazil (see table I.A-7 for details).19 Together 
with its balance-of-payments figures, these actions show 
that Brazil has become the epicentre of the global trends 
under way in the region’s industrial sector.
19
 This is one of the large transactions underpinning the high level of 
FDI recorded in Brazil in the last quarter of 2008.
Figure I.14
PRICE INDEX OF SELECTED MINERALS AND METALS, 2004-2008
(Base price index 2000=100)





































































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates made on the basis of official figures.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)32
Since demand for basic products has fallen, however, 
and the financial crisis has hampered access to credit, 
transnational corporations have scaled back their investment 
plans, even in iron ore. At the beginning of 2009, Anglo-
American announced a 50% cut in its expansion plans, 
which will almost undoubtedly affect its projects in Brazil 
and Chile. Rio Tinto announced the postponement of its 
US$ 2 billion expansion plan for the La Corumba mine, 
which has brought associated logistics projects, such as 
the iron-ore port in Uruguay, to a halt. Rio Tinto’s huge 
debts pose another obstacle to its expansion plans (Reuters, 
2009c, Times On Line, 2008a y 2008b).20
Meanwhile, the drop in copper prices has triggered 
vast changes in strategy in transnational corporations 
operating in this segment, at least in the short term, 
mainly in Chile, Mexico and Peru. The impact in Chile 
has been huge: US$ 12 billion in projects have been 
postponed or suspended (La Tercera, 2009a). One of the 
most significant cases was the postponement by Australian 
firm BHP Billiton of its US$ 6.7 billion expansion project 
at La Escondida, the largest private copper mine in 
Chile (Business Latin America, 2009). Two other major 
projects will also be delayed: Inca Pacific of Canada has 
halted its copper mining operations at El Magistral in 
Peru, and Baja Mining has put its announced US$ 911 
million investment in copper, cobalt, magnesium and 
zinc mining on hold in Mexico. Similar reactions have 
been observed in other segments, for example, one of 
the world’s leading gold mining companies, Newmont 
(United States) has stated that its Minas Congas project 
in Peru is now under review (América economía, 2008a 
and 2008b; Reuters, 2008a).
Investment in the mining sector maintained its 
momentum in 2008, but lower demand and prices caused 
leading mining enterprises to revise their investment plans 
towards the end of 2008 and in early 2009. Even then, given 
the time it takes for mining projects to come to fruition, 
companies are proceeding with caution so as to still be able 
to react quickly to a rise in demand once the crisis is over. 
Investment in the sector will therefore continue, but at a 
slower pace, and access to financing will become a vital 
factor and play a major role in corporate decisions in 2009. 
Against a backdrop of falling prices, restricted financing, an 
economic slowdown and growing uncertainty, companies 
have halted or postponed new projects and expansions 
and found themselves forced to adjust their operations by 
cutting back operations or laying off workers.
20
  Rio Tinto obtained a loan of US$ 40 billion to buy Alcan in 2007 
and will have to pay US$ 8.9 billion in the first nine months of 
2009 to cover the first part of the loan (Times Online, 2008a).
(ii)  Hydrocarbons
In 2008, the wealth of resources in the region continued 
to attract FDI in the hydrocarbon sector although not to 
the same extent as in the mining sector. This is largely 
due to the strong presence of local State-owned oil 
companies, especially in the countries with the largest 
reserves, which sometimes limits the participation of 
transnational corporations.21 Investment in the sector 
was buoyant worldwide in 2008, with exploration and 
production companies investing an estimated US$ 96.2 
billion in the sector, 47% more than in 2007. As in the 
mining sector, however, the financial crisis and the drastic 
plunge in oil prices (see figure I.13) forced firms to revise 
their budgets and drilling plans at the end of 2008 and 
beginning of 2009 (Global Markets Direct, 2008).
As Colombia is one of the most open countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean as far as foreign investment in 
the energy sector is concerned, it is also the one to receive 
the highest proportion of FDI in the hydrocarbons sector: 
over US$ 3 billion in 2008, which represented 35% of 
total FDI in the country. The largest transaction was the 
acquisition of the Colombian firm Kappa Energy Holdings 
by the Canadian enterprise Pacific Rubiales. The Spanish fuel 
distributor Compañía Española de Petróleos, SA (CEPSA) 
bought the 70% block of the Caracara field from Houston 
American Energy. Although this transaction was between 
two foreign companies, it reflects the strategy adopted by 
CEPSA to move ahead with secondary production and ensure 
access to its basic input (América economía, 2008n). The 
Swiss company Glencore meanwhile announced a gradual 
increase in its investments at its Cartagena refinery from 
US$ 600 million to US$ 3 billion (Proexport, 2008c).
Some of the trends observed in 2007 lasted into 
2008, such as the sale of assets to channel investment into 
other exploration projects and the arrival of companies 
from emerging economies outside the region. The United 
States firm Anardarko, for example, sold its holdings in 
the El Peregrino field in Brazil to the Norwegian company 
StatoilHydro so as to redirect its resources towards its projects 
in the Gulf of Mexico and Ghana (Offshore, 2008) and 
the Indian firm Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) 
bought a 40% stake in the San Cristóbal field of Petróleos 
de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela.22 The region’s large State oil companies, 
21
 In Latin America and the Caribbean, the weight of State companies 
in the hydrocarbons sector is noticeable: 80% of the sales of the 
largest companies in the region correspond to State enterprises. In 
Brazil, despite investment-conducive regulations, the predominance 
of Petrobras has been seen as an obstacle to the entry of transnational 
corporations in the hydrocarbons sector (ECLAC, 2008a).
22
 The amount of the Anadarko-StatoilHydro operation was US$ 1.8 
billion, while the transaction between ONGC and PDVSA came 
to US$ 480 million.
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Petrobras and PDVSA, meanwhile continued their regional 
expansion, as analysed in part 2 of section D. 
Transnational corporations remained interested in the 
region despite the fact that they play a smaller role than the 
State companies. Corporations such as British Petroleum 
(BP), Chevron, Shell and StatoilHydro participated in the 
bidding process for the Carabobo block in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, and British Gas (BG), Exxon, 
Hesp, Petrogal, Repsol and Royal Dutch Shell tendered 
bids for the findings in the Santos basin in Brazil (América 
economía, 2008c and 2008d).
The interest of the large transnationals may wane, 
however, in the face of plunging oil prices and the risk of 
subsequent changes in fiscal terms and conditions. The 
nationalization processes and threats that transnationals 
have faced in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia have triggered 
major disputes. Conoco Phillips and ExxonMobil have 
initiated arbitration proceedings against the Government 
of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela regarding the 
nationalization of their Venezuelan assets, for example.23 As 
far as the withdrawal of FDI from the sector is concerned, 
the most notable case has been the purchase of 15% of 
YPF from the Spanish corporation Repsol by the Petersen 
group of Argentina for US$ 2.235 billion. 
On the regulatory front, one of the most notable changes 
was the reform of the energy sector in Mexico which aims to 
revitalize the State monopoly Petróleos de México (Pemex). 
Foreign investors are still not allowed to participate in the 
exploitation of the deepwater reserves in the Gulf of Mexico 
or in the construction and administration of refineries, but 
they can now bid for exploration and drilling contracts as 
subcontractors in specific parts of Mexico (Time, 2008). 
FDI continued to pour into the hydrocarbons sector in 
2008, although the flows were far smaller than in mining. 
The strong presence of State companies and legislative 
restrictions limit the participation of transnational 
corporations in the sector. Even in Mexico, where reforms 
were introduced, the participation of foreign enterprises is 
restricted to a few activities. As shown in part 2 of section 
D, the most active companies in the hydrocarbons sector 
are still Petrobras and PDVSA.
(iii) Renewable energies
High oil prices and growing environmental concerns 
have generated considerable interest in the renewable solar, 
wind, geothermic and biomass energies. The region has 
23
 Other major nationalization processes this year in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela were the nationalization of Banco de 
Venezuela, the affiliate of the Spanish Santander banking group, 
and the expropriation of the assets of the Mexican firm Cemex 
(América economía, 2008f).
agro-climatic features that make it attractive to investment 
in this sector, and although FDI flows have been relatively 
scarce so far, they are still arriving. The British firm Leaf 
Clean Energy, for example, bought the Mexican company 
Energía Escalona, while the United States corporation 
Energy Quest purchased the Chilean firm Etanol del 
Pacífico Sur. The Spanish company GreenFuel has 
announced plans to build a biodiesel plant in Argentina. 
Eight countries together invested approximately US$ 480 
million in the Peruvian ethanol industry.
Brazil has sparked the most interest thanks to its agro-
climatic conditions and its leading position in the renewable 
energy sector, especially in the production of liquid biofuels. 
The firm Destilaria Guaricanga was bought out by Infinity 
Bio-Energy (United Kingdom), Ventania by Martifer 
Renewables (Portugal), Koblitz by AREVA (France), Santa 
Elisa Valley by Amyris Biotechnology (United States), and 
Glep Energias Renovaives by Conduit Capital Partners 
(United States). AES Corporation (United States) acquired a 
power plant in the country. The biofuels market is expected 
to grow faster in Brazil than elsewhere in the region thanks 
to Government policies. The development of the biofuels 
market and the maximization of the opportunities it offers 
in and outside Brazil is one of the key strategies of the 
energy giant Petrobras (PETROBRAS, 2008). Cosan, the 
largest sugar and ethanol producer in the country, acquired 
ExxonMobil’s service and distribution centres in Brazil for 
US$ 989 million with a view to ensuring a distribution channel 
for its ethanol production (Herald Tribune, 2008).
The region’s potential in the wind energy segment 
has resulted in several major investments: most notably 
the US$ 1 billion investment in the Talinay wind farm in 
Chile announced by the Spanish company Enhol and the 
joint venture between the Irish firm Mainstream Renewable 
Power and the Chilean enterprise Andes Energy, which 
plans to invest US$ 1.3 billion in the construction of wind 
farms in the country (Business Latin America, 2008g and 
El Mercurio, 2008). The Spanish firm Endesa also invested 
in 2007 in the construction of the El Canela wind farm in 
Chile, which is still expanding. At the beginning of 2009, 
Mexico inaugurated the first phase of the largest wind 
farm project in Latin America, which is a joint venture 
being carried out by the Mexican firm Cemex and the 
Spanish firm Iberdrola, which invested about US$ 500 
million in the project (OEM, 2009). 
However, investment prospects in this sector may be 
severely affected by the sharp drop in the oil price.24 One 
24
 The Economist Intelligence Unit projects the average oil price in 2009 to 
be US$ 35 per barrel, well below the levels recorded in 2008 (Business 
Latin America, 2009). The prices of oil and other products, such as 
grains, edible oils and sugar, play a huge role in decision-making in 
biodiesel and bioethanol production. However, rises (or falls) in the 
oil price can trigger rises (or falls) in the price of inputs and hence 
alter the costs of biofuel production (Razo and others, 2007).
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of the main limitations on the development of renewable 
energies in the last few decades has been their cost-
effectiveness. The main challenge for this technology 
is to compete with conventional energy sources. The 
internalization of the environmental costs of conventional 
energy sources may make renewable energies more 
competitive, but improving cost-effectiveness remains a 
priority (OECD/IEA, 2007). With the technology as it stands 
today, the low price of oil is eroding the competitiveness of 
renewable energies, as well as their investment prospects. 
Investment in the sector in 2009 will therefore depend 
largely on Government support and incentives. 
In short, despite the financial crisis, natural-resource-
seeking FDI in the region did not lose momentum, but 
targeted fewer countries. It has been driven mainly 
by investments in the mining sector, followed by the 
hydrocarbons sector. Although some companies have been 
paring down their investment projects, natural-resource-
seeking FDI has largely withstood the crisis thanks to 
commodity prices that remained high for most of the 
year and the fact that mining investments take several 
years to bear fruit. Companies in the sector therefore look 
beyond the current situation in their investment planning 
and decision-making. 
(b)  Efficiency-seeking foreign direct investment
The global crisis could have mixed effects on 
efficiency-seeking FDI. On the one hand, this type of FDI 
could shrink in reaction to falling demand in the developed 
countries and this, together with a possible surplus installed 
capacity in the region’s export platforms, could further 
deter new ventures in this area. On the other hand, the 
current situation could be viewed as an opportunity and 
encourage companies to relocate production activities 
to developing countries that offer relatively lower costs. 
Although both scenarios are feasible, efficiency-seeking 
FDI has in fact contracted because the reorganization and 
restructuring of production requires time and is difficult 
to carry out during a credit crunch.
In Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico and 
the countries of the Caribbean Basin have been the main 
destinations of efficiency-seeking investment. Foreign 
companies generally set up assembly plants in the various 
countries of this subregion to manufacture exports, mainly 
for the United States market. In this way, Mexico has 
become the third largest exporter of manufactured goods 
to the United States, after China and Canada (see figure 
I.15).25 These ties have made the subregion extremely 
25
 The contributing factors are proximity and access to the United States 
market, the cost and quality of human resources and infrastructure, 
and tax and other types of incentives, such as free zones, temporary 
duty-free admission and export maquila arrangements. 
sensitive to fluctuations in the United States economy, 
and the present crisis has had a devastating effect on 
investment flows: FDI to Mexico and the Caribbean Basin 
countries shrank by 5% in 2008, while in Mexico, the 
largest recipient in the subregion, FDI in manufacturing, 
including the maquila industry, plummeted by 49%.
Figure I.15
UNITED STATES: MARKET SHARES OF SELECTED COUNTRIES 
IN IMPORTS OF MANUFACTURED PRODUCTS, 1989-2007
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information provided by the United States Department 
of Commerce.
In Mexico, the automobile and electronics sectors 
continue to be the mainstays of a manufacturing industry 
that is dominated by foreign companies. In 2007, exports 
from these two sectors reached US$ 41.9 billion and US$ 72 
billion, respectively.26 Although there have been some 
changes in manufacturing industry in Central America, 
such as the increasing weight of the electronics sector, 
the textiles and apparel industry continues to be the most 
important (Padilla and others, 2008). Offshore business 
services have been gaining ground in Mexico and the 
Caribbean Basin countries. FDI in offshore services offers 
new opportunities not only in terms of job creation, but 
also in terms of transferring know-how and incorporating 
higher-value-added activities into the economy. 
This subsection begins with a brief overview of 
investment in the Mexican automobile industry. This 
industry was hit particularly hard by the problems afflicting 
the large United States automakers, which have worsened 
in the current financial crisis, and the United States 
authorities have been putting together a rescue plan that will 
have repercussions in the Mexican industrial sector. The 
second part of the subsection presents a general analysis 
of the effects of the financial crisis on efficiency-seeking 
investment in Central America.
26
 See [online] www.promexico.gob.mx, 12 January 2009. 
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(i) Investment prospects in the Mexican 
automobile industry
General Motors, Chrysler and Ford have been 
bedevilled by high operating costs and onerous 
labour contracts for years. At the same time, heavy 
competition from Japanese automakers (Toyota, Nissan 
and Honda) has been eating into their market share 
(ECLAC, 2004). In 2008, the situation worsened, and 
the contraction of the domestic economy as a result 
of the real estate and financial crisis, together with 
the rise in some of the sector’s basic inputs, such as 
steel and copper, on top of high oil prices, had strong 
repercussions on demand for larger car models, such 
as sports utility vehicles, which are the United States 
automakers’ main products. The situation triggered an 
18% fall in global automobile sales in 2008, affecting 
nearly all companies, especially the United States ones: 
General Motors and Ford posted their lowest sales in 
50 years (VOA News, 2009).27 The strong contraction 
of the United States market was replicated, albeit 
not as intensely, in other large developed markets in 
Europe and Asia (PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive 
Institute, 2009). 
Given the gravity of the situation, the Government 
of the United States began to work out a rescue package 
for the automobile industry that made support conditional 
upon the companies’ privileging operations in the United 
States over operations elsewhere.28 In the first stage, 
Chrysler and General Motors were awarded priority in this 
Government bail-out, which seems, however, to have been 
insufficient. At the beginning of 2009, both companies 
asked for more financial support from the Government 
at the same time as they announced mass lay-offs, plant 
closures and the suspension of production of certain 
27
 In 2008, Chrysler sales fell by 30%, General Motors sales by 23% 
and Ford sales by 20%. Although not as dramatically, the Japanese 
automakers’ sales also dropped: Toyota’s by 16% and Honda’s 
by 8%.
28
 In November 2008, in the face of a credit crunch in the financial 
system, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler requested US$ 34 
billion in aid from the United States Congress. In December 
that year, given the dire situation that the companies were in, the 
Government of the United States approved a US$ 17.4 billion aid 
package for the automobile industry. The funds were taken from 
the US$ 700 billion of the stimulus package that had been approved 
in October, originally to bail out companies in the banking sector. 
The funds were to be used first to prop up General Motors and 
Chrysler, which were teetering on the brink of bankruptcy, because 
Ford was in better financial shape. In April 2009, the Government 
pumped more resources into the industry to avoid bankruptcies 
and to promote the restructuring of the companies in the worse 
straits. United States authorities welcomed the strategic partnership 
between Fiat and General Motors.
models.29 In May 2009, GM and Chrysler filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Chapter II of the United States Bankruptcy 
Code after failing to renegotiate their heavy debts. Despite 
suspending debt payments, both companies have continued 
to operate. Chapter II allows a company to reorganize its 
business operations so that it can eventually come out of 
bankruptcy and meet its financial obligations. Some of 
these measures have also been taken at the international 
operations of United States companies.
In the face of plummeting demand (three out four 
vehicles produced in Mexico are exported to the United 
States), General Motors, Ford and Chrysler have dismissed 
workers en masse, put technical stoppages into effect and 
halted certain non-strategic assembly lines at their Mexican 
plants. Between them, in 2008, the three companies laid 
off 2,500 workers. In the industry as a whole, some 10,000 
people are estimated to have been affected by these lay-offs 
(Expansión, 2009). In the midst of this turmoil, non-United 
States companies have been facing similar problems because 
their main export market is also the United States. In 
addition to reducing its workforce, the German automaker 
Volkswagen held at least three technical and emergency 
stoppages in the first quarter of 2009, and in January, the 
company confirmed that 800 temporary workers would not 
be rehired at its Puebla plant (CNN Expansión, 2009a). The 
Japanese firm Nissan, meanwhile, announced that it would 
close its main Mexican assembly plant in Aguascalientes 
for 26 days during the first quarter of 2009 and that if the 
recession in the United States continued, it might lay off 
6,000 workers (CNN Expansión, 2009b). For Volkswagen 
and Nissan, these measures could represent a 20% slash in 
production in Mexico in 2009 (El Universal, 2009). The 
sales of the autoparts sectors are also expected to shrink by 
10% in 2009 on top of the 5% decline witnessed in 2008 
(América economía, 2008g).
Despite this, Mexican automobile production increased 
by 4% and sales by 3% in 2008. This growth was mainly 
thanks to rising exports to Canada, Asia, Europe and 
the rest of Latin America, markets which have still not
29
 In February 2009, Chrysler requested a new loan of US$ 5 billion from 
the Government of the United States and announced the dismissal 
of 3,000 workers and the suspension of production of three of its 
models. General Motors meanwhile announced that it would be asking 
for a further US$ 16.6 billion in addition to the US$ 13.4 billion the 
company had already received. The General Motors restructuring 
plan includes the dismissal of 47,000 workers around the world, 
the closure of 14 plants in the United States and the reduction in 
the automobile brand names that it produces from eight to four 
(leaving it with Chevrolet, Buick, Cadillac and GMC). According 
to the company’s estimates, with this plan, General Motors will be 
turning a profit again in two years’ time and will be able to pay off 
its debt to the Government by 2017 at the latest (BBC, 2009).
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to 12% (PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 
2009; América economía, 2008g). Given this outlook, 
FDI to the Mexican automobile sector plummeted from 
US$ 1,876 million in 2007 to US$ 885 million in 2008.
 been fully hit by the global crisis (see table I.4). The 
situation could turn around, however. Installed capacity 
worldwide is expected to operate at only 68% in 2009, 
and Mexico’s production is projected to shrink by close 
Table I.4





2007 2008 Difference 2008-2007 2007 2008
United States 1 203 947 1 175 513 -28 434 -2.4 74.6 70.8
Canada 88 710 112 606 23 896 26.9 5.5 6.8
Latin America 101 301 121 162 19 861 19.6 6.3 7.3
Asia 12 098 35 976 23 878 197.4 0.7 2.2
Europe 194 744 213 754 19 010 9.8 12.1 12.9
Other 12 513 2 383 -10 130 -81.0 0.8 0.1
Total 1 613 313 1 661 394 48 081 3.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of statistics obtained by the Mexican Automotive Industry Association.
Despite the bleak prospects, some interesting 
announcements have been made that could give the industry 
a boost, specifically by shifting production to smaller and 
more fuel-efficient vehicles. General Motors has led the way 
with an investment of almost US$ 1 billion in a new plant 
that will produce compact cars in San Luis Potosí (CNN 
Expansión, 2008c). Meanwhile, Ford, the least affected of 
the three United States giants, announced a US$ 3 billion 
investment in the production of its Fiesta model for the 
North American market (CNN Expansión, 2008d).30 Geely 
Holding Group, the largest Chinese automaker, for its part, 
announced its interest in investing US$ 500 million in 
building a new plant in Mexico. The original goal was to 
export vehicles to the United States, South America and, 
above all, Central America, where the company already 
has a large market presence (El Economista, 2008). 
However, owing to the financial crisis, in March 2009, 
Geely decided to downsize the project in Mexico and to 
strengthen its global position, and expressed an interest in 
the luxury carmakers Volvo (a subsidiary of Ford) and Saab 
(a subsidiary of General Motors), which are struggling at 
the moment (El Periódico de México, 2009).
The restructuring under way in the industry means 
that some companies will probably be relocating their 
plants. This is the case of the German firm Daimler AG, 
the world’s largest truck manufacturer, which transferred 
part of its production from Canada and the United States to 
a new complex in Saltillo (Mexico), with an investment of 
30
 Ford announced that its plant in Cuautitlán in Mexico would switch 
from producing pickups to producing the compact Fiesta model for 
the North American market. Ford will also be setting up a diesel 
engine production line at its plant in Chihuahua and building a 
transmission factory in Guanajuato, in a joint venture with the 
German firm Getrag.
US$ 274 million (América economía, 2009b). This move 
was made with a view to improving the efficiency of its 
production and its logistics so as to be well positioned 
when the market recovers. 
If the crisis continues or worsens, the most vulnerable 
transnational automakers might have to shut down production 
lines and plants, in both their home countries and those where 
they have set up international operations. Mexico will be 
especially vulnerable in this case, as it will not receive any 
of the financial support being given to the parent companies 
and its main export market is already going through a major 
economic crisis that has caused vehicle sales to plummet. 
Given the surplus in global production capacity, it is highly 
unlikely that large new investments will be announced in 
the automobile industry any time soon. 
(ii) New projects with growth potential
Despite the slowdown in the electronics industry in 
Mexico (INEGI, 2008), world leaders in this sector still 
have operations in the country and Mexico continues to be 
a major exporter of electronic goods to the North American 
market. The Japanese firm Sharp invested in the television 
segment in 2008: first it built an assembly plant for new-
generation televisions and then it set up local manufacturing 
facilities for the liquid crystal display (LCD) screens that 
are a key component in television receivers. Until then 
Mexico had competed in the assembly of television and 
computer screens but not in the production of value-added 
components such as LCD screens.31 Sharp aims to sell 
31
 The liquid crystal sheets will be cut, and modules such as the light 
and polarization systems and other elements currently brought in 
from Japan will be put together at the new plant. This will reduce 
the production time for television sets from nine to four weeks.
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screens to other assembly plants in the region (Bancomext, 
2008). Following closely on its heels is Samsung of the 
Republic of Korea, which announced the construction of a 
new LCD screen plant in Mexico (El Semanario, 2008). The 
goal of these undertakings is to enhance the competitiveness 
of the Mexican television industry, shorten delivery times 
and increase Mexico’s technological capacity vis-à-vis 
China, its main competitor in this segment. 
In other high-tech projects, the German company 
Q-Cells announced the investment of US$ 3.5 billion over 
the medium and long term in the installation of a plant that 
will produce thin-film crystalline solar cells for export to 
the United States market. Q-Cells is not the only company 
in Mexico producing equipment for the renewable energy 
sector. The Japanese firm Kyocera (solar cells) and the 
joint venture between the Japanese company Mitsubishi 
and the United States company TPI Composites, known 
as Vientek (blades for wind turbines) are also operating 
in the country. These investments seem to be paving the 
way for the establishment of a manufacturing and export 
cluster to serve the potential and growing renewable 
energies market in the United States. 
(iii)  Impact of the financial crisis on efficiency-
seeking investments in Central America and 
the Dominican Republic32
In the last few years, manufactured goods have been 
the largest component of exports from Central America 
and the Dominican Republic. Between 2000 and 2006, 
manufacturing exports represented over 60% of total exports 
and the United States was the main export destination 
(Padilla and others, 2008). The subregion is thus highly 
vulnerable to any fluctuations in the United States economy, 
as the current financial crisis has shown. 
In 2008, FDI in the subregion’s manufacturing industry 
did not grind to a halt, but it did slow down. Two companies 
that did invest in Costa Rica, which has been a major FDI 
destination for investments in the electronics, medical and 
autoparts sectors, were the United States company St. 
Jude Medical, which produces cardiovascular products 
(US$ 40 million), the German automaker Continental AG 
(US$ 30 million) and the United States firm Firestone 
Industrial Products (US$3 million). FDI in El Salvador 
and the Dominican Republic continued to be heavily 
concentrated in the textile and apparel industries. The 
German company Bodet & Horst and the United States 
firm Darlington Manufacturing Company, for example, 
invested in El Salvador in 2008, and 22% of the companies 
32
 This section is based on information provided by the Costa Rican 
Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE), the National Investment 
Promotion Agency of El Salvador (PROESA) and the Export and 
Investment Centre of the Dominican Republic (CEI-RD). 
starting operations in the free zones of the Dominican 
Republic belong to the textile industry. 
There are some signs, however, that the crisis has begun 
to dampen efficiency-seeking FDI in the subregion. Goods 
exports in Costa Rica in 2008 expanded only half as much 
as expected at the beginning of the year. In the sectors 
using advanced manufacturing technology, including the 
automobile and electronics sectors, the number of visits 
from potential investors fell in the second half of 2008, 
and fewer companies invested during the course of the 
year than in 2007. FDI flows also dropped in El Salvador 
and several clothing and apparel factories closed, such 
as the ones owned by Cupid Foundations (United States) 
and Lido (Republic of Korea). 
On the other hand, the offshore business services sector 
has continued to grow steadily. Leading companies in this 
sector, such as the United States firms Sykes, Western 
Union and P&G, made fresh investments in Costa Rica. 
Three of the five largest FDI projects in El Salvador in 2008 
were also in offshore business services (Americatel, Sykes 
and Citigroup). In the Dominican Republic, 28% of the 
companies setting up operations in the free zones provide 
export and telemarketing services (see chapter II). 
Efficiency-seeking FDI is likely to decline as the 
economic crisis deepens, especially in the advanced 
manufacturing sectors where projects require large amounts 
of investment capital.
In short, the international crisis might spur companies 
to relocate production to more cost-effective countries, 
which could increase efficiency-seeking FDI in the region. 
During the first months of the financial crisis, however, FDI 
has mainly contracted because exports have been falling in 
response to the bleak growth projections for the developed 
countries, especially the United States. This is reflected in both 
the strategies that companies have adopted and the official 
statistics of Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean Basin. 
One challenge that has yet to be met in Latin America and 
the Caribbean is how to ensure that efficiency-seeking FDI 
flows help countries upgrade to the more knowledge- and 
technology-intensive activities that have higher value added, 
as these are still scarce in the region (ECLAC, 2008b). 
(c) Market-seeking foreign direct investment
Economic growth is the main engine of market-seeking 
FDI, which means that any economic slowdown deters this 
type of investment. In 2008, the region’s sixth consecutive 
year of economic growth, the growth rate of Latin America 
and the Caribbean was 4.2%. This, together with falling 
unemployment and better quality jobs, reduced poverty in 
the region and increased the population’s disposable income 
(ECLAC, 2008c). These conditions also attracted foreign 
investors interested in the region’s potential as a market. The 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)38
situation began to change, however, as the effects of the global 
economic crisis spread throughout the region and started 
to shut down the engines of growth. The impact has been 
uneven, however, and has affected different sectors at different 
times.33 Hence the varied growth rates recorded across the 
region: 5.5% in South America, 4.1% in Central America, 
2.3% in the Caribbean and 1.3% in Mexico. According to 
ECLAC estimates made in April 2009, the region is projected 
to post negative growth in 2009 (-0.3%).
Despite the bleak economic outlook, it should be borne 
in mind that the region’s growth has outpaced average world 
growth for the last few years and that, though negative, the 
growth projections for the region are better than those for 
the developed economies for 2009. This could encourage
33
 The crisis has been transmitted to the region via two channels: 
the real channel (slowdown in exports, drop in commodity prices, 
reduction in remittances, less income from tourism, less FDI) and 
the financial channel (increased cost of external credit and more 
limited availability of international financing) (ECLAC, 2008c). 
FDI in the region. This section presents a brief analysis of 
the strategies pursued by some transnational corporations 
in selected sectors to penetrate markets in the region and 
examines how they have reacted to the international crisis.
(i) The automobile industry in South America
FDI flowing into the automobile industry in MERCOSUR 
seeks to satisfy demand in national and regional markets, 
unlike the FDI in the same sector in Mexico, the purpose of 
which is to create export platforms. The main automobile 
manufacturing centres in South America, Argentina and 
Brazil have seen production levels rise in the last few years 
thanks to robust domestic demand (see figure I.16).
Figure I.16
ARGENTINA AND BRAZIL: PRODUCTION AND EXPORT OF AUTOMOBILES, 1996-2008
(Thousands of units)







































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (ADEFA) of Argentina and 
the National Association of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers (ANFAVEA) of Brazil.
Despite the financial crisis, several companies pressed 
ahead with their expansion plans in 2008. General Motors 
(United States) announced investments of between 
US$ 500 million and US$ 1 billion in the production of 
a new model, and Ford (United States) modernized its 
Sao Paulo plant to produce the latest version of the Ka 
model. Honda (Japan), meanwhile, boosted the capacity 
of its plant in Sumaré, near Campinas, by 20%. Fiat (Italy) 
went ahead with its US$ 375 million project to upgrade 
its industrial base in Minas Gerais by 2010 and plans 
to invest approximately US$ 300 million to expand the 
capacity of its engine and transmission plants, as well as 
its vehicle assembly operations at its factory in Argentina 
(Business Latin America, 2008d).
Growing demand in the emerging markets, especially the 
BRICs, has sustained the pace of activity in the automobile 
industry, and the large automakers have not shown any 
signs of wishing to delay their announced investments. The 
crisis has begun to make itself felt in the South American 
market, however. Brazil, which produces 75% of light 
vehicles in South America, saw its sales fall in the last 
quarter of 2008 and is expecting them to diminish to 2.5 
million units in 2009, 20% fewer than in the previous year 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2009). 
This drop in sales in Brazil will have a direct impact on the 
industry in Argentina, which exports approximately 70% 
of its production to Brazil.34 The autoparts industry and its 
34
 See the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association (ADEFA) of 
Argentina [online] www.adefa.com.ar. 
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investments will also be directly hit by the waning demand. 
A survey conducted by the Union of the Automotive Vehicle 
Component Industry (Sindipeças) of Brazil on investment 
and prospects revealed that 48% of companies plan to keep 
their investments at the same level in 2009, 46% expect to 
reduce them, and only 6% plan to increase them. Although 
no significant changes in investment plans were announced 
by automakers, the effects of shrinking demand have already 
begun to appear. In Brazil, 12,000 workers at the factories of 
General Motors, Fiat, Scania and Volkswagen were forced 
to take vacations (La Nación, 2008), while falling demand 
resulted in a production stoppage at Iveco, the Argentine 
plant of the Fiat group. The Governments of Argentina and 
Brazil have set up financing programmes to sustain demand 
and to avoid mass lay-offs in the industry (AFP, 2008; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers Automotive Institute, 2009).
Although the South American automobile industry is 
facing difficult times, it seems to be holding its investment 
position in readiness for a possible recovery in 2010. The 
developed markets may be saturated, but opportunities and 
unsatisfied demand still abound in the emerging markets, 
including Brazil, which could turn out to be a lifesaver for 
some of the large automakers in the near future. 
(ii)  The emergence of a new protagonist in the region: 
the banking sector
For obvious reasons, the banking sector has been one 
of the most shaken by the international financial crisis 
and is currently undergoing a major restructuring process 
that will continue until a new equilibrium is reached. 
Three banks dominate the regional market: Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya Argentaria (BBVA), Santander and Citigroup. 
Of these, Citigroup has been the worst hit by the crisis, 
and authorities are considering splitting its operations into 
two business units: one for commercial banking and one 
for investment banking. In 2009, the Government of the 
United States announced its intention to increase its stake in 
Citigroup. If a partial sale of assets goes ahead, Hong Kong 
and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC) has expressed 
particular interest in Citigroup’s assets in Argentina, Brazil 
and Mexico (Telegraph, 2008; Reuters, 2009b).
The Spanish banks Santander and BBVA, which 
performed well in 2007, began to feel the effects of the 
crisis. BBVA turned in good results up to the third quarter 
of 2008, but saw its profits wane as the economies of 
Mexico and the United States, its largest markets outside 
Spain, started to experience a slowdown. Despite capital 
increases, BBVA does not have much room for lending 
because demand for credit has fallen in both Mexico and 
the United States. Santander, which was affected by the 
Madoff scandal, has stated that it will continue to invest in 
markets with large potential, such as Brazil and the United 
Kingdom.35 However, Santander also announced that it will 
be laying off 400 workers in Brazil to save US$ 1 billion 
by 2012 (La Segunda, 2009). 
While the largest banks in the region are manoeuvring to 
come out of the crisis in as strong a position as possible, the 
Brazilian financial entity Itaú has emerged as a new sector 
leader with its acquisition of Unibanco and the creation of 
the largest private bank in Brazil. The purchase was in part 
a reaction to the competition posed by Santander after its 
acquisition of Brazilian bank Banco Real. Itaú Unibanco now 
has a solid position in the national market and possibilities 
of competing and expanding in the regional one (Bloomberg, 
2008). Itaú already had operations in Argentina and Chile 
and is targeting Colombia, Mexico and Peru next.
This buy-out will probably increase the pressure on 
smaller banks in the region to negotiate their acquisition by 
larger ones as the global financial crisis is pushing up the 
costs of financing and the economic slowdown is harming 
their loan portfolios. Potential future targets include Banco 
Votorantim, Banco Safra, Interbank and Grupo Financiero 
Banorte (International Business Times, 2008a). It is highly 
likely that the banking market will undergo a series of 
mergers and acquisitions in the future.
(iii)  The telecommunications sector withstands the crisis and 
its two leaders continue to battle it out in the region
The telecommunications market has shown tremendous 
resilience during the economic and financial crisis, and the 
number of service subscribers continues to grow steadily. 
Two companies are vying for the leading position in the 
telecommunications sector: América Móvil/Telmex and 
Telefónica (ECLAC, 2008a). The financial results of both 
companies reflect significant growth in sales and corporate 
profits, which has placed them in a strong position to 
withstand the economic crisis.36 The income levels of these 
companies allow them to advance their investment plans 
without having to rely on the complicated credit market. 
América Móvil’s investments exceeded US$ 4 billion 
in 2008, and its level of investment is expected to be the 
same in 2009. Telefónica has also continued to expand 
and has bought the remaining shares in its subsidiary in 
Chile for US$ 1.5 billion. The company has projected 
that the sector in Latin America and the Caribbean 
will grow by 8% per year up to 2010 and is therefore 
continuing its investment plans. It has recently shown 
interest in the Cuban market (International Business 
35
 As a member of the consortium of European banks that bought 
ABN AMRO, Santander ended up controlling the Brazilian bank 
Banco Real and becoming the second largest private bank in the 
country in terms of assets (ECLAC, 2008a). 
36
 On the basis of the financial statements of both companies as at 
the end of the third quarter of 2008. 
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Times, 2008b; Business Latin America, 2008f; América 
economía, 2008l).
One of the most notable strategic moves was the 
purchase of Brasil Telecom by Oi for US$ 2.306 billion. 
With this transaction, Oi has become América Móvil’s 
and Telefónica’s new rival in the sector, and not just in 
Brazil: over the next few years, as it consolidates its 
position, this Brazilian company is expected to venture 
out and conquer other markets in Latin America (América 
economía, 2009a). This new participant will increase the 
competition in the telecommunications market, which could 
push the large operators in the sector to invest so as not to 
lose their leading positions in the regional market.
(iv)  Retailing: the giant Wal-Mart makes its moves in 
the region
The expansion and consolidation of supermarkets 
continued in 2008. The most significant announcement 
was the acquisition of the Chilean firm D&S by the global 
leader in the industry, the United States firm Wal-Mart, 
which already has operations in Argentina, Brazil, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and 
Nicaragua. With this purchase, Wal-Mart has obtained 
another valuable foothold in the South American market 
for furthering its international expansion strategy (Wal-
Mart, 2009). The Chilean market had up to now been one 
of the bastions of national supermarket chains and one 
which the large international companies had not been 
able to penetrate with great success (Calderón, 2006). 
This move is probably being used to pave the way for 
Wal-Mart’s eventual expansion into Colombia and Peru. 
Wal-Mart’s low-price policy will increase pressure on its 
Chilean competitors, which will have to come up with 
strategies to compete against the retail giant. Wal-Mart 
also continued its expansion in Brazil, where it opened 
nine new stores in 2008 and is expected to invest US$ 984 
million in 2009 to establish a strong position in one 
of the fastest-growing markets in the region (América 
economía, 2008m).
The Chilean firm Cencosud completed its acquisition 
of Supermercados Wong in Peru to expand and consolidate 
its presence in the region. The company already has 
operations in Argentina, Brazil and Colombia, in addition 
to Chile. In 2009, the group is planning to reduce its 
short-term debt and scale back its investments (Cencosud, 
2008), and is therefore not expected to pursue any major 
expansions. In fact, given the sluggish growth projections 
for this year, Cencosud decided to suspend the building 
of its mega-project, Costanera Center, in Santiago, which 
would have required further investments of US$ 600 
million (La Tercera, 2009b). 2009 will not be an easy year 
for the company which, in addition to having had to halt 
one of its landmark projects, will now have to compete 
with Wal-Mart, the largest retailer in the world. 
The economic slowdown is definitely having an affect 
on the retail trade, but it is still not clear to what extent. 
What is clear is that Wal-Mart will continue its aggressive 
strategy to penetrate the Latin American market.
In short, the slowdown of the economies of Latin 
America, together with increasingly limited access to 
consumer credit, could stem the inflow of market-seeking 
FDI. In response to this situation, the Governments of 
the region have implemented a range of policies to prop 
up aggregate demand, which could counteract the effect 
of falling demand.37 These policies will probably be 
insufficient, however, to keep market-seeking FDI at the 
levels recorded in previous years.
37
 For an overview of the measures that the region’s governments 
have adopted in response to the crisis, see ECLAC (2009). 
3.  Conclusions
Despite the international crisis and the drop in foreign 
direct investment worldwide, FDI in Latin America and 
the Caribbean reached a new historic high in 2008 of over 
US$ 128 billion, 13% higher than in 2007.
This overall performance conceals huge disparities 
at the subregional level. FDI to South America increased 
notably thanks to the rise in natural-resource- and 
market-seeking investment, which was stimulated by 
commodity prices that remained high for most of 2008 
and by the subregion’s economic growth. Brazil was the 
main recipient of FDI in the region and accounted for 
most of the increase in FDI. Investment flows to Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin, on the other hand, declined as 
a result of the crisis in the main export market of these 
economies, the United States. The recession in the United 
States stemmed the flow of efficiency-seeking FDI at the 
same time as the global economic and financial crisis 
slowed economic growth in the region itself, which had 
a negative impact on market-seeking FDI. Mexico was 
the worst hit and suffered a 20% reduction in FDI with 
respect to 2007.
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The economic conditions that sustained the FDI boom 
in Latin America and the Caribbean throughout 2008 have 
begun to change. As the crisis worsens in the region, the 
engines that drive FDI have begun to stall one by one. The 
prospects of less growth and access to financial resources, 
together with mounting uncertainty and perceptions of 
increased risk, will reduce FDI flows to the region in 
2009. In fact, given the trends and preliminary data for 
the main receiving countries, all  evidence points to FDI 
in the region falling by between 35% and 45% in 2009. 
This situation serves as a reminder of two things: FDI 
has considerable potential to generate structural change; 
and investment is not an end in itself, but a means to 
achieving economic growth. What matters is not so much 
the quantity of the FDI received as the quality of that FDI 
and its potential to generate spillovers and linkages that 
enhance the production and technological capacity of the 
receiving economy.
D.  Outward foreign direct investment  
 and the trans-Latins
1.  Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) flows
In 2008, flows of OFDI from the countries of Latin America 
and the Caribbean continued to increase, rising to US$ 34.561 
billion, up 42% from the previous year (see figure I.17). 
Figure I.17
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FLOWS OF 

























































Net flows of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a 
 Figures for outward foreign direct investment do not include flows from financial 
centres. The outward foreign direct investmen figures indicate outflows of direct 
investment by residents, minus disinvestments abroad by those investors.
This historically positive result probably reflects, 
at least in part, the completion of transactions that that 
already been negotiated and projects that had already 
been started before the economic and financial crisis 
really gained momentum. 
Brazil is the region’s leading foreign investor, 
accounting for US$ 20.457 billion of OFDI (61% of the 
total), followed by Chile and the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, with US$ 6.891 billion and US$ 2.757 
billion, respectively (see figure I.18). For Brazil, this 
represents a 190% increase over the previous year and 
is the second largest outflow in its history, after 2006. 
Most of these investments were in natural resources, iron 
and steelworks, and food, under a relatively favourable 
price scenario and local economic conditions through 
the third quarter of the year. Although it is not possible 
to reach a conclusion on the basis of the aggregate 
data, information published by companies suggests that 
more is being invested in organic growth and in raising 
the productivity of international operations and less in 
acquisitions. 
In Chile, OFDI flows, as recorded in the balance of 
payments, increased 76% from the previous year. Much 
of this investment was related to transactions in the retail 
sector —including those of Cencosud and Falabella— in 
Brazil and Peru that were announced in late 2007 and 
carried out in 2008.38
38
 Estimates according to the concept of “direct investment of 
Chilean enterprises detected abroad” (on the basis of investment 
announcements collected by the Santiago Chamber of Commerce 
and which more closely reflect the current economic situation) 
show a 37% reduction with respect to the preceding year, but a 
historically high result (CCS, 2009).
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Figure I.18
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, whose OFDI 
in 2008 outstripped its incoming FDI, 96% of investment 
is attributable to the State oil company PDVSA. In 2008, 
Mexico, which in recent years had been one of the two 
leading investor countries, saw its outward foreign 
investments contract. Having been affected more quickly 
by the crisis, some Mexican transnationals were forced 
to revise their internationalization strategies and even 
shed international assets. Others, such as Mexichem and 
Bimbo, however, have moved forward with their expansion 
plans (see section 2). 
When OFDI is measured in relation to GDP, the largest 
outward investor in 2008 (among the countries for which 
information is available) was Chile, followed by Brazil, 
Colombia and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
Figure I.19
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
estimates on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
Few countries publish official figures on the destination 
of OFDI. In 2008, the main geographic destination of 
Brazilian outward investments was the United States 
(28%), whereas the financial centres of the Caribbean 
received 25% of Brazilian OFDI. Some 12% of Brazilian 
outward investment went to Latin America, with the 
largest recipients being Argentina (4%), Chile (3%) and 
Uruguay (3%).39 By contrast, Chilean outward investment 
in South America amounted to 72% of its OFDI. Whereas 
Argentina was previously the main destination of Chilean 
investments, in 2008 the largest volumes went to Brazil and 
Peru —two markets in which the fastest-growing Chilean 
trans-Latins are consolidating their positions. Most of 
Colombia’s OFDI went to the United States (57%); the 
remainder was distributed among Brazil (19%), Panama 
(13%) and Mexico (8%).
39
 The figures comprise solely transactions for more than US$ 1 
million and exclude investments in goods and real estate.
40
 The main trans-Latins (Latin American enterprises that make 
significant investments abroad) may be grouped into four large 
categories: (1) enterprises in the natural resources sector or natural-
resource-based manufacturing sector (hydrocarbons, mining, cement, 
petrochemicals); (2) enterprises related to the mass consumption 
of goods and services (food, beverages, telecommunications, 
retail commerce, banking); (3) producers of intermediate goods 
(autoparts and bodies, industrial equipment); and (4) engineering 
and construction companies (see table I.A-6 of the annex).
2.  Trans-Latin investments abroad in 2008
Although figures for investment abroad reflect the 
activity of a large number of enterprises —877 
corporations in Brazil are estimated to invest abroad 
(BBC Brasil, 2009)— the volumes recorded are mainly 
attributable to a relatively small number of companies and 
transactions.40 In 2008, the following sectors were the 
main recipients of investments made by trans-Latins 
outside of their countries of origin:
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(a) Hydrocarbons 
High crude prices through September were a 
determining factor in the strong results of oil producers. 
Petrobras and PDVSA, the Latin American companies 
in the sector that have invested the most outside of their 
countries of origin, maintained and even expanded their 
internationalization programmes in 2008.
Petrobras’ international investments in 2008 totalled 
US$ 6.133 billion, 7% more than in 2007, and accounted 
for 12% of the company’s total investments. Approximately 
86% of international investment was used for exploration 
and production in Argentina and the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia. In the secondary-processing sector, the 
company acquired ExxonMobil’s operations in Chile, 
the only South American country where it did not yet 
have operations. This transaction was part of a trend 
that has seen some transnational enterprises withdraw 
from the Latin American fuel-distribution market, with a 
concomitant expansion of regional companies (ECLAC, 
2008a). Outside of Latin America, Petrobas increased 
its stake in Pasadena Refining System Inc., in Texas, 
United States, and signed an agreement to purchase 
ExxonMobil’s 87.5% stake in Nansei Sekiyu Kabushiki 
Kaisha, which owns a 100,000 barrel-per-day capacity 
refinery in Japan, in addition to logistical infrastructure 
that will allow Petrobras to commercialize its biofuels in 
Japan and other Asian markets. 
Despite the crisis, in early 2009, Petrobras expanded 
its 2009-2013 investment plan, which calls for a total 
investment of US$ 174.400 billion. One tenth of this 
amount will be used for investments outside of Brazil, 
mostly in exploration and production activities in Latin 
America, West Africa and the Gulf of Mexico. In response 
to the crisis, the company is granting priority to projects 
that can generate results more quickly and has sought 
out strategic partners (which would later receive profits 
from the crude production). Due to the long maturation 
period of exploration and production projects, many of 
the investments are being made now in anticipation of 
the eventual recovery of the world economy. 
PDVSA also continued to benefit from high oil prices 
through September 2008 as its profits for the first three 
quarters of 2008 soared (Dow Jones, 2009). The company 
continued to invest in Argentina, Cuba, Ecuador, Gambia, 
Mali, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Viet Nam. It has 
restructured its international refining capacity by selling its 
Paulsboro Savanna refineries in the United States, investing 
in the Camilo Cienfuegos refinery in Cuba (in which it 
owns slightly more than half of the production assets) 
and announcing the construction of a refinery in Ecuador. 
PDVSA, which in the United States controls Citgo, one of 
the 10 largest fuel distributors in that country, is evaluating 
new business opportunities in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, 
Europe and South America. Meanwhile, investments by 
Petroandina, a joint venture between Yacimientos Petrolíferos 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) and PDVSA, spearheaded 
investment in the hydrocarbons sector in the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. Petroandina announced investments of 
US$ 900 million for oil extraction activities and close to 
US$ 250 million for experimental drilling and studies. 
For its part, YPFB signed a US$ 1 billion agreement with 
the Dutch-owned Petroholland for exploration and the 
construction of a gas pipeline. 
Colombia’s State-owned Ecopetrol was behind one 
of the largest international investments by Latin American 
gas and oil companies in 2008. The company acquired 
a stake in an exploration project in the Gulf of Mexico 
operated by the Norwegian firm Statoil-Hydro. This 
operation comes in the wake of others undertaken by 
Ecopetrol in Brazil, Peru and the United States. 
(b) Mining and iron and steel 
Latin American mining companies’ investments 
abroad are also motivated by the long-term outlook for 
minerals and metals markets, especially in emerging 
economies. Some investments in this sector are related 
to the trend analysed in the section on natural-resource-
seeking FDI. 
Latin America’s largest mining enterprise, Companhia 
Vale do Rio Doce, has moved forward with an ambitious 
investment plan in Brazil and abroad, in anticipation of 
an economic recovery around the globe. In 2008, it made 
some acquisitions outside of Brazil, in line with a strategy 
intended to enhance its position in coal and copper extraction. 
The company acquired a coal mine from Cementos 
Argos, of Colombia, and entered into a joint venture with 
TEAL Exploration and Mining, which has reserves in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Namibia and Zambia. 
Most of CVRD’s investments outside of Brazil in 2008 were 
not in acquisitions but in project development. In times of 
uncertainty, focusing growth strategy on the development 
of mining assets that the company already controls allows 
the company to delay or accelerate projects according to 
the outlook for growth in demand. In 2009, 30% of the 
US$ 14.2 billion investment budget will be used for projects 
outside of Brazil. Some US$ 1.1 billion will be used for 
investments in Canada, US$ 831 million in Mozambique 
and US$ 515 million in Oman (see table I.5). CVRD, like 
its competitors, has felt the effects of the crisis and has had 
to curb operations in response to the expected contraction in 
the world iron-ore market. It has scaled back its operations in 
Brazil and Canada and laid off 1,300 employees worldwide. 
The company also suspended a steel-foundry project with 
China’s Baosteel (Reuters, 2009a and 2008e).
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Table I.5
INTERNATIONAL PROJECTS OF VALE DO RIO DOCE FOR 2009
(Millions of dollars)
Project and location Amount to be executed in 2009 Total amount
Pellet plant, Oman 458 1 356
Tres Valles (formerly, “Papomono”) project, production of cathode copper, Coquimbo, Chile 56 102
Hydroelectric plant in Karebbe, Indonesia, to supply power for the operations of PT Inco 119 410
Expansion of the Carborough Downs coalmine, Queensland, Australia 138 330
Coal production project, Moatize, Mozambique 444 1 398
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), estimates on the basis of Companhia Vale do Rio Doce, “Vale realiza investimento recorde em 
2008: US$ 10,2 bilhões”, Nota de prensa, 21 January 2009.
for natural resources. The company also increased its stake 
in the Spanish firm Sidenor, allowing it to consolidate its 
position in the world steel market. In addition to these 
acquisitions, Gerdau announced important investments to 
expand the capacity of its subsidiaries in Argentina and Peru 
in line with its growth strategy in the Americas. However, 
towards the end of the year, the company announced the 
postponement of its investment in Argentina and cutbacks 
in some operations both in and outside of Brazil (América 
economía, 2008h; Valor online, 2009).
For its part, the Argentine group Techint announced 
US$ 6.6 billion in investments in Mexico over five years 
in plant construction and expansion projects, as well as in 
developing tin- and iron-ore reserves (CNN Expansión, 
2008a). Ternium, the iron- and steel-making division of 
Techint, had —like its competitors— three strong quarters 
until customer demand plummeted, mainly in three sectors 
that were hit hard by the crisis: automobiles, construction 
and household appliances. Its international operations were 
marked by the completion of the integration of the IMSA 
group which had begun in 2007. Ternium’s purchase of 
IMSA and the simultaneous increase of its participation in 
the Mexican and United States high-value-added market 
left the company vulnerable to the performance of these 
two economies. Upon finalizing the purchase, Ternium sold 
IMSA assets in the United States considered non-essential 
—the companies Steelscape Inc. (except for one of its 
plants), ASC Profiles, Varco Pruden Buildings and Metl-
Span— to BlueScope Steel. 
Another important event in Ternium’s international 
operations was the nationalization of Sidor in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Techint had headed 
the consortium that purchased 60% of Sidor in 1998. 
Under the nationalization process, Ternium’s shareholding 
in the company comes under the control of the State-
owned Venezuelan company Corporación Venezolana 
de Guayana. 
Tenaris, the Techint group’s steel-pipe maker, was 
also negatively affected by its acquisition of the United 
States company Maverick in 2007 because the number of 
The largest publicly announced acquisition by a 
trans-Latin in the mining sector in 2008 (outside of 
the company’s country of origin) was the purchase of 
Mineração Taboca’s tin division in Brazil by the Peruvian 
firm Minsur. Minsur accounts for 12% of tin production 
worldwide, and until now all of its operations have been 
located in Peru. This first international acquisition by the 
company increases its output capacity by approximately 
20% and includes, among the main mining assets, a mine 
in the Amazon region and a foundry in São Paulo. 
Other particularly noteworthy acquisitions in the 
mining sector include the acquisition by the Brazilian 
group Votorantim of US Zinc (United States) and Minera 
Atacocha (Peru). In 2008, Votorantim started producing 
indium in Peru (used, inter alia, to manufacture liquid 
crystal displays), made new investments in iron and 
steelworks, acquired a majority stake in Argentine long 
steel producer AcerBrag and began to invest in a new 
steel plant in Colombia, in partnership with Acerías de 
Colombia (Acesco).
The steel market had a relatively positive performance 
in the first half of the year, as a large volume of investments 
was made. Nevertheless, worldwide demand began to 
decline in the second half of the year, cutting into the 
profits of the region’s main steelmakers, which were 
forced to revise their operations and investment plans 
and lay off large numbers of employees in late 2008 and 
early 2009. 
The Brazilian company Gerdau is moving forward with 
its expansion to cut costs and exert more influence over 
its scrap-metal and energy suppliers (Bloomberg, 2007). 
In 2008, the company completed the acquisition of the 
United States-based Macsteel and established a strategic 
alliance with Corporación Centroamericana del Acero (with 
assets in Guatemala and Honduras) by acquiring a 30% 
stake in the company. It also acquired 50.9% of Cleary 
Holdings, which has coke production units and reserves in 
Colombia. The transaction is in line with the global trend in 
the steel industry towards vertical integration to ensure the 
availability of key raw materials amid heavy global demand 
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new gas exploration and production projects (one of the 
key markets for Tenaris’ products) waned in the following 
two years. Nevertheless, during most of 2008, demand 
for Tenaris’ products increased, among other reasons, 
thanks to the rise in imports by China. 
One of the main OFDI transactions carried out by a 
Brazilian company in 2008, which substantially altered the 
country’s OFDI balance, involved Companhia Siderúrgica 
Nacional (CSN). As noted above, CSN sold a stake in Namisa 
—the company that controlled its mining assets— to a group 
of Japanese firms. Although these resources —more than 
US$ 3 billion— were immediately transferred to a CSN 
subsidiary in Panama, their final destination cannot be 
inferred on the basis of the information currently available 
to the public (BBC Brasil, 2009).
(c)  Cement and concrete 
Cemex, which in 2007 carried out the second-largest-
ever cross-border acquisition by a Latin American company 
(buying the Australian firm Rinker for US$ 14.6 billion), 
was hard hit by the crisis in 2008. In addition to the natural 
vulnerability that construction and cement industries have 
to economic cycles, the acquisition of Rinker meant that 
when the crisis broke out, Cemex had a high debt ratio 
and a heavy concentration of assets in the sluggish United 
States market.41 Cemex’s credit ratings were downgraded 
from investment grade and the company announced the 
cancellation of more than 50% of its capital investments 
for 2009 and its intention to sell some of its assets abroad to 
finance part of its debt. The cement maker also announced 
a 10% downsizing of its workforce worldwide (América 
economía, 2008i). In February 2009, it was expected that 
the economic stimulus package in the United States might 
help increase demand for Cemex’s products, but results 
were deemed unlikely to be seen before 2010 (CNN 
Expansión, 2009c and 2009d). Furthermore, like Techint, 
Cemex suffered the nationalization of its operations in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. 
The cement division of the Votorantim group 
acquired Prairie, a concrete producer from the Great 
Lakes region of the United States, as well as a strategic 
stake in Cementos Bío Bío, a leading Chilean cement 
and concrete producer.
(d)  Petrochemicals 
The Mexican company Mexichem continued to expand 
its international presence in the petrochemicals sector. 
41
 Although Rinker was an Australian company, the concentration of 
many of its assets in the United States was one of Cemex’s main 
reasons for making the purchase.
Continuing with the internationalization process begun in 
2006 with the purchase of a company in the United States, 
Mexichem acquired Dripsa (Argentina), Bidim (Brazil), 
Geosistemas (Peru), Colpozos (Colombia) and a majority 
stake in Plastubos (Brazil) in 2008, in addition to making 
other acquisitions in Mexico. The company financed most 
of these transactions with its equity. Nevertheless, the 
acquisition of Prodesal in Peru did not go through, partly 
because of the negative outlook for the world economy and 
partly because of restrictions established by Colombian 
competition authorities (El Tiempo, 2008).
(e)  Food and beverages
The largest transaction announced by a trans-Latin 
in 2008 was the acquisition by the Mexican company 
Bimbo of the bread-making and baked products division 
of Weston (Canada) in the United States, which placed 
Bimbo in a leadership position in the industrialized bread-
making market in that country. As this US$ 2.5 billion 
transaction took place in January 2009, it is not reflected 
in OFDI data for Mexico for 2008. Bimbo also acquired a 
75% interest in Brazilian bread-maker Nutrella Alimentos, 
making it the leading industrialized bread-maker in Brazil 
as well. These acquisitions are part of Bimbo’s geographic 
diversification strategy. 
As was the case in 2007, important acquisitions took 
place in the meat-producing industry in 2008. Sigma 
Alimentos, part of the ALFA group of Mexico, acquired 
Braedt, a leader in Peru’s coldcuts market, as well as 
Butterball’s Longmont brand, the largest turkey-products 
manufacturer in Latin America. Moving forward with 
its strategy of diversifying and expanding its activities 
in various markets and in order to gain direct access to 
international markets, Brazil’s Marfrig bought Moy Park in 
Europe and acquired some beef jerky brands in the United 
States. At the beginning of the year, Marfrig bought the 
beef jerky producer Mirab in Argentina. When the United 
States imposed restrictions on meat imports from Brazil, 
the company transferred its processed meat beef jerky 
operations from Brazil to its Uruguayan subsidiary. 
The Brazilian company JBS had embarked on an 
internationalization process in 2005, with the purchase 
of Swift Armour in Argentina. In 2008, it expanded its 
geographic presence by acquiring a 50% interest in Inalca, 
of Italy, and in Tasman, of Australia. In the United States, 
JBS announced the acquisition of National Beef and 
Smithfield Beef for US$ 970 million and US$ 565 million, 
respectively. Although the acquisition of Smithfield Beef 
was successfully concluded, the purchase of National 
Beef was challenged by the United States Department of 
Justice on the grounds that the transaction could lead to 
higher consumer prices and lower wholesale prices for 
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cattle producers. JBS withdrew its bid in February 2009. In 
addition to these new acquisitions, the company invested 
in the expansion of its plants and distribution centres in 
Angola, Australia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Italy, the Russian Federation and the United States. JBS’s 
presence in the leading beef-producing countries protects 
it from trade and health restrictions. 
In the beverage market, the largest acquisition 
concluded in 2008 was in the Caribbean, where Angostura 
(Trinidad and Tobago), acquired a majority stake in 
Lascelles, a Jamaican liquor producer for US$ 920 
million. The acquisition is expected to be the first step 
for closer integration between the two companies, which 
will allow them to expand internationally. Also in the 
beverages segment, Coca-Cola FEMSA, of Mexico, moved 
forward with its strategy, as a distributor of The Coca-Cola 
Company, of complementing its non-soft-drink line and 
acquired Brisa, a bottled-water company in Colombia. 
In addition, it concluded the acquisition of Refrigerantes 
Minas Gerais in Brazil, giving it control of approximately 
one-third of the bottling and distribution system of The 
Coca-Cola Company in that country.
(f)  Retailing
Chilean companies have played a prominent role in 
the retail trade in the region, the main target of Chilean 
OFDI. In 2008, most Chilean investment in this sector was 
used to open new stores in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru (CCS, 2009). Even with the economic 
and financial crisis, Falabella posted sharply higher sales 
in 2008, even in the fourth quarter of the year, thanks to 
its international expansion. The company inaugurated 30 
new stores outside of Chile, in Argentina, Colombia and 
Peru. In the last quarter of 2008 alone, it opened 14 stores 
in Peru and took over five Casa Estrella stores in Colombia. 
Despite the economic downturn, Falabella plans to open 
130 new stores, both in Chile and abroad, in the coming 
four years. Another Chilean company, Cencosud, having 
gained a foothold in Brazil and Peru in 2007 (it completed 
its purchase of Supermercados Wong in Peru the following 
year), opened its first points of sale in Colombia in 2008. 
Cencosud has also invested in Argentina, Brazil and Peru, 
which, taken together, accounted for 56% of its revenue in 
2008, up from 37% in 2007. In the near future, Cencosud 
expects to consolidate its presence in the markets where 
it currently operates.
The other notable investment in retailing in 2008 was 
the purchase by the Mexican firm Grupo Casa SABA of 
the Brazilian network of pharmacies Drogasmil. This 
is the first international move by Grupo Casa SABA, 
which views Drogasmil as a starting point for future 
growth in Brazil.
(g) Autoparts and bodies 
In an industry reeling from the crisis, Latin American 
autoparts manufacturers made modest investments in 2008. 
The economic situation might reinforce the trend towards 
geographic diversification already being followed by companies 
such as Nemak, of the ALFA group, which, in the wake of 
the sizeable acquisitions it has made in recent years, now 
posts half of its sales in Europe and South America and is 
seeking to expand in Asia (CNN Expansión, 2008b).
The Brazilian manufacturer of bus bodies Marcopolo 
has focused its international growth strategy on developing 
markets, often through partnerships with companies in the 
target destinations. It began to produce buses in India in a 
joint venture with Tata Motors in 2008. In Egypt, it entered 
into a joint venture with GB Auto SAE, one of the largest 
companies in that country, to produce buses for markets 
in Africa, Europe and the Middle East in addition to the 
markets that Marcopolo already serves through its factories 
in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Mexico, Portugal, the 
Russian Federation and South Africa. Through a joint venture 
with the Russian firm Ruspromauto, Marcopolo began to 
manufacture buses to be used for urban transportation in 
the Russian Federation. 
3.  Conclusions and outlook for 2009
In 2008, the volume of OFDI from the countries of Latin 
America and the Caribbean reached US$ 34.561 billion, 
which represented a 42% increase with respect to 2007. 
This was the result of a combination of factors:
Some of the largest investments in 2008 were • 
brought about by inertia, as the result of corporate 
decisions taken prior to the worsening of the 
crisis in September. Some of the sectors in which 
trans-Latins are most active, in particular natural-
resource-based production sectors, performed 
favourably for the first two thirds of the year. In 
addition, some companies —in the petrochemical 
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and the meat-producing sectors— continued with 
the internationalization processes they had embarked 
on in 2006 and 2007; 
A substantial portion of the investments were made • 
in markets that have been less affected by the crisis or 
were impacted only later, particularly in the region and 
in other developing countries, or in sectors with a low 
income elasticity, such as industrial bread-making. In 
fact, some companies’ investments have been driven 
by the need to diversify and increase their presence in 
markets that have better growth prospects;
Some investments, especially in the hydrocarbon • 
and mining sectors, where projects have a long 
maturation period, have been made in anticipation 
of a recovery in the global economy.
Despite the good results posted in terms of investment 
in 2008, starting in the fourth quarter of the year many 
trans-Latins were forced to curb their operations and 
review their investment plans in response to declining 
global demand, uncertainty regarding the recovery in 
demand and the limited availability of credit. Some 
enterprises were severely hampered by past international 
acquisitions —such as Cemex’s purchase of Rinker and 
Tenaris’ acquisition of Maverick— that made them more 
sensitive to fluctuations in the United States market and the 
effects of the economic crisis in that country, in addition 
to sharply increasing their debt levels.42 
The behaviour of OFDI flows from the countries of 
Latin America and the Caribbean in 2009 will depend on the 
evolution of the crisis, the extent to which it affects global 
demand for natural resources and the speed and intensity 
of the contagion of the economies of the region and other 
economies where the trans-Latins have made investments. 
Due to increasingly tight credit and the fall in regional 
and global demand, the international expansion of Latin 
American and Caribbean enterprises is expected to be less 
dynamic in 2009.43 Nevertheless, the internationalization of 
these companies is already under way and oriented towards 
the long term, and the crisis could create opportunities for 
those that can obtain financing.
43
 The first signs of deceleration in this process began to show in the 
first quarter of 2009. For example, in Brazil, some US$ 400 million 
in divestments were recorded, in comparison with net divestments 
of nearly US$ 4.5 billion in the same period the year before (Central 
Bank of Brazil).
Table I.6
THE LARGEST NON-FINANCIAL COMPANIES AND GROUPS OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, IN TERMS OF SALES,  
WITH INVESTMENTS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN
(Millions of dollars)





PDVSAa Venezuela (Rep. Bol. de) 110 000 98 ... 49 Oil/Gas
PETROBRAS Brazil 87 476 21 12 62 Oil/Gas
TECHINT Argentina 39 770 63 63 52 Diversified
Cia. Vale do Rio Doce Brazil 33 115 84 46 50 Mining
Banco Itaú Brazil 31 195 13 23 ... Banking
América Móvil b Mexico 29 113 50 32 ... Telecommunications
CEMEX Mexico 21 673 82 71 50 Cement
Mexichem Mexico 21 170 50 31 ... Petrochemicals
Grupo Modelo Mexico 17 291 37 ... 41 Beverages
Gerdau Brazil 17 283 54 39 32 Steel/Metallurgy
Femsa Mexico 16 453 17 44 57 Beverages
Grupo Votorantim Brazil 13 589 16 5 50 Diversified/Cement/Mining/Steel
Telmex b Mexico 12 108 52 52 ... Telecommunications
Braskem Brazil 9 981 20 6 ... Petrochemicals
Grupo Alfa Mexico 9 750 53 70 39 Diversified
Cencosud Chile 7 623 37 63 97 Retailing
Camargo Corrêa Brazil 7 175 19 26 32 Diversified
CSN Brazil 6 978 24 ... ... Steel
Grupo Bimbo Mexico 6 756 31 60 90 Food
Falabella Chile 5 560 29 27 59 Retailing
Andrade Gutierrez Brazil 5 096 7 4 13 Construction
Odebrecht Brazil 4 950 77 15 54 Diversified/Construction
EMBRAER Brazil 4 896 96 45 24 Aerospace industry
Sadia Brazil 4 874 46 1 52 Food
TAM Brazil 4 248 10 ... 13 Transportation/Logistics
Sudamericana de Vapores Chile 4 131 90 58 7 Transportation/Logistics
Perdigão Brazil 3 745 41 ... 40 Food
Grupo Elektra Mexico 3 647 55 12 35 Diversified/Retailing
Lan Chile 3 525 85 63 15 Transportation/Logistics
Grupo Maseca Mexico 3 347 66 15 20 Food




b  The sales of América Móvil and Telmex are presented separately.
42
 In addition to the effects of the crisis, these two firms have seen 
their investments in the region affected by the nationalization of 
their operations in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
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E.  Concluding remarks
Foreign direct investment reached a record high in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in 2008, despite the eruption 
of the global economic and financial crisis. FDI flows into 
the region have in fact remained buoyant since 2003. This 
boom cycle may have come to an end in 2008, however, 
owing to the worsening of the international crisis.
The increase in FDI in Latin America and the 
Caribbean in the last few years, for whatever motive, 
has undoubtedly brought benefits. This increase has not, 
however, necessarily translated into countries taking 
better advantage of FDI, nor has the larger presence of 
transnational corporations in the region.
Natural-resource-seeking FDI has fuelled exports in that 
sector, raised the international competitiveness of natural-
resource-based products, generated jobs in both urban and rural 
areas and increased fiscal income. Transnational corporations 
operating in this sector still view their operations as enclaves, 
however. They have no ties to the national economy, involve 
minimal local processing and furthermore may pose hazards 
in terms of pollution and environmental degradation. In 
the mining sector, for example, foreign companies are less 
likely to have work done locally and tend to seek suppliers 
of inputs, services, machinery and equipment abroad. 
This hampers the development of externalities and limits 
the possibilities of retaining the value added generated by 
mining activities (ECLAC, 2008b). 
Efficiency-seeking FDI has helped transform the 
industrial sector in some countries. Costa Rica and Mexico, 
for example, have raised the international competitiveness 
of their manufacturing output, which is reflected in the 
increased volume and technological quality of their 
exports. This type of FDI also contributes to the transfer of 
knowledge and technology, which helps upgrade the skills 
of the workforce. It is associated with some difficulties, 
however, because efficiency-seeking FDI runs the risk 
of remaining trapped in low-value-added activities that 
generate few production linkages and tends to build only 
on static advantages (low costs) rather than on dynamic 
ones (innovation) in the recipient economy. The region’s 
electronics industry, which is dominated by transnational 
corporations, is one example of this phenomenon. FDI has 
transformed the electronics sector by boosting exports and 
transferring knowledge and technology, but it still targets 
mainly assembly, in other words low-value-added activities. 
Moving up the value chain of efficiency-seeking FDI is still 
proving to be difficult in the region (ECLAC, 2008a, chapter 
II), but FDI in offshore business services (see chapter II) 
may be one way to achieve this upgrade.
Market-seeking FDI spawned new economic activities in 
the receiving economies, increased local content, promoted 
production linkages and connections with the local business 
community and improved services. There is also a risk, 
however, that, in the absence of solid institutions or owing 
to regulatory loopholes, this type of FDI will displace local 
companies or encourage production of goods and services 
that are not internationally competitive. One sector in which 
this has occurred is the telecommunications sector. Legal 
vacuums, passive attitudes among telecommunications 
and competition authorities, intense lobbying by the 
dominant operators and the absence of alternative service 
providers have, in some cases, resulted in the benefits of 
new technologies being slow to reach local consumers 
(ECLAC, 2008a, chapter III).
The large FDI flows that have poured into the region 
over the past five years show clearly that the arrival of 
FDI per se does not guarantee that all the possible benefits 
that the presence of transnational corporations implies 
will necessarily be reaped. 
Outward FDI has also continued to grow in the region. 
However, it is important to analyse the contribution that the 
companies of the region have made to the development of 
their economies of origin. The globalization of the trans-
Latins forces them to develop their own competitiveness. 
However, the link between that competitiveness at the 
corporate level and improvements in competitiveness or 
efficiency at the industry level is by no means clear in 
developing economies. In part, this is because it is difficult 
to quantify the effect. But it is also because the benefits 
generated by knowledge and technology transfers may 
be undermined in developing countries by their limited 
ability to absorb them (Globerman and Shapiro, 2008).
This points to the need to develop the absorption 
capacity of the region’s economies.44 The question, then, 
is not how much FDI a country receives, but what it does 
and achieves with that FDI. 
A sound reaction to the current crisis must include 
policies to build and strengthen national economies’ production 
capacity so as to maximize the benefits of not only FDI, but 
also the countries’ own investments abroad. This could form 
part of a broader and more ingenious method for presenting 
a countercyclical response during economic slowdowns. 
44
 Absorption capacity is determined by, among other factors, the level 
of education of the population, labour training and the presence 
of solid institutions as well as adequate physical, scientific and 
technological infrastructure. For a more detailed analysis of this 
topic, see Blomstrom and Kokko (2003) and Nunnenkamp (2004).
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2008 49
Annex
Table I.A-1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY COUNTRY OR TERRITORY, 1998-2008
(Millions of dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 7 290.7 23 987.7 10 418.3 2 166.1 2 148.9 1 652.0 4 124.7 5 265.2 5 537.0 6 462.0 7 979.0
Bolivia 
(Plur. State of) 949.3 1 010.5 733.9 703.3 674.1 194.9 82.6 -290.8 277.8 366.3 512.0
Brazil 31 913.0 28 576.0 32 779.2 22 457.4 16 590.2 10 143.5 18 145.9 15 067.0 18 782.0 34 584.9 45 059.3
Chile 4 627.7 8 760.9 4 860.0 4 199.8 2 549.9 4 307.4 7 172.7 6 983.8 7 357.7 14 457.3 16 786.8
Colombia 2 828.8 1 507.9 2 436.5 2 541.9 2 133.7 1 720.5 3 015.6 10 252.0 6 656.0 9 048.7 10 563.8
Costa Rica 613.1 619.5 408.6 460.4 659.4 575.1 617.3 861.0 1 469.0 1 896.0 2 016.1
Ecuador 870.0 648.4 720.0 1 329.8 783.3 871.5 836.9 493.4 270.7 193.0 973.5
El Salvador 1 103.7 215.9 173.4 279.0 470.2 141.7 376.3 511.2 218.9 1 509.0 784.0
Guatemala 672.8 154.6 229.6 455.5 110.6 131.0 154.7 226.7 353.8 535.8 837.8
Honduras 99.0 237.3 381.7 304.2 275.2 402.8 546.7 599.8 674.2 815.9 888.4
Mexico 12 654.3 13 843.7 18 028.3 29 801.6 23 721.8 16 474.9 23 658.8 21 922.0 19 316.3 27 278.0 21 949.5
Nicaragua 218.2 337.3 266.5 150.2 203.9 201.3 250.0 241.1 286.8 381.7 593.8
Panama 1 203.1 864.4 623.9 467.1 98.6 770.8 1 012.3 962.1 2 497.9 1 907.2 2 401.7
Paraguay 341.9 94.5 104.1 84.2 10.0 27.4 37.7 53.5 182.9 196.4 150.0
Peru 1 644.0 1 940.0 809.7 1 144.3 2 155.8 1 335.0 1 599.0 2 578.7 3 466.5 5 342.6 4 079.0
Uruguay 164.1 235.3 273.5 296.8 193.7 416.4 332.4 847.4 1 493.5 1 222.7 2 043.9
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 4 985.0 2 890.0 4 701.0 3 683.0 782.0 2 040.0 1 483.0 2 589.0 -590.0 646.0 1 716.0
Antigua and Barbuda 22.8 51.8 66.6 111.9 79.7 179.4 95.2 230.1 359.2 357.6 301.9
Anguilla 28.1 38.0 43.0 34.7 38.2 34.4 91.8 118.6 143.2 120.1 90.4
Dominica 6.5 18.0 20.3 20.6 20.7 31.9 27.5 32.2 28.9 60.7 59.9
Grenada 48.7 41.6 39.4 60.8 57.4 90.5 66.3 73.3 95.6 186.5 147.1
Montserrat 2.6 8.2 2.3 0.6 0.6 2.1 2.8 1.3 2.2 5.9 1.9
Saint Kitts and Nevis 31.9 57.7 99.0 90.3 81.1 77.9 53.1 104.3 114.6 163.8 94.0
Saint Lucia 83.4 83.2 58.2 63.0 57.1 111.8 81.0 82.0 237.7 247.9 185.5
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 89.0 56.8 37.8 21.0 34.0 55.2 66.1 40.7 109.8 118.8 97.4
Bahamas 166.3 149.4 250.3 191.6 208.6 292.4 529.3 640.9 842.8 853.9 886.0
Barbados 15.8 17.4 19.4 18.6 17.4 58.3 -12.1 62.0 104.8 233.2 133.3 a
Belize 17.7 53.6 23.3 61.2 25.4 -10.9 111.5 126.9 116.6 148.0 189.0
Guyana 44.0 46.0 67.1 56.0 43.6 26.1 30.0 76.8 102.4 152.4 178.0
Haiti 10.8 30.0 13.3 4.4 5.7 13.8 5.9 26.0 160.0 74.5 29.8
Jamaica 369.1 523.7 468.3 613.9 481.1 720.7 601.6 682.5 882.2 866.5 810.4 a
Dominican Republic 699.8 1 337.8 952.9 1 079.1 916.8 613.0 909.0 1 122.7 1 528.0 1 578.9 2 884.0
Suriname 9.1 -61.5 -148.0 -26.8 145.5 200.7 286.2 398.5 322.7 315.7 345.6 a
Trinidad and Tobago 729.8 643.3 679.5 834.9 790.7 808.3 1 001.0 940.0 883.0 830.0 2 500.0 a
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
a 
 Estimates from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for 2008.
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Table I.A-2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,
BY DESTINATION SECTOR, 1999-2008
(Millions of dollars)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Anguilla
Tourism … 35 19 16 7 21 60 72 78 56
Other … 0 4 3 0 0 31 0 0 0
Antigua and Barbuda
Tourism … 7 20 10 4 15 75 259 245 212
Petroleum … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commercial … 12 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Finance … 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction … 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 0
Banking and insurance … 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Medicine … 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other … 29 66 53 113 29 100 29 27 5
Argentina
Natural resources 17 845 2 736 898 1 133 -278 2 265 … … … …
Manufacturing 1 950 1 487 49 988 1 145 1 221 … … … …
Services 3 153 4 750 1 260 -461 539 123 … … … …
Other 1 038 1 445 -42 489 246 665 … … … …
Belize 
Natural resources … … … … … … … 12 9 36
Manufacturing … … … … … … … 0 0 0
Services … … … … … … … 91 87 82
Tourism 46 26 9
Other … … … … … … … 14 37 44
Bolivia (Plur. State of)
Natural resources 472 441 566 721 356 168 288 390 370 734
Manufacturing 152 93 87 91 62 90 58 52 143 102
Services 386 299 224 187 149 126 58 140 328 346
Brazil
Natural resources 423 649 1 494 638 1 487 1 073 2 194 1 542 4 751 12 995
Manufacturing 7 002 5 070 7 001 7 555 4 506 10 708 6 527 8 462 13 481 14 013
Services 20 147 24 157 12 547 10 585 6 909 8 485 12 915 12 702 16 073 17 449
Chile
Natural resources 1 374 354 1 153 2 006 403 350 595 1 140 434 2 076
Manufacturing 833 253 809 218 234 430 199 91 69 189
Services 7 023 2 432 3 058 1 157 649 3 856 1 003 1 938 867 2 058
Colombia
Natural resources -16 122 1 057 910 913 1 745 3 288 3 786 4 474 5 754
Manufacturing 505 556 261 308 289 188 5 513 803 1 867 1 374
Services 1 019 1 758 1 224 915 518 1 083 1 451 2 067 2 709 3 437
Costa Rica
Natural resources 50 -11 1 -9 -36 51 37 66 -10 426
Manufacturing 366 308 237 486 395 456 375 432 722 553
Services 200 126 223 182 211 284 450 967 1 181 1 001
Other 3 -14 0 0 6 4 -1 4 4 36
Dominica
Tourism … 4 6 5 4 3 4 0 7 7
Manufacturing … 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0
Agro-industry … 2 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 0
Construction … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Petroleum … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other … 0 2 1 12 7 12 24 43 42
Ecuador
Natural resources 605 682 1 139 503 198 458 222 -69 -100 270
Manufacturing 8 10 59 67 79 115 75 90 97 170
Services 36 29 132 214 594 264 196 250 198 533
El Salvador
Natural resources -16 -11 30 9 -2 22 0 29 10 5
Manufacturing 18 32 65 47 48 41 317 17 21 28
Services 210 133 159 143 12 313 191 182 1 315 480
Other (maquila) 3 19 26 10 71 31 4 0 101 26
Grenada
Tourism … 15 16 27 39 28 37 48 117 86
Manufacturing … 2 5 0 0 0 1 0 4 3
Education … 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0
Other … 2 11 7 19 8 9 19 31 23
Honduras a
Natural resources 113 56 40 30 59 58 53 44 11 4
Manufacturing 47 218 133 94 177 282 270 227 384 181
Services 78 82 123 122 144 166 263 359 515 608
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Mexico
Natural resources 329 262 76 354 151 216 233 414 1 883 4 373
Manufacturing 9 157 9 996 5 899 8 789 7 735 13 175 11 007 9 923 12 125 6 384
Services 4 358 7 770 23 827 14 579 8 589 10 268 10 683 8 980 13 270 11 193
Nicaragua
Natural resources 25 12 15 10 4 1 0 15 11 38
Manufacturing 32 68 46 60 45 33 87 63 121 96
Services 243 175 89 134 151 206 155 109 250 460
Panama
Natural resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 … … …
Manufacturing 34 0 316 -76 3 41 -62 … … …
Services 632 396 217 98 566 1 092 1 693 … … …
Other 5 228 -66 76 166 -32 -696 … … …
Paraguay
Natural resources … … … … … … -1 -34 1 …
Manufacturing … … … … … … -17 64 11 …
Services … … … … … … 54 84 169 …
Peru
Natural resources 336 37 65 53 1 244 283 735 96 604
Manufacturing 133 70 162 713 25 -82 -78 433 11 89
Services 935 2 563 558 245 29 -280 -272 345 214 1 453
Dominican Republic 
Natural resources 0 0 7 23 78 60 31 100 76 300
Industry and commerce 183 154 167 223 103 321 199 259 188 704
Services 1 067 673 796 600 326 448 718 1 039 1 245 1 815
Other (includes free zone) 88 126 110 71 107 81 175 131 70 67
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Tourism … 52 63 68 40 8 1 0 33 39
Manufacturing … 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commerce … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Banking … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Construction … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other … 30 7 1 12 10 40 24 10 9
Saint Lucia
Tourism … 27 0 14 23 28 27 174 156 97
Manufacturing … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Petroleum … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agriculture … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Other … 11 41 26 62 20 28 1 2 16
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
Tourism … 46 3 9 20 85 31 130 160 90
Manufacturing … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Agriculture … 0 0 0 0 11 7 0 0 0
Other … 0 0 20 61 4 3 10 6 10
Trinidad and Tobago
Natural resources 449 614 787 695 710 867 813 736 711 ….
Manufacturing 7 -38 -13 13 12 17 15 16 21 ….
Services 18 2 30 43 30 49 47 62 56 ….
Other 169 102 31 40 56 65 65 69 43 ….
Uruguay
Natural resources … … -15 48 198 142 264 …. …. ….
Manufacturing … … 12 54 40 23 26 …. …. ….
Services … … 281 145 149 145 248 …. …. ….
Other … … 18 -53 29 22 310 …. …. ….
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Petroleum …. 1 206 2 016 532 -25 -529 1 021 -1 958 -180 -230
Finance …. 590 403 526 197 646 492 369 673 345
Other … 2 905 1 264 -276 1 868 1 366 1 076 999 153 1 601
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2008. These data are based on official figures of 
Argentina (National Directorate of International Accounts (DNCI) of the National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC), net income); Bolivia (Plur. State of) (Central Bank, 
gross income); Brazil (Central Bank, gross income); Chile (Foreign Investment Committee, investments made); Colombia (Bank of the Republic, net income); Dominican 
Republic (Central Bank, net income); Ecuador (Central Bank, net income); El Salvador (Central Reserve Bank, net income); Honduras (Central Bank, net income); Mexico 
(Department of the Economy, net income); Nicaragua (Central Bank, net income); Panama (General Comptroller of the Republic, net income); Paraguay (Central Bank, net 
income); Peru (Proinversión, net income); Uruguay (Central Bank, net income); Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) (Central Bank, net income); and Trinidad and Tobago (Central Bank, 
net income). Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (Eastern Caribbean 
Central Bank, net income). Data do not necessarily coincide with balance of payments.
a 
 Includes maquila from 2004 onward.
Table I.A-2 (concluded)
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Table I.A-3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET INFLOWS OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 1999-2008
(Millions of dollars)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Anguilla
United States … 24 0 8 7 21 62 68 68 46
Other … 12 0 11 0 0 30 4 10 10
Antigua and Barbuda
United Kingdom … 11 0 4 1 3 0 0 0 0
United States … 6 18 9 19 0 19 0 0 0
Italy … 0 0 0 0 3 27 0 0 0
Caribbean … 4 2 0 0 12 10 0 0 0
Other … 28 69 55 119 25 118 288 272 217
Argentina
Netherlands 424 378 1 302 -436 -170 983 ... ... ... ...
United States 1 307 947 533 342 -251 618 ... ... ... ...
France 1 536 656 521 -624 -185 389 ... ... ... ...
Germany 272 69 -100 381 112 336 ... ... ... ...
Chile 201 96 -245 22 24 171 ... ... ... ...
Other 20 244 8 273 155 2 464 2 121 1 777 ... ... ... ...
Bolivia (Plur. State of)
United States 339 368 351 289 189 131 ... ... ... ...
Netherlands 106 47 58 12 5 53 ... ... ... ...
Spain 10 46 59 268 63 40 ... ... ... ...
United Kingdom 21 25 56 50 63 27 ... ... ... ...
Colombia 2 0 3 3 4 26 ... ... ... ...
Other 532 344 349 377 242 86 ... ... ... ...
Brazil
United States 8 088 5 399 4 465 2 615 2 383 3 978 4 644 4 434 6 039 7 047
Luxembourg 290 1 027 285 1 013 239 747 139 745 2 855 5 937
Netherlands 2 042 2 228 1 892 3 372 1 445 7 705 3 208 3 495 8 116 4 639
Japan 5 702 9 593 827 504 1 368 243 779 648 465 4 099
Spain 2 115 2 035 2 767 587 710 1 055 1 220 1 514 2 164 3 851
Other … … 10 807 10 687 6 757 6 538 11 531 11 396 14 066 18 884
Chile
Canada 518 744 142 913 188 368 84 1 833 334 2 012
United States 1 389 788 1 808 551 373 123 -15 337 266 523
Spain 4 620 643 386 248 160 3 742 207 75 107 455
Japan 251 55 145 58 31 18 47 51 33 368
Mexico 72 2 14 3 16 150 605 47 55 163
Other 2 380 807 2 525 1 608 518 235 870 825 578 802
Colombia
United States 545 120 223 784 274 874 1 410 1 524 1 389 1 745
Panama 180 259 129 40 135 10 208 240 477 760
Spain 154 479 161 107 155 136 599 492 289 564
Mexico 6 23 12 21 19 16 1 063 31 340 412
United Kingdom 18 1 14 -11 35 16 3 747 17 35 200
Other 1 427 2 384 1 134 739 581 914 1 112 870 1 364 1 650
Costa Rica
United States ... 280 257 328 354 557 532 695 940 1 263
Mexico ... 29 33 31 38 29 37 31 64 110
Spain ... 22 26 0 7 7 14 10 54 74
Germany ... 10 3 1 58 16 7 25 59 66
El Salvador ... 15 16 23 25 14 21 33 41 62
Other ... 53 125 275 92 171 250 674 738 441
Dominica
United States … 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Canada … 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Taiwan Province of China … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2
Other … 1 9 8 19 10 16 24 51 50
Ecuador
Mexico … … … 0 6 0 7 43 -40 303
Spain … … … 1 3 1 3 7 85 127
Panama … … … 39 85 94 76 67 78 71
China … … … 16 20 -8 -20 12 85 49
Canada … … … 0 19 274 29 -252 49 43
Other … … … 697 699 675 382 103 -56 367
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El Salvador
Panama … … 6 15 -1 2 42 68 841 321
United States … … 196 57 63 -5 332 13 499 129
Italy … … 0 27 0 0 0 47 0 32
Nicaragua … … 4 8 -13 0 1 7 8 10
Brazil … … 0 0 0 0 0 4 9 9
Other … … 73 101 80 409 137 87 90 39
Grenada
United Kingdom … 0 0 0 0 3 4 0 0 0
United States … 0 11 24 45 2 0 0 0 0
Germany … 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0
Caribbean … 4 5 0 13 8 13 0 0 0
Other … 15 16 10 6 13 30 67 152 112
Honduras a
United States 112 100 98 171 195 192 303 339 460 339
Ireland ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 214
United Kingdom 3 16 11 1 -3 61 48 49 103 71
Guatemala 4 11 6 10 3 9 25 17 15 40
Canada 52 18 19 22 22 79 17 107 139 37
Other ... 237 171 72 186 206 206 162 212 93
Mexico
United States 7 485 12 920 21 411 13 013 9 190 8 619 11 638 12 431 11 577 8 938
Canada 1 042 2 113 2 887 4 960 2 885 7 854 1 190 1 592 5 200 4 322
Spain 693 670 1 031 233 303 551 450 539 659 2 361
United Kingdom -188 283 126 1 254 1 074 274 1 310 1 261 565 1 387
Netherlands 1 087 2 721 2 653 1 557 715 3 341 2 437 2 742 4 363 1 158
Other 3 725 -678 1 694 2 706 2 309 3 020 4 897 750 4 913 3 785
Nicaragua
Mexico ... 0 9 8 4 72 36 53 128 127
Canada ... 4 3 0 0 0 43 14 32 110
United States ... 37 31 31 76 -16 51 53 84 90
Venezuela (Rep. Bol. de) ... 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 47 76
Guatemala ... 4 17 38 0 3 9 22 0 75
Other ... 222 91 127 122 191 103 145 91 116
Panama
Argentina 4 2 -5 0 0 5 19 … … …
Colombia -19 -49 30 361 26 12 -283 … … …
Costa Rica -8 3 11 13 -1 -6 13 … … …
Ecuador -36 -12 -2 -15 0 4 3 … … …
Mexico 138 173 -70 -19 29 -9 -28 … … …
Other 1 217 535 684 90 28 739 1 185 … … …
Paraguay
United States … … … … … … 25 86 84 …
Netherlands … … … … … … 15 18 -32 …
United Kingdom … … … … … … -8 -5 9 …
Japan … … … … … … 4 -6 -14 …
Uruguay … … … … … … 1 8 2 …
Other … … … … … … -2 14 131 …
Peru
Chile … … 106 15 1 -125 -82 62 32 591
Italy … … 202 124 -216 103 -504 65 -22 414
South Africa … … 49 603 3 0 268 467 0 405
Norway … … 117 0 0 25 5 15 0 276
France … … 3 29 18 0 0 0 -30 148
Other … … 308 240 249 -120 247 904 341 311
Dominican Republic
United Kingdom 76 17 2 0 -25 21 95 66 77 598
Canada 95 133 10 18 -23 274 111 141 151 384
United States 181 202 433 382 462 177 457 715 291 192
Spain 457 190 193 35 -13 127 215 253 586 59
Netherlands 62 36 245 119 25 5 41 33 26 57
Other 468 375 195 362 188 306 204 320 448 1 064
Saint Kitts and Nevis
United Kingdom … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 21
United States … 40 4 19 5 10 15 0 0 0
Canada … 41 57 46 34 0 0 0 0 19
Caribbean … 0 1 2 9 4 2 0 0 0
Other … 2 7 2 3 4 26 24 43 9
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Saint Lucia
United Kingdom … 1 3 17 29 7 6 51 24 0
United States … 27 0 9 7 1 0 0 0 0
Italy … 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0
Saudi Arabia … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
France … 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Caribbean … 0 0 11 4 0 0 15 22 0
Other … 10 38 3 44 41 49 105 112 113
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines
United Kingdom …. 0 0 21 38 0 38 135 140 98
United States …. 9 0 8 20 4 0 0 0 0
Italy …. 37 2 0 20 85 0 0 0 0
Caribbean …. 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0
Other …. 0 1 1 0 11 2 5 3 2
Trinidad and Tobago
United States 275 316 372 353 376 698 694 627 574 …
United Kingdom 232 255 307 291 297 170 165 150 159 …
Germany 8 14 37 35 36 43 41 38 43 …
India 57 11 21 20 20 24 16 27 21 …
Canada 9 2 7 7 12 3 1 3 3 …
Other 63 82 91 85 68 61 22 39 29 …
Uruguay
Argentina … … 14 -28 270 182 397 … … …
Brazil … … -6 40 0 38 203 … … …
Panama … … 103 37 31 28 106 … … …
Paraguay … … 77 14 -3 2 35 … … …
Bahamas … … 20 29 8 0 29 … … …
Other … … 90 101 110 82 78 … … …
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Spain … 478 214 89 83 84 40 274 295 237
Netherlands … -10 78 117 56 304 53 -74 203 84
Panama … 42 44 20 23 29 38 29 53 29
Colombia … -38 3 5 -8 1 2 9 22 3
Other …. 4 227 3 338 561 1 893 1 087 2 474 -832 76 1 363
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2008. These data are based on official figures of 
Argentina (National Directorate of International Accounts (DNCI) of the National Statistics and Census Institute (INDEC), net income); Bolivia (Plur. State of) (Central Bank, 
gross income); Brazil (Central Bank, gross income); Chile (Foreign Investment Committee, investments made); Colombia (Bank of the Republic, net income); Dominican 
Republic (Central Bank, net income); Ecuador (Central Bank, net income); El Salvador (Central Reserve Bank, net income); Honduras (Central Bank, net income); Mexico 
(Department of the Economy, net income); Nicaragua (Central Bank, net income); Panama (General Comptroller of the Republic, net income); Paraguay (Central Bank, net 
income); Peru (Proinversión, net income); Uruguay (Central Bank, net income); Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of) (Central Bank, net income); and Trinidad and Tobago (Central Bank, 
net income). Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Eastern (Caribbean 
Central Bank; net income). Data do not necessarily coincide with balance of payments.
a 
 Includes maquila from 2004 onward.
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Table I.A-4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FLOWS OF OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT,  
BY COUNTRY, OFFICIAL FIGURES, 1998-2008
(Millions of dollars)
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Argentina 2 325 1 730 901 161 -627 774 676 1 311 2 438 1 465 1 503
Bolivia (Plur. State of) 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 5
Brazil 2 721 1 690 2 282 -2 258 2 482 249 9 807 2 517 28 202 7 067 20 457
Chile 1 483 2 558 3 987 1 610 343 1 606 1 563 2 183 2 876 3 830 6 891
Colombia 796 116 325 16 857 938 142 4 662 1 098 912 2 158
Costa Rica 5 5 8 10 34 27 61 -43 98 263 6
El Salvador 1 54 -5 -10 -26 19 -53 113 -26 100 65
Guatemala 35
Honduras 0 0 0 0 0 20 -6 1 1 1 3
Mexico 4 404 891 1 253 4 432 6 474 5 758 8 256 686
Uruguay 9 -3 -1 6 14 15 18 36 -1 84 -5
Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of) 1 043 872 521 204 1 026 1 318 619 1 167 2 076 2 237 2 757
Belize 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 n.d.
Jamaica 82 95 74 89 74 116 52 101 85 115 n.d.
Trinidad and 
Tobago 0 264 25 150 106 225 29 341 370 0 n.d.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures as at 15 May 2009.
Table I.A-5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOP 60 NON-FINANCIAL TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, BY CONSOLIDATED SALES, 2007
(Millions of dollars)
Ranking Corporation Country Sector Consolidated Sales Main subsidiaries
1 Telefónica de España Spain Telecommunications 29 915 Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Peru, 
Colombia, Ecuador, Central America
2 Wal-Mart United States Commerce 29 067 a Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, El 
Salvador
3 Volkswagen Germany Automotive 22 724 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
4 América Móvil/Telmex bMexico Telecommunications 21 840 c Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, 
Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Dominican Republic 
5 General Motors United States Automotive 21 262 Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Argentina
6 DaimlerChrysler United States Automotive 17 308 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
7 Repsol-YPF Spain Petroleum/Gas 16 817 Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
8 Ford United States Automotive 14 909 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
9 Anglo-American Plc United Kingdom Mining 13 021 Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia, Venezuela 
(Bol. Rep. of)




Petroleum/Gas 12 040 d Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)
11 Cargill United States Agro-industry 11 868 d Brazil, Argentina
12 Bunge United States Agro-industry 11 419 d Brazil, Argentina, Mexico
13 Arcelor Mittal Luxembourg/Netherlands Iron and steel/Metallurgy 11 397 a Brazil, Mexico
14 Nestlé Switzerland Food 10 719 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile
15 Nissan Japan Automotive 10 124 e Mexico, Brazil
16 Endesa Spain Energy 9 366 Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru
17 AES Corp. United States Electricity 8 682 Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Panama
18 Carrefour France Commerce 8 405 f Brazil, Argentina, Colombia
19 Exxon Mobil United States Petroleum/Gas 8 188 f Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of), Argentina
20 BHP Billiton Australia/United Kingdom Mining 8 182 Chile, Brazil, Peru, Colombia
21 Fiat Italy Automotive 8 173 g Brazil, Argentina
22 Chevron United States Petroleum/Gas 8 039 f Brazil, Colombia, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Argentina
23 Toyota Japan Automotive 7 757 h Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
24 Hewlett Packard United States Computing 7 641 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
25 Unilever Netherlands/United 
Kingdom
Agro-industry 6 870 a Argentina , Brazil, Mexico
26 Techinta Argentina Iron and steel/Metallurgy 6 576 j Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, 
Ecuador, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
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Ranking Corporation Country Sector Consolidated Sales Main subsidiaries
27 Delphi United States Automotive 6 295 Mexico, Brazil
28 Iberdrola Spain Electricity 5 240 Brazil, Guatemala, Mexico, Chile, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
29 Italy Telecom Italy Telecommunications 5 223 Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Cuba, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of)
30 General Electric United States Electronics 4 700 Mexico, Brazil
31 Peugeot-Citröen France Automotive 4 632 Brazil, Argentina
32 Dow Chemical United States Petrochemicals 4 589 Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Chile, Colombia
33 Caterpillar United States Machinery/Equipment 4 500 Brazil, Mexico
34 Honda Japan Automotive 4 261 a Brazil, Mexico
35 PETROBRAS Brazil Petroleum/Gas 4 245 j Argentina, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela (Bol. 
Rep. of), Bolivia (Plurinational State of), 
Mexico
36 Siemens Germany Electronics 4 167 Brazil, Mexico
37 British American 
Tobacco
United Kingdom Tobacco 3 942 Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela (Bol. 
Rep. of), Jamaica, Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago
38 Portugal Telecom Portugal Telecommunications 3 609 Brazil
39 PepsiCo United States Beverages/Alcoholic 3 498 e Mexico, Argentina, Venezuela
(Bol. Rep. of)
40 Renault France Automotive 3 429 h Brazil, Argentina, Colombia, Mexico
41 IBM United States Computing 3 401 g Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
42 BASF Germany Chemicals/Pharmaceuticals 3 364 Brazil, Mexico
43 Nokia Finland Electronics 3 343 Brazil, Mexico
44 Avon United States Hygiene/Cleaning 3 250 a Brazil, Mexico, Colombia
45 The Coca-Cola Co. United States Beverages/Beers 3 244 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
46 E.I. du Pont de 
Nemours
United States Petrochemicals/Chemicals 3 132 Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
47 Danone France Food 2 983 h Mexico, Brazil, Argentina
48 Philip Morris United States Tobacco 2 963 Mexico, Brazil
49 Sanmina SCI United States Electronics 2 933 e Mexico, Brazil
50 LG Electronics Republic of Korea Electronics 2 838 Brazil, Brazil
51 Cencosud b Chile Commerce 2 812 d Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru
52 Procter and Gamble United States Hygiene/Cleaning 2 763 a Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica, 
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
53 Bayer Germany Petrochemicals/Chemicals 2 626 a Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
54 Philips Netherlands Electronics 2 535 a Mexico, Brazil
55 Kimberly Clark Co. United States Pulp/Paper 2 500 a Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Peru, 
Honduras, Dominican Republic, El 
Salvador, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
56 Samsung Corp. Republic of Korea Electronics 2 373 g Brazil, Mexico
57 Bosch Germany Automotive 2 227 g Brazil, Mexico, Argentina
58 Flextronics Singapore Electronics/Automotive 2 197 Mexico
59 Volvo Sweden Automotive 2 137 Brazil, Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
60 Intel United States Electronics 2 075 Costa Rica
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the companies’ annual reports and the magazines América economía, 2008; 
Expansión, 2008; Exame, 2008 and Semana, 2008. 
a 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil and Mexico. 
b 
 Companies whose origins are in Latin America (trans-Latins).
c 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Latin America, but outside its country of origin. 
d 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Argentina and Brazil. 
e 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Mexico. 
f 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil and Colombia. 
g 
 This figure corresponds to its sales in Brazil. 
h This figure corresponds to its sales in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
j
 This figure corresponds to the sales of its subsidiaries: Tenaris and Techint in Brazil and Ternium in Mexico.
j This figure corresponds to its sales in Argentina.
Table I.A-5 (concluded)
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Table I.A-6
CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS FOR AMOUNTS IN EXCESS OF US$ 10 BILLION, ANNOUNCED OR CONCLUDED IN 2008
(Millions of dollars)
Firm or asset acquired Country of the firmacquired Buyer Country of Buyer Stated Value Sector
Operations announced before 2008 and concluded in 2008
ABN Amro Holding NV Netherlands Fortis; Banco Santander; 




Altadis S.A. Spain Imperial Tobacco Group Plc United Kingdom 20 476 Tobacco
Reuters Group Plc United Kingdom Thomson Corp Canada 18 199 Media 
Rodamco Europe NV Netherlands Unibail-Rodamco France 17 759 Diversified
Koninklijke Numico NV Netherlands Groupe Danone France 16 473 Food
Imperial Chemical 
Industries PLC
United Kingdom Akzo Nobel Netherlands 16 059 Chemicals
European Energy Assets Spain, Italy E.On Germany 15 786 Electricity





Italy Banca Monte dei Paschi di 
Siena S.p.A
Italy 13 214 Banking
Kelda Group Ltd United Kingdom Citigroup Inc; Gic Special 






Operations announced and concluded in 2008
Anheuser-Busch Cos. Inc. United States Inbev NV Belgium 60 829 Beverages-Beers
(Several, including ABN 
Amro Business Unit; Fortis 
Verzekeringen NV; Fortis 
Bank; Fortis Corporate 
Insurance)
Netherlands, Belgium The Kingdom of the 
Netherlands (Government)
Netherlands 23 186 Financial services







Switzerland Blackrock Inc. United States 15 000 Financial services
Rio Tinto Plc United Kingdom Alcoa Inc; Aluminium 




14 135 Basic minerals
British American Tobacco 
Plc
United Kingdom Shareholders (spin-off) 11 043 Tobacco
Operations announced in 2008
Genentech Inc United States Roche Holding AG-
Genusschein
Switzerland 41 265 Biotechnology











Belgium BNP Paribas France 11 538 Financial services
Trane Inc United States Ingersoll-Rand Co. Ltd. Bermuda 11 202 Industrial 
construction
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg and press reports.
Note:  The data on mergers and acquisitions refer to concluded or pending operations announced in 2008. The operations reported here refer only to those for which the transaction 
value is known. 
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Table I.A-7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS OF ASSETS AND FIRMS FOR AMOUNTS  
IN EXCESS OF US$ 500 MILLION, ANNOUNCED OR CONCLUDED IN 2008
(Millions of dollars)





Buyer Country of buyer Seller Country of seller
Stated  
value Sector
Operations announced before 2008 and concluded in 2008




Royal Bank of 
Canada
Canada 2 187 Banking
ArcelorMittal Inox Brasil 
S.A.
Brazil Arcelormittal Luxembourg, 
India
1 683 Steel
Gas and electricity assets Mexico Gas Natural SDG 
S.A.
Spain EDF, Mitsubishi 
Electric Co.
France, Japan 1 448 Electricity
Cable business Chile Nexans S.A. France Madeco S.A. Chile 853 Metals
Lascelles Demercado & 
Co Ltd















Bolsa de Mercadorias & 
Futuros
Brazil CME Group Inc. United States 726 Financial 
services
Chilquinta Energía S.A.; 
Luz del Sur
Chile, Peru Ashmore Energy 
International
United Kingdom Public Service 
Enterprise GP
United States 685 Electricity
Afore Santander 
Mexicana; Afp y Cesenta 




ING Groep NV Netherlands Banco Santander 
S.A.
Spain 655 Financial 
services
Grupo de Supermercados 
Wong
Peru Cencosud Chile 623 Retail commerce
Service Vouchers 
Business
Brazil Sodexo France Vr Services 
Group 






Rusoro Mining Ltd Canada Gold Fields Ltd. South Africa 507 Mining
Operations announced and concluded in 2008
Iron X Brazil Anglo American Plc United Kingdom MMX Mineração 
e Metálicos SA
Brazil 3 493 Steel
Nacional Minerios S.A. 
(40%)
Brazil Posco; Nippon Steel 
Corp; Itochu Corp: 
Jfe Holding Inc; 
Sumitomo Metal 
Industries; Kobe 







Brazil 3 008 Steel
Grupo Financiero Inbursa Mexico Criteria CaixaCorp 
S.A.
Spain 2 469 Financial 
services
CTC Telefónica Chile Chile Telefónica SA Spain 1 579 Telecommuni-
cations
Seguros ING SA de CV Mexico AXA France ING Groep NV Netherlands 1 500 Insurance
Minera Esperanza; 
Minera El Tesoro (30%)
Chile Marubeni Corp Japan Antofagasta Plc United 
Kingdom
1 401 Mining
Sociedad Austral de 
Electricidad S.A.






















Colombia Not disclosed United States Houston 
American 
Energy Corp
United States 920 Petroleum
Vopak Terminal Bahamas 
Ltd.





2 Highways/Chile Chile Several buyers 
(FCC; Cajas de 
Ahorros)
Spain Banco Nacional 
de Comercio 
Exterior
Mexico 553  
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K2 petroleum block United States Ecopetrol S.A. Colombia Union Oil Co. of 
California
United States 510 Petroleum
Operations announced in 2008
Distribución y Servicio 
D&S
Chile Wal-Mart Stores United States   3 627 Food
VW Truck & Bus Brazil MAN AG Germany Volkswagen AG Germany 1 612 Automobiles
Iron X (remaining minority 
stake) 
Brazil Anglo American Plc United Kingdom 1 923 Steel
Peregrino Field Brazil StatoilHydro ASA Norway Anadarko 
Petroleum Corp.
United States 1 800 Petroleum
West Polaris Panama Ship Finance 
International Limited
Bermuda Seadrill Ltd. Norway 850 Petroleum
London Mining South 
America
Brazil Arcelormittal Luxembourg London Mining 
Plc
Norway 810 Mining
Braslo Produtos de Carne 
Ltda; Penasul Alimentos 
Ltda, Agrofrango 
Industria; Moy Park Ltd; 
Kitchen Range Foods Ltd.
Brazil (3); Ireland; 
United Kingdom
Marfrig Frigoríficos 
e Comércio de 
Alimentos S.A.
Brazil Osi Group Llc United States 680 Retail commerce









Spain 568 Highway 
administration 
services 
Operations involving withdrawal of TNCs, with the sale of assets/firms to local companies
YPF S.A. Argentina Grupo Petersen Argentina Repsol YPF Spain 2 235 Petroleum-Gas
Banco Bradesco S.A. Brazil NCF Participações Brazil Banco Bilbao 
Vizcaya 
Argentaria
Spain 1 382 Banking
Esso Brasileira de 
Petróleo
Brazil COSAN Brazil Exxon Mobil 
Corp.
United States 989 Petroleum-Gas
UNIBANCO AIG Seguros Brazil UNIBANCO-UNITS Brazil American 
International 
Group (AIG)
United States 820 Banking
Chevron Brazil Ltda; 
Sociedade Anónima de 
Oleo Galena Signal
Brazil Ultrapar Participações 
S.A.
Brazil Chevron Corp. United States 730 Petrochemicals
Solpart Participações S.A. Brazil Several buyers Brazil Telecom Italia Italy 515 Telecommuni-
cations
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg and press reports.
Note: Includes initial acquisitions of 5% or more of the equity in a firm or consortium, initial acquisitions of less than 5% but for amounts in excess of US$ 200 million, acquisitions 
of additional equity for any amount and joint operations creating new firms.
Table I.A-7 (continued)
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Table I.A-8
MAIN CROSS-BORDER ACQUISITIONS BY TRANS-LATINS OUTSIDE THEIR COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN,  







Buyer Country of buyer Seller 
Country of 
seller Stated value Sector
Operations announced before 2008 and concluded in 2008
Gerdau Macsteel 
Inc.
United States Gerdau Brazil 1 458 Metal 
Manufacturing
Lascelles 














Peru Cencosud Chile 623 Retail commerce
US Zinc Corp. United States Votorantim 
Group




Corsa Controladora Mexico Gerdau Brazil 101 Steel
Operations announced and concluded in 2008
LWB Refractories 
GmbH & Co. KG
Germany Magnesita 
Refratarios S.A.











































Cryogas S.A. Colombia Indura SA Chile Linde AG Germany 139 Industrial gases
Operations announced in 2008
Fresh Bread & 
Baked Goods 
Business















Industria; Moy Park 
Ltd.; Kitchen Range 
Foods Ltd)
Brazil (3), Ireland, 
United Kingdom 
(respectively)










United States 560 Food 
Esso Chile 
Petrolera Ltda.
Chile PETROBRAS Brazil Exxon Mobil 
Corp
United States 400 Gas stations 








Brazil Grupo Casa 
Saba S.A. de 
C.V.
Mexico 113 Pharmacies
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from Bloomberg and press reports.
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Chapter II
Foreign direct investment in offshore 
business services in Latin America  
and the Caribbean
A. Introduction
Previous issues of this report have stressed that the main challenge of Latin American and 
Caribbean countries in their investment promotion efforts is to attract high-quality FDI 
(defined as that which induces local economic, technological and social development) rather 
than merely large quantities of investment. Although not among the industries generating the 
greatest dollar value of FDI, offshore business services have the potential to score well by the 
criteria that define high-quality FDI. 
Offshoring refers to the provision of services from a 
location outside the country where the customer is located. 
Through the use of information and communication 
technologies (ICT), companies can overcome the barriers 
imposed by the geographical distance between the demand 
and supply of labour in certain activities. The scope of 
services offshored is broad and in constant expansion 
through innovative uses of ICT, as discussed further in 
this chapter.
A related concept is that of outsourcing, whereby a 
company provides services to another company, regardless 
of its location. Some, but not all, offshored services are 
outsourced. In fact, a number of companies have offshored 
in-house (or “captive”) service centers (see boxes II.1 
and II.2). By taking part in the offshore business services 
market, developing countries have benefited from the 
creation of jobs that are usually better remunerated than 
alternatives for similarly skilled persons, as well as from 
the skills-upgrading generated by on-the-job experiences 
and training, and from exposure to global standards in 
management practice, ICT tools, and technology, among 
other factors.
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Box II.1
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY OFFSHORE BUSINESS SERVICES?
Offshore business services cover a broad 
range of activities, including contact 
centers, business processes, information 
technology (IT) services, and knowledge-
intensive, analytical services (see table 1). 
Classifications often distinguish IT services 
from IT-enabled services, which include 
the remaining categories of services 
in table 1 (contact centres, business 
processes and knowledge-intensive, 
analytical services).
Offshore services can be provided either 
in-house (also known as captive offshoring) 
or by a separate company (outsourcing to 
companies referred to as vendors) (see 
table 2). This chapter addresses both 
as part of the same phenomenon, but 
when discussing corporate strategies, 
focuses on outsourcing vendors, for 
whom offshoring often lies at the core 
of their competitive strategies.
Table 1
MAIN CATEGORIES OF IT AND IT-ENABLED SERVICES OFFERED THROUGH OFFSHORE OPERATIONS
IT services Software development, application testing, content development, 
IT infrastructure management and IT consulting.
Contact centres In-bound/out-bound calls or interaction with customers through other media 
such as Internet chats, fax and e-mail. Main functions include telemarketing 
and customer support (also referred to as “voice BPO”).
Business processes Data entry and transcription.
Horizontal business processes or back-office services: purchases, logistics, marketing and 
sales (other than contact functions), human resources, and finances and accounting.
Vertical business processes: services specific to certain industries, such as claims and 
payments processing for financial institutions, insurance management for health care, network 






Intellectual property research, equity, financial and insurance research, data search, 
integration and management, analytics and data mining, research and information 
services in human resources, engineering and design, animation and simulation services, 
remote education and publishing, research and development (R&D) and vertical 
functions (services to medical, legal, biotech and pharmaceuticals industries).
Table 2
INTERNALIZED AND EXTERNALIZED PRODUCTION












Home country Production kept in-house in home country Production outsourced to third-party 
service provider in home country
Other 
countries
Production by affiliate in foreign country  
(intra-firm, in-house, or captive offshoring)
Production outsourced to third-party 
provider (vendor) abroad
Vendor may be a local company or a foreign 
affiliate of another transnational corporation
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World 
Investment Report 2004. The Shift Towards Services (UNCTAD/WIR/2004), New York. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.04.II.D.33, 2004.
Other industry-specific terms used 
throughout this text are as follows:
•	 Nearshoring:	offshoring	to	countries	close	
to the client market to take advantage 
of a combination of low costs and 
geographic and time-zone proximity.
•	 Onshore	services:	provided	 in	 the	
client’s home country.
•	 Second-generation	offshoring:	refers	
to services that are intensive in 
knowledge and analysis.
•	 Integrated	outsourcing	companies:	
companies that base their business 
models on the integration of business 
processes and IT.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Boston Consulting Group (BCG), “Estudios de competitividad en clusters de la 
economía chilena. Informe final” [online] http://www.economia.cl/1540/articles-187159_recurso_1.pdf. 2007; Mario Castillo, “La industria global de servicios: oportunidades 
para Chile”, Globalización económica: oportunidades y desafíos para Chile, Jorge Leiva and Mario Castillo (eds.), Santiago, Chile, Chile 21/Production Development 
Corporation (CORFO), 2008; Evalueserve, “The next big opportunity —moving up the value chain— from BPO to KPO” [online] http://kpo.evalueserve.com/KPO/BPO-
to-KPO-Shift.aspx, 2004 and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 2004. The Shift Towards Services (UNCTAD/
WIR/2004), New York. United Nations publication, Sales No.E.04.II.D.33, 2004.
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Box II.2
CAPTIVE VERSUS OUTSOURCED OFFSHORING
The choice of whether to establish captive 
offshore centres or to outsource depends 
on numerous factors pertaining, among 
others, to the company itself, the industry, 
the functions considered and the availability 
of adequate vendors.a In fact, many 
companies use hybrid models of in-house 
and outsourced centres, operating in- and 
offshore. It is estimated that approximately 
40% of all offshore business services are 
in-house operations (also referred to as 
the captive, or “make-vs.-buy” model), 
but this share varies among the different 
segments. In-house offshoring is relatively 
higher in IT-enabled services (50%) than 
in IT services (20%) (BCG, 2007). 
In IT services, outsourcing overtook in-
house offshoring in around 2005. In its first 
stage, up until the beginning of the 1990s, 
IT service offshoring involved primarily 
United States and European companies 
establishing captive centres in India. The 
Indian vendors developed throughout the 
1990s and, starting in 2004-2005, expanded 
and surpassed captive IT centres. The KPO 
market may follow a similar pattern. When 
knowledge processes started being offshored 
at the end of the 1990s (pioneered by GE 
and McKinsey), they were undertaken in-
house partly because of the absence of KPO 
vendors. These started emerging in 2000 
when companies such as Evalueserve and 
Amba Research appeared on the scene. KPO 
is expected to overtake in-house offshoring 
approximately in 2010. Among the reasons 
for the growth in the share of outsourced 
services as opposed to in-house services is 
the increasing maturity and capacity of KPO 
vendors and the fact that captive centres 
are often only cost-worthy for very large 
companies, whereas the vendor model may 
be cost-effective for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs). Certain knowledge 
processes that are key to companies’ 
businesses, however, are likely to remain 
in-house (Evalueserve, 2007).
In BPO, the trend is not as well defined, 
with some analysts pointing to continuing 
growth in captive centres and others 
arguing that more mature vendors and 
experienced clients will ensure high growth 
rates in outsourcing. The latter highlight 
recent acquisitions of captive centres by 
vendors. Among the most significant are: 
the purchase by TCS of Citigroup’s captive 
BPO operation for US$ 505 million and 
the purchase by WNS (itself originating 
as a captive British Airways centre) of 
Aviva Global Services for US$ 230 million, 
both in 2008; the divestiture of 60% of 
the BPO arm of GE Capital International 
Services (now Genpact); the acquisition 
by HCL Technologies of Deutsche Bank’s 
BPO arm; and the takeover by Infosys of 
Philips’s BPO centres in Poland, India and 
Thailand (BPO Times, 2007; The Times of 
India, 2007; Infosys, 2007). Likewise, there 
is no unanimous trend in the call centre 
industry. Currently it is estimated that in 
India, a major destination for offshore 
contact centre operations, 130,000 of the 
280,000 contact centre operators are in-
house (Cybermedia, 2008). Although there 
will always be captive functions, as vendors 
mature and as companies become familiar 
with outsourcing and are pressured to focus 
on their core functions, there may be a 
trend towards greater outsourcing or hybrid 
solutions. One example is Teleperformance’s 
“Buy-Out’ programme, whereby a vendor 
manages a service centre staffed by the 
client at the client’s facilities (Interaction the 
Teleperformance Magazine, 2006).
Although captive offshoring has been 
a solution across industries, the largest 
centres are concentrated in the finance and 
technology industries. In the KPO segment, 
captive centres are common in financial, 
automotive, pharmaceutical and publishing 
companies (Evalueserve, 2007).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Boston Consulting Group (BCG), “Estudios de competitividad en clusters de la 
economía chilena. Informe final” [online] http://www.economia.cl/1540/articles-187159_recurso_1.pdf. 2007; BPO Times, “Will captives still captivate” [online] http://www.
bpotimes.com/efytimes/fullnewsbpo.asp?edid=18849, 10 May 2007; Evalueserve, “The future of knowledge process outsourcing. Make or buy in KPO”, EVS White Paper, 
18 April 2007; Infosys, “Infosys awarded multi-year global BPO contract by Royal Philips Electronics” [online] http://www.andhranews.net/India/2007/July/25-Infosys-Awarded-
Multi-9313.asp, 25 July 2007; Interaction the Teleperformance Magazine, “Business transformation buy out. The solution dedicated to in-house contact centers”, No. 16, 
September 2006 and The Times of India, “Captive BPO arms are passe” [online] http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/2529829.cms, 9 November 2007.
a
 Transaction cost theory and agency theory are common theoretical approaches to the decision on whether to outsource or maintain functions in-house (see Schniederjans, 
Schniederjans and Schniederjans, 2005).
Moreover, the offshore business services industry 
(henceforth also referred to as offshoring) is very dynamic. 
Despite difficulties and discrepancies in quantification,1 
1
 The difficulty of quantifying the offshore services market has been 
extensively documented, and efforts to improve official data are on 
the agenda of several government and intergovernmental institutions 
(López, Ramos and Torre, 2008; Arora and others, 2006; GAO, 2004; 
Martínez, Padilla and Schatan, 2008). Trade statistics generally do 
not allow for the separation of offshore corporate services from 
other tradable services; and FDI statistics, when available, do not 
distinguish services catering to the global market from those directed 
at local markets. No other set of comparable official statistics 
adequately reflecting the situation of offshore corporate services 
exists for a significant number of countries. Companies have little 
incentive to disclose information on their offshore operations. One 
survey-based study estimates that in 2006, the market for offshore 
corporate services, defined similarly to the group of services 
considered in box II.1, was US$ 65 billion, of which approximately 
35% referred to IT services and 65% to IT-enabled services. The 
market was expected to grow to over US$ 280 billion by 2010, with 
higher growth expected in IT-enabled services (BCG, 2007) (see 
figure II.1). Another study estimates offshoring in IT services and 
business processes at US$ 30 billion in 2006 (Chakrabarty, Gandhi
estimates generally coincide in predicting high growth 
rates for the coming years (see Figure II.1 for a survey-
based projection), although a slowdown may occur in the 
short run due to the current international economic and 
financial crisis.2 Additionally, several indicators point to 
a large potential for growth given that offshore services 
remain a fraction of the global business services market 
(BCG, 2007; Chakrabarty, Gandhi and Kaka, 2006). Figure 
II.2 shows estimates of actual versus potential offshoring 
market for services in selected industries. 
 and Kaka, 2006). A third estimate puts the market for offshored 
“IT-based services” at US$ 81 billion in 2005 and US$ 252 billion 
in 2008 (Gereffi and Fernández-Stark, 2008). 
2
 There is still controversy over the impact of the global financial 
crisis on offshoring. Whereas it is likely that in the short run there 
will be a slowdown, particularly in segments serving the hardest-hit 
industries, there may also be an increase in the number of companies 
resorting to offshoring as a cost-saving measure, as has been the 
case in previous periods of economic slowdown. Also, the volume 
of certain types of transactions handled offshore and associated 
with crisis management solutions may rise. 
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Figure II.1
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IT-enabled services IT services
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of Boston Consulting Group (BCG), “Estudios de competitividad en 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of McKinsey Global Institute, “Interactive exhibit. Overview of global 
supply and demand of offshoring services” [online] http://www.mckinsey.com/
mgi/rp/offshoring/, 2008.
Not all offshoring operations involve FDI. Captive 
offshoring does involve FDI by definition because it 
involves a company establishing operations in a country 
other than its home country. Outsourced offshoring may 
be done by a transnational corporation (TNC) outside 
its home country or by a local company. In fact, local 
companies play an important part as offshore service 
providers in many countries, most notably in India. 
Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Infosys, and Wipro, 
which are today among the largest transnationals in the 
offshore business services market, started out providing 
offshore services from India the company’s country 
of origin. TNCs have, however, been considered key 
players in the development of this industry. First, 
because TNCs account for a large share of offshoring 
operations, both as investors and as clients. Second, 
because, as in manufacturing, TNCs have been the 
motors behind the expansion of global value chains in 
services (OECD, 2008b). Third, because partnerships 
and supplier relationships with TNCs can act as bridges 
between local companies, professionals and world 
markets, especially in higher-value added segments 
(López, Ramos and Torre, 2008).
In the past few years, TNCs have shown increasing 
interest in Latin America and the Caribbean as an 
offshore destination, and several investments have 
been made. Nonetheless, challenges persist for the 
region to fully reap the benefits of offshoring. To help 
understand those challenges, this chapter examines how 
the region is situated within the corporate strategies of 
major players. Thus, section B examines key trends in 
this industry worldwide, section C identifies the main 
transnational players and describes the role attributed 
to Latin America and the Caribbean in the corporate 
strategies of selected companies, and section D discusses 
the challenges ahead.
B.  Trends in the global offshore business 
 services market
Offshoring began expanding significantly in the mid-
1990s, motivated by enabling factors and push factors. 
Examples of enabling factors include developments in 
software and telecommunications solutions, investment 
in infrastructure in the years leading up to the dot.com 
crisis, and the standardization of management practices. 
These advances —which essentially made information 
storage, processing, and transmission technically and 
economically feasible— generated what has been called 
the “tradability revolution”, were also influenced by 
changes in customs and practices, such as a smaller 
reliance on face-to-face contact for certain functions 
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(UNCTAD, 2004a).3 As for the offshore destinations, 
improvement of business environments, a greater 
availability of qualified workers and welcoming policies 
helped make the growth in offshoring possible.
Examples of the push factors for offshoring were 
the insufficient number of skilled professionals in the 
United States to face the Y2K crisis and competition 
and economic recessions that put pressure on corporate 
costs (Friedman, 2006; López, Ramos and Torre, 2008). 
Offshoring was further encouraged by tighter restrictions 
on the mobility of workers (which had previously helped 
overcome labour shortages in IT), among other reasons, 
because of a cutback in H1B visas in the United States 
in 2003 (Lewin, Massini and Peeters, 2008). 
Alongside these factors, it is likely that a significant 
share of growth in the offshoring industry can be 
attributed to the accumulation of experience, know-how 
and confidence in offshore solutions. Buyers, vendors, 
and companies opting for in-house offshore centres 
gradually expanded the volume and nature of activities 
performed offshore. The development of the outsourcing 
market in particular made it possible for smaller 
companies to benefit from offshoring —increasingly 
for innovation and product development— without 
incurring the information costs involved in doing so 
in-house (Lewin, 2008). 
As the industry matured, two parallel trends took 
shape. First, competition increased among outsourcing 
players in the traditional functions (contact centres, 
business process outsourcing, IT services). This drove 
profit margins down and increased the pressure to offshore 
to low-cost destinations. New companies appeared and 
existing ones expanded into other segments. Contact 
centre companies started performing BPO functions, 
while BPO players started providing IT services, and 
vice-versa. In fact, the digitization of business processes 
somewhat blurred the distinction between IT services 
and BPO. Even companies that originally focused on IT 
hardware manufacturing, such as IBM and Hewlett Packard 
(HP), entered the BPO and IT services market (ECLAC, 
2008a). As the Indian outsourcing vendors started playing 
a greater role as competitors, outsourcing companies
3
 The onset of the information age has also been referred to as a 
“third industrial revolution” (Blinder, 2006).
from higher-cost countries that had not fully explored the 
potential of offshoring were forced to do so to maintain 
cost competitiveness (Aggarwal and others, 2006).4 The 
same logic applied to companies in other industries: as 
competitors benefited from low-cost outsourced offshoring, 
companies were forced to resort to offshoring as well, 
either through captive centres or by outsourcing (see box 
II.2). Thus, the commoditization of the outsourcing market 
has led to greater demand for offshoring.
Second, there has been an upgrading of the offshore 
industry as companies have offshored higher-skilled and 
higher-value-added services that involve fewer standardized 
procedures and greater analysis and industry-specific 
knowledge. These second-generation offshoring services 
include innovation, R&D and other science and engineering 
functions. This trend also includes the offshoring of knowledge 
processes (KPO), in other words, services based on knowledge 
and the analysis of specific fields, such as financial markets, 
legal issues and intellectual property research.
There are several reasons for the growth in the 
offshoring of these higher-end services. On the demand 
side, clients have gained enough confidence to consider 
offshoring and outsourcing activities previously viewed 
as core functions. In fact, it is in the higher-value-added 
services that clients reap the greatest cost savings, while 
providers make the highest profits (ORN/Booz&Co., 2007). 
On the supply side, outsourcing vendors have upgraded 
their service mix to compensate for shrinking profit margins 
in the traditional segments. Through their accumulated 
experience with offshoring, they have been able to place 
these second-generation services in their offshore bases. At 
the same time, countries hosting offshore service centres 
have matured in terms of providing adequate human 
resources, infrastructure and business environments, thus 
enabling the offshoring of these functions.
In sum, offshoring has grown in traditional segments, 
and new services have been added to the list of commonly 
offshored services. As offshoring has matured and diversified, 
investors have acquired a better understanding of its benefits 
and costs and of the comparative advantages of different 
regions. Against this background, two types of opportunities 
arise for Latin America and the Caribbean. 
4
 In parallel, even companies that opted to avoid outsourcing —for 
all or certain functions— felt pressured to set up captive offshore 
centres to maintain competitiveness in regard to their competitors 
in their core businesses (Robinson and Kalakota, 2004).
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1.  Competing on cost: nearshoring and the value of proximity
In the traditional offshore functions, cost is still the major 
determinant factor. Few countries are able to compete, 
based on cost, and particularly labour costs, with India, 
which is still by far the main location for offshore 
operations and concentrated, in 2007, approximately 
84% of the world IT services market and 46% of the 
IT-enabled services market (BCG, 2007). An estimate 
of the number of jobs created by FDI in “business 
services” (a category that encompasses many of the 
services included in the definition of offshore business 
services adopted here) shows that in 2006, India and the 
Philippines were the top destinations, accounting for 
33% and 19% of total jobs, respectively (IBM Global 
Business Services, 2007).5
Some analysts have observed signs of saturation 
in these traditional markets, and in India in particular 
that may constitute opportunities for other destinations, 
including Latin America and the Caribbean (A.T. 
Kearney, 2007). The views on the extent and symptoms 
of this saturation are not unanimous. Whereas some 
mention wage inflation, others point to falling quality, 
high attrition (or turnover) rates (which makes 
activities that involve technology transfer especially 
difficult) and inflexibility in tending to clients’ needs. 
It is unclear to what extent increasing wages or other 
symptoms of possible saturation in India and other 
traditional markets are effectively leading to relocation 
towards other countries. India in particular is still 
cost competitive and has unequalled advantages in 
terms of skills, know-how and the confidence of 
service providers and their customers. Moreover, 
public and private actions are being put into place in 
India to expand supply and thus overcome any effects
5
 These estimates do not necessarily reflect offshore operations 
because business services can also be provided to local customers. 
Nonetheless, in these two countries, the bulk of business services 
are notoriously offshore operations. 
of saturation. These efforts include innovative training 
systems with private-sector involvement and the 
expansion of the industries from the already consolidated 
hub cities (Bangalore, the National Capital Region 
—Delhi and the surrounding urban area—, Mumbai, 
Pune, Chennai, Hyderabad and Kolkata) to second- 
and third-tier cities (Ahmedabad, Nagpur and Japur, 
among others) (Gereffi and Fernández-Stark, 2008).
What does seem to be the case is that companies 
making the decision to offshore are looking beyond the 
direct financial costs of the operations and are starting 
to attribute higher opportunity costs to factors such as 
attrition and the inconveniences of dealing with the 
distance between service provider and customer (travel 
time and cost, difficulties of operating on opposite or 
very different time zones, misunderstandings due to 
cultural differences).6 In that context, greater attention 
is being given to the benefits of proximity to major 
markets, in what has been named “nearshoring”.7 
Nearshoring refers to offshoring to countries close to 
the client market to take advantage of a combination of 
low costs and geographic and cultural proximity. In the 
contact centre and BPO markets, as more companies 
compete, the importance of service quality is greater, 
and more value is placed on differentiating aspects of 
service. Beyond language proficiency, customers (or 
companies offshoring their own operations) require 
accents that are more palatable to the customer, as well 
as cultural sensitivity. In BPO, IT services and KPO, 
many services require more frequent interaction or are 
more sensitive to time zone proximity. Latin America 
and the Caribbean is an increasingly important nearshore 
destination for United States customers.
6
 Softtek, a Mexican IT and BPO company (see section C.2), has 
marketed the advantages of Latin America and the Caribbean (and 
its home country in particular) in these aspects under the concept 
of “Total Cost of Engagement” (see below), stressing that the 
approach to the cost of offshoring should go beyond the arbitrage 
of the cost of labour and facilities. 
7
 The term nearshoring is used in this document to signify a subset 
of, rather than an alternative to, offshoring.
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2.  Competing by way of global networks
The second source of opportunities for Latin America and 
the Caribbean is the trend to explore complementarity 
between destinations in global networks of service centres, 
as opposed to the traditional concept of offshoring from 
high-cost country to low-cost country based on simple labour 
cost arbitrage. In both traditional and second-generation 
offshoring, companies are creating global integrated service 
networks with knowledge centres situated in several parts 
of the world. Networks of complementary service centres 
are being developed as companies try to benefit from 
diversity.8 Companies have established bases in different 
time zones to provide 24-hour work cycles (“follow the 
sun” models). They have also diversified their locations to 
minimize their vulnerability to country or region-specific 
natural and political risks.9 Through geographical diversity, 
companies have been able to tap into specialized talent 
pools and into multilingual skills and have benefited from 
creativity gains associated with working with groups from 
different backgrounds with different problem-solving 
approaches (Manning, Massini and Lewin 2008; OECD 
2008c; Evalueserve, 2004; Couto and others, 2006).
Moreover, by resorting to newer offshoring destinations, 
companies have avoided the problem of high attrition rates 
in more saturated markets. In addition to the costs involved 
in training a constant flow of workers, high attrition rates 
limit the possibility of offshoring functions that require the 
transfer of certain types of technology or knowledge.
In sum, as the offshoring industry has become 
larger, more sophisticated and more diverse, location 
decisions have become more complex, and factors 
not associated with labour and installation costs have 
increased their weight in companies’ decisions on where 
to locate. This has created opportunities for emerging 
offshore destinations, including Latin America and the
8
 Companies have adopted business models based on networks 
of service centres that are located in the client’s home country 
(onshore), in nearshore locations and in further offshore 
locations. Companies have trademarked terms that designate 
these combinations. Examples are Bestshore (EDS), Rightshore 
(CapGemini), Anyshore (Bearing Point). 
9
 One example illustrates the importance of diversifying offshore 
operations: the energy blackout on the East Coast of North America 
in 2003 happened outside Asian business hours, and companies 
with offshore centres in Latin America were able to react and run 
emergency procedures more rapidly (América economía, 2008o).
Caribbean. These stem, paradoxically, on the one hand 
from attributes associated with proximity, similarity, 
and familiarity (valuing homogeneity), and on the other 
hand, from attributes associated with diversity that offer 
complementarity of talents, approaches, time zones 
and other assets between different locations within 
integrated global networks of service centres (valuing 
heterogeneity).
In terms of the framework traditionally used for 
analysing corporate strategies in this report series (see 
ECLAC, 2005 and subsequent issues), when the main 
factor determining the establishment of an offshore 
service centre is cost, entry strategies of offshoring 
TNCs are essentially efficiency-seeking. However, 
as the industry has matured, other (non-cost) factors, 
such as the availability of specific skills, have become 
increasingly important in offshoring decisions. Thus, 
especially for higher-value-added segments, entry 
strategies will often involve the pursuit of strategic 
assets or a hybrid approach that values a combination 
of strategic assets and relatively low costs.10 Moreover, 
companies have seen potential in the promising emerging 
markets. Therefore, many companies have invested 
in large emerging markets under a combination of 
efficiency- and/or strategic-asset-seeking strategies and 
market-seeking strategies. By combining local market 
operations with export-oriented (offshore) ones, they 
have been able to dilute the fixed costs associated with 
these operations or, in some cases, test the business 
environment, human resources and other conditions of 
that location by working with local clients first. These 
trends are visible in the strategies pursued by TNCs in 
offshoring centres in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
which are discussed in the next section.
10
 Kledia and Mukherjee (2008) approach offshoring from a theoretical 
framework that builds on the eclectic paradigm.
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C.  Latin America and the Caribbean in the corporate 
 strategies of the main offshore players
1.  Overview of offshore services in Latin America and  
 the Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean’s role in the global offshore 
business services industry is relatively small. In 2007, the 
region accounted for 3% of payments by United States 
companies to companies abroad (affiliated and unaffiliated) 
for computer and information services, compared to 
India’s 27%. In total business and professional services 
(which include management consultancy, public relations, 
R&D, testing, advertising, construction, architecture, 
engineering, legal and equipment support services), the 
region’s share is about 7% (BEA, 2008). 
Nonetheless, there are signs that interest in the region 
among investors is growing. A.T. Kearney’s Global Services 
Location Index (see table II.1) shows the countries that are 
seen as most attractive for future investments. Although Asian 
countries still head the list, Latin American and Caribbean 
countries have risen in the ranking over time. 
Table II.1
A. T. KEARNEY GLOBAL SERVICES LOCATION INDEX, 2004-2007
2004 2005 2006/2007
1 India India India
2 China China China
3 Malaysia Malaysia Malaysia
4 Czech Republic Philippines Thailand
5 Singapore Singapore Brazil
6 Philippines Thailand Indonesia
7 Brazil Czech Republic Chile
8 Canada Chile Philippines
9 Chile Canada Bulgaria
10 Poland Brazil Mexico
Others in the top 50 Mexico, Argentina, Costa 
Rica (in top 25)
Mexico, Costa Rica, Argentina Uruguay, Argentina, Jamaica, 
Costa Rica, Panama
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from A.T. Kearney [online] http://www.atkearney.com/.
Moreover, in the 2008 State of the Outsourcing 
Industry report (Black Book of Outsourcing, 2008), Brazil 
and Chile were ranked as second and third alternatives 
to India (after the United States) given than 87.2% and 
84.2% of interviewed companies, respectively, indicated 
that they would “definitely consider” these countries 
for their offshoring projects. Based on current and past 
experience, South America was recommended by 77.4% 
of respondents and Mexico by 56.3%. The report states 
that “Latin America, above all regions, is expected to 
leverage its competitive advantages in high-growth areas of 
offshoring and possibly move ahead as the most attractive 
labor arbitrage alternative”.
As a region, Latin America and the Caribbean 
presents a range of common advantages for offshoring, 
among which are: geographical and cultural proximity 
to the United States; time zone advantages; destinations 
with relatively low political, economic and natural risks, 
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providing a good hedging alternative; talent and technology 
hubs with lower attrition rates (making it safer for 
operations involving knowledge transfer), and established 
markets for many segments (highly influenced by the 
presence of transnational corporations and the growing 
internationalization of local companies). The region 
has several hubs where, for historical reasons, multiple 
language skills are available, making it “poised to serve 
a more diverse array of global markets [than India] with 
multilingual skills” (Shankardass, 2007). This situation 
has been shaped not only by the heritage of immigration 
from Europe and elsewhere, but also more recently by 
the emigration and subsequent return (sometimes years 
or decades later) of people and families for economic, 
political and educational reasons. 
However, the countries in the region, and even areas 
within those countries, present a great degree of diversity in 
their comparative advantages in attracting FDI in offshore 
business services. Some countries compete as low-cost 
destinations with the Asian destinations, especially for 
the lower-end activities. Others compete based on the 
availability of skills combined with easier interaction 
with clients due to the nearshore factors mentioned above. 
The following paragraphs provide brief overviews of the 
industry in (i) the English-speaking Caribbean; (ii) Central 
America and the Dominican Republic; (iii) the large markets: 
Mexico and Brazil; and (iv) the main South American 
destinations, apart from Brazil. Further information on 
the industry in selected countries is available in the annex 
to this chapter.
(a) The English-speaking Caribbean 11
The English-speaking Caribbean has hosted United 
States-oriented call centres and data-entry centres since 
the 1980s. However, for decades the industry remained 
relatively small. Especially since 2005, there has been a 
wave of new investments. High growth rates have been 
registered in a combination of data entry and transcription 
services, call and contact centres and certain BPO functions. 
For Caribbean economies, this industry is particularly 
important inasmuch as it complements the very cyclical 
tourism industry (see chapter III).
11
 Based on company interviews and survey responses from Antigua 
& Barbuda Investment Authority, eTeck (Evolving TecKnologies 
and Enterprise Development Company Limited, Trinidad and 
Tobago), GoInvest (Guyana), National Development Corporation 
(Saint Lucia), National Investment Promotion Inc. (Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines), and Jamaica Trade and Invest, in addition to 
cited documents.
Two factors have contributed to recent growth in 
offshore business services in the Caribbean, apart from 
the general expansion of offshoring worldwide. First, the 
increasing importance of nearshoring, mentioned above. 
The English-speaking Caribbean States have promoted 
the advantages they offer in terms of geographical and 
cultural proximity to the United States, competitive costs 
and low attrition rates. Their main advantage vis-à-vis their 
Latin American neighbours, which also benefit from these 
nearshore factors, is that English is either a first language 
or the official and primary language of instruction.12 
Secondly, the liberalization of telecommunications 
markets in several Caribbean States from 2001 on has 
led to lower costs and better service, factors that are 
crucial in this industry. However, this process has evolved 
unevenly, and challenges remain in ensuring effective 
competition, especially in the fixed-line segment and in 
international connections. Most members of CARICOM 
are still connected to other regions by a single cable that 
is controlled by a single operator (Browne, 2007).
Although Jamaica has been overtaken by the 
Dominican Republic as the largest offshore business 
services player in the Caribbean (Zagada Institute, 
2008), within the English-speaking Caribbean States, it 
tops the list, with an estimated 10,000 agents. Jamaica 
is the only English-speaking Caribbean State to host 
large service centres (of more than 1,000 agents) of 
the top TNCs in this industry, such as ACS, West and 
Alliance One (acquired by the Teleperformance Group in 
2007). Barbados, meanwhile, has the highest number of 
offshoring jobs in the Caribbean in terms of population 
size. The presence of offshore banks has contributed to 
the country’s emergence as a destination for offshore 
services. In the other island States, relatively small 
centres specializing in specific functions coexist with 
a small number of medium-sized centres employing 
between 100 and 300 people. In Guyana, where 
offshoring operations took off in 2002, 1,400 people 
are now employed in offshore business services, 830 of 
them in foreign companies (GoInvest, 2008). Trinidad 
and Tobago hosts a number of foreign and local call-
centre and BPO companies, with several specializing 
in health-care management services. 
12
 In the same way that the English-speaking Caribbean has a linguistic 
advantage catering to Anglo-Saxon markets, Suriname has started to 
provide offshore contact centre services to the Netherlands. Likewise, 
Haitian residents of the Dominican Republic have been employed 
in centres providing French-language services, although for now 
these are relatively small operations. A study was commissioned 
in 2008 by the Sogebank Foundation and Kata on the feasibility 
of a BPO centre in Haiti.
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(b) Central America and the Dominican Republic13
Central American countries and the Dominican 
Republic have also benefited from the increasing 
importance of nearshoring. Although only a fraction of 
the population in these countries speaks English fluently, 
in absolute terms, the number of English-speaking agents 
with technical skills that can be employed in a number 
of different areas and functions is significant, allowing 
for the establishment of larger centres than in most of the 
English-speaking Caribbean. The bilingual contingent 
has grown in recent years through educational efforts and 
through the return of people who had previously worked 
or been raised in the United States. Moreover, the growth 
of the Hispanic community in the United States and of 
the markets of Latin America and Spain has created 
demand for Spanish-speaking operators, to the benefit 
of these countries.
Governments have actively supported FDI generally 
and most have taken measures to promote FDI in the 
offshore service industry in particular. In fact, as the 
apparel industry started suffering from competition 
from China and other Asian countries especially from 
2001 onward, the Central American countries and the 
Dominican Republic have been making efforts to diversify 
their economies and have targeted the offshore business 
services industry in particular (ECLAC, 2008a; 2008b). 
The Dominican Republic - Central America - United 
States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) has also 
contributed to the attractiveness of these countries for 
offshore operations directed at clients in the United States 
(Business Week, 2006).
Costa Rica is the most mature market in Central 
America for offshore business services, having gradually 
scaled up to higher-value-added activities and ensured 
steady growth in the jobs in offshore services, which today 
number approximately 23,500 (see box II.3). Panama also 
has a large contingent of workers in this industry, which is 
more concentrated, however, in contact centres and simple 
BPO functions. The Dominican Republic has one of the 
fastest growing contact-centre and BPO industries. Jobs in 
this industry have soared from a little over 5,000 in 2005 to 
an estimated 22,000 today. In El Salvador and Guatemala, 
6,800 and 6,500 people, respectively, are employed in 
offshore service centres. In terms of population size, 
the industry is more significant for El Salvador. In fact, 
along with Costa Rica, El Salvador is among the largest 
13
 Based on company interviews and survey responses from the Export 
and Investment Centre of the Dominican Republic (CEI-RD), the 
Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE), the 
Export Development and Investment Fund (FIDE) of Honduras, 
Invest in Guatemala and the Investment Promotion Agency of El 
Salvador (PROESA), in addition to cited documents.
recipients of jobs created by FDI in business services in 
per capita terms (IBM Global Business Services, 2007). 
Both countries have active policies targeting primarily 
BPO, and, secondarily, shared services in the case of 
El Salvador and IT services in the case of Guatemala. 
Nicaragua and Honduras are newcomers to the offshoring 
industry and have been choice destinations for companies 
wanting to explore the advantages of low costs, even by 
Central American standards, and low attrition rates, as 
well as significant numbers of English-speakers.
(c) Mexico and Brazil 14
The larger markets, Mexico and Brazil, host service 
centres in virtually every major segment of offshore business 
services. Although their role as offshore destinations is 
relatively recent and although the share of services that are 
exported is relatively small, in 2007 these two countries 
accounted for 67% of cross-border sales of computer and 
information services to United States companies from 
Latin America and the Caribbean (BEA, 2008). Part of 
the attractiveness of both countries for offshore operations 
stems from their large local markets and industries. The 
strong presence of transnational corporations in multiple 
industries led to the establishment of in-house service 
centres (including engineering and other R&D functions), 
regional headquarters and shared service centres. It also 
led to the presence of outsourcing vendors that cater both 
to global clients and local ones. Through these investments 
geared initially towards local markets, companies 
acquired infrastructure, knowledge and experience in 
the local business environments. As IT developments 
made offshoring technically and economically feasible, 
some took advantage of their bases in these countries and 
started catering simultaneously to the local market and to 
offshore customers (or their own corporate headquarters 
and global networks). 
In parallel to this general trend involving multi-
industry clients and outsourcing vendors, the existence 
of sizeable IT hardware manufacturing industries in both 
Mexico and Brazil had a particularly important effect. 
First, it helped create a pool of engineers and other 
professionals employable in the IT services industry. 
Second, both countries hosted the main original equipment 
manufacturers in electronics (such as IBM or HP), and 
when these companies shifted their core activities from 
manufacturing to services, they took advantage of their 
decades-long experience and infrastructure in both to set 
up service centres there (ECLAC, 2008a).
14
 Based on company interviews and survey response of ApexBrasil, 
in addition to cited documents.
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After 2000, Costa Rica started 
receiving greater volumes of investment in 
shared-service and back-office centres. In 
addition to P&G and Intel, Chiquita GTC, 
Baxter Americas, Dole, Oracle, DHL, 
Hellman Logistic, Citigroup, Astra Zeneca 
and Lion Resources (Publicis) established 
shared service centres. Amba Research, 
Access Personnel, Equifax, Experian, 
Seton Centra, Hewlett Packard (BPO), 
IBM, Western Union and LL Bean, among 
others, set up back-office operations. 
On the back of its consolidated contact 
centre and BPO industry, Costa Rica started 
targeting offshore operations for higher-
value-added services in 2004. Software 
development companies (such as Avionyx, 
Cypress Creek, Ridge Run and Round Box 
Media), engineering design firms (such as 
Emerson, Rehkemper & Sons and Align 
Technologies) and interactive advertising 
agencies (such as Schematic, avVenta and 
Critical Mass) started to invest in the country 
in the pursuit of higher-skilled professionals 
rather than large volumes of lower-skilled 
ones. At the same time, companies that were 
already in the country, such as P&G, started 
carrying out more complex operations.
Costa Rica’s gradual upgrading 
within the offshore services industry has 
been made possible by a combination of 
educational efforts to generate a skilled 
workforce in different technical areas, 
cluster effects arising from the presence of 
other offshore service companies and the 
electronics industry, and active targeting. 
Box II.3
COSTA RICA: UPGRADING FROM CONTACT CENTRES TO KNOWLEDGE PROCESS OPERATIONS
Costa Rica has been hosting contact 
centres since the mid-1990s, and they 
still constitute a significant segment of the 
economy today. Of the 23,500 offshore 
business service jobs in Costa Rica, 58% 
are in contact centres. Labour costs in 
Costa Rica are now considered high relative 
to other countries in Central America, 
especially for the lower-skilled functions 
where cost is the crucial competitive factor. 
Nonetheless, in 2007, four new contact 
centres were established, creating 1,145 
new jobs, and eight new contact centres 
were planned for 2008 and 2009. This 
suggests that other factors compensate 
for higher labour costs in Costa Rica, even 
in the contact centre market. Within this 
segment and in BPO functions, Costa Rica 
has invested in developing its capacities 
as a multilingual hub. Western Union’s 
1,000-employee centre in Costa Rica, for 
instance, provides contact centre, customer 
management and back-office services in 
Russian, Portuguese, Cantonese, German, 
French and Italian, apart from English (80% 
of services) and Spanish (8%). 
However, Costa Rica’s policy strategy 
aims at higher-value-added services. The 
establishment of the Intel plant in 1998 
generated significant spillover benefits for 
the country, including a demonstration of 
the importance of targeting and of the value 
of the signalling effect of the establishment 
of a major transnational corporation. Much 
like what had happened to Intel and the 
development of the electronics cluster 
(the limitations of which are discussed 
in OMGI, 2006), the establishment of 
the Global Business Services Unit of 
Procter & Gamble (P&G) in 1999 paved 
the way for several other operations in 
global business service centres. Directly 
related to the P&G operations, HP and 
IBM set up operations providing different 
sets of services to the company. HP now 
has 6,500 employees in Costa Rica. Intel 
itself expanded into services in Costa 
Rica with its Latin America Engineering 
Services (LAES) group and a financial 
services group in 2004, followed by 
procurement and technical assistance. 
Intel has also provided venture funding 
for software companies located in Costa 
Rica (OMGI, 2006). 
COSTA RICA: NUMBER OF JOBS IN OFFSHORE SERVICES (CUMULATIVE),
1995-2009 a
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Source: Vanessa Gibson, “Invirtiendo en Costa Rica”, document presented at the Seminar on offshore business services in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, 
Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 18 November 2008.
a 
 Figures for 2009 are projections.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the response by Costa Rican Coalition for Development Initiatives (CINDE) to 
the survey on offshore business services in Latin America and the Caribbean; Vanessa Gibson, “Invirtiendo en Costa Rica”, document presented at the Seminar on 
offshore business services in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 18 November 
2008 and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), The Impact of Intel in Costa Rica: Nine Years after the Decision to Invest, Washington, D.C., 2006.
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Brazil benefits from being a member of the BRIC group 
(Brazil, Russian Federation, India and China) inasmuch 
as many companies, like IBM, have favoured these large, 
high-growth markets in their expansion strategies. Most 
of the offshore operations undertaken from Brazil are 
combined with operations for the local market, with 
exports typically accounting for only a fraction of revenues 
from the Brazilian operations. The country has been less 
successful at attracting new operations by companies 
looking specifically for low-cost offshore sites, chiefly 
because of relatively high costs (aggravated over certain 
periods by currency appreciation) and small numbers of 
skilled professionals who are fluent in English. That the 
main motivation for investment in many of the existing 
service centres is not offshoring should not obscure the 
fact that the exports that are carried out are significant in 
the region. IBM alone exported approximately US$ 300 
million in services from Brazil in 2007.
Brazil is one of the largest recipients of FDI jobs in 
R&D (IBM Global Business Services, 2008). One of the 
factors that have contributed to R&D in IT industries is the 
Informatics Act, which provides tax incentives to original 
equipment manufacturers and contract manufacturers provided 
that, among other conditions, they invest in R&D centres in 
Brazil. Some of these R&D facilities have become global 
centres of excellence in specific products or areas and now 
export solutions to headquarters. This instrument has been 
relevant for companies that stand at the interface between 
hardware and services, such as IBM, HP and Motorola. 
Incentives for R&D have been strengthened through more 
recent initiatives, as set out in table II.A-1 in the annex to 
this chapter (see ECLAC, 2008a).
Mexico has greater nearshore advantages (for the 
United States market) than its South American neighbours 
and capacity for larger operations than the countries of 
Central America and the Caribbean. These are key assets, 
especially in the more traditional functions. Mexico has 
the second largest call centre industry in the region and 
dominates the market for customer service to the Hispanic 
community in the United States (A.T. Kearney, 2007). 
The border areas, particularly, host BPO companies 
like ACS and Genpact (both in Ciudad Juarez) (see box 
II.4). Also, under NAFTA, trade in services with the 
United States is easier than for other countries as certain 
security and data transfer issues are easier to manage, 
and visas do not constitute a barrier for the flow of IT 
professionals (Karamouzis and others, 2007). Mexico too 
has a substantial number of global R&D facilities within 
companies that also hold manufacturing facilities in the 
country. Thus the two largest countries in the region are 
especially well positioned to attract offshoring investments 
due to a combination of a history in manufacturing, large 
markets and, especially in the case of Mexico, proximity 
to the United States. 
Box II.4
OFFSHORING IN MEXICO: REGIONAL HUBS
Owing to the patterns of development of 
the export-oriented manufacturing industry 
in Mexico, regional specialized hubs have 
started to emerge within the offshore 
services industry. The Mexican offshore 
business services industry is largely 
concentrated in Mexico City, Monterrey 
and Guadalajara. All three cities have 
large urban populations and a sufficient 
density of companies to make them an 
attractive destination for IT-based service 
companies. These cities also have good 
educational infrastructures, and recognized 
institutions have partnered up with 
companies to develop their programmes. 
In Monterrey and Guadalajara, however, 
the relationship between the offshore 
business service industry and the cities’ 
manufacturing past is clearer. In both 
cases, the export-oriented maquila industry 
—especially in electronics and autoparts— 
led to the incorporation of the use of IT 
in local industry and generated R&D 
capacity. The development models used 
in manufacturing were different, however, 
and this has shaped the development of 
the service industry in each city.
Guadalajara (Jalisco State) provides a 
larger volume of services through a smaller 
number of larger firms, including transnational 
corporations such as HP and IBM. Reflecting 
its role as an electronics cluster based on the 
maquila model, the region has specialized 
in niche services such as semiconductor 
design, embedded software and multimedia 
products. The large maquila plants of IBM 
have been converted to IT service centres, 
and several former maquiladora employees 
have set up small IT firms.
Monterrey (Nuevo León State), 
meanwhile, has benefited from a dynamic 
business environment that has nurtured 
a larger number of local firms. The 
existence of strong local manufacturing 
firms contributed to the creation of IT 
services firms such as Softtek and 
Neoris. The former was set up by former 
employees of the Alfa group, whereas 
Neoris originated as a spinoff of the IT 
operations of Cemex. Both companies 
have grown to compete internationally (see 
below). The presence of the Monterrey 
Institute of Advanced Technological 
Studies (ITESM) has also played a key 
role in supplying qualified engineers and 
fostering entrepreneurship.
Smaller agglomerations of services, 
mostly call centres and BPO, have developed 
on a smaller scale in Aguascalientes, Ciudad 
Juaréz (Chihuahua State), Querétaro 
and Baja California. The latter has also 
developed a computer programming 
industry (Mullan and others, 2008).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of A.T. Kearney, “Destination Latin America: a near-shore alternative” [online] 
http://www.atkearney.com/shared_res/pdf/Near-Shore_Latin_America_S.pdf, 2007; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Foreign 
Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2007 (LC/G.2360-P), Santiago, Chile, 2008. United Nations publication, Sales No. E.08.II.G.11; Francis Karamouzis 
and others, SWOT Analysis: Mexico is Emerging as a Global Services Destination, Gartner Research, 10 July 2007; Jessica Elizabeth Mullan and others, “México 
en la economía mundial de los servicios de tecnologías de la información”, Comercio exterior, vol. 58, No. 10, October 2008.
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(d) Main destinations in Spanish-speaking South America: 
Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay 15
Almost every country in South America has received 
investments in some form of offshore services. As the 
industry expands, destinations that are relatively new to this 
industry are becoming increasingly attractive. For now, four 
countries, apart from Brazil, concentrate the bulk of these 
operations: Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Uruguay.
Argentina started attracting investments in offshore 
business services in the 1990s and has competed well 
both in segments where cost is the critical factor, such 
as call centres, and in higher-skilled industries, such as 
IT. With the devaluation of the peso in 2002 the country 
became particularly attractive in terms of cost, which 
added to the advantages of a highly educated workforce
15
 Based on company interviews and survey responses from the Chilean 
Production Development Corporation (CORFO) and the Export 
Promotion Agency of Colombia (PROEXPORT), in addition to 
cited documents. 
(the country has the region’s highest rate of annual 
enrolment for tertiary education) of significant size. In 
call centres, Argentina has started taking up a larger share 
of the Hispanic customer services market in the United 
States. It is estimated that 60,000 people are employed 
in contact centres in Argentina and that 40% of service 
revenues are for offshore services. An increasing range 
of BPO services (finance and accounting, translations, 
collections and others) are also being undertaken in the 
country (A.T. Kearney, 2007). However, the country 
has been targeting higher-value-added services. Several 
investments in software development were made following 
the institution of tax breaks for software operations in 
2004. Although Buenos Aires concentrates the bulk of 
offshore business service activities, the most dynamic 
cluster is in the province of Córdoba (see box II.5). 
Box II.5
THE IT/BPO INDUSTRY IN THE CÓRDOBA CLUSTER
The IT/BPO industry in Córdoba, 
Argentina, has, thanks to the presence 
of a large university community, adequate 
infrastructure and a considerable density 
of local IT firms, grown from a handful of 
software development and electronics 
firms and two or three local call centres 
in 1999 to a thriving cluster of about 100 
software development firms, 200 electronics 
components suppliers and 10 TNCs. The 
establishment of Motorola in Córdoba in 
2000 marked a major landmark in the 
history of offshore services in Argentina. 
Following in Motorola’s footsteps, Intel 
established a research centre, and EDS 
set up a global service delivery centre in 
the city (Clarín, 2005; Business Week, 
2006). From representing a few hundred 
jobs in 1999, the industry now employs 
approximately 30,000 people in the IT 
cluster there, including 20,000 in contact 
centre functions and approximately 9,000 
in IT (1,500 of which are in TNCs). 
The challenges now facing Córdoba, 
Argentina, are illustrative of the challenges 
many countries in the region face in 
maximizing the potential local benefits 
of offshoring by TNCs. Córdoba’s 
automotive industry is known to have 
developed around a small number of 
TNCs that made it possible for hundreds 
of local providers to emerge. In the IT 
industry, however, although policy has 
been successful at attracting major 
TNCs, the challenge remains to integrate 
local providers (there are approximately 
100 software development companies 
in the area) into the supplier networks 
of the TNCs. This is in part due to the 
software production model prevailing 
among TNCs. In the past the incentive 
scheme adopted in Córdoba, which 
included grants for each person hired, 
was adequate for attaining the initial goal 
of bringing world class companies to 
the area. Now, making the leap towards 
integrating local companies into the world 
market, either through the networks of 
TNCs or independently, may require 
more and direct support to be given to 
local companies. Financing, as well as 
training, not only in technological capacity 
but also in management and marketing 
skills, should be key components of 
policy directed at small and medium-
sized providers and individuals. Such 
support would also help the province 
become less dependent on incentives 
and subsidies for its attractiveness as 
a location for FDI in offshore business 
services. The expansion of the skills 
base, highlighted above, is also essential 
to the development of the local IT sector 
and other offshore service players as it 
can help avoid the crowding out of local 
companies that compete for labour with 
the TNCs. TNCs have an important role 
to play as a channel between local firms 
and world markets. (San Pedro, 2008).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of interviews to the companies; Manuel San Pedro, founder of Cluster Córdoba 
Technology, presentation at the Seminar on offshore business services in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 18 November 2008; Clarín, “La Argentina busca un lugar en las grandes ligas del software”, 30 October 2005; Business 
Week, “Can Latin America challenge India?”, 30 January 2006.
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Chile and Uruguay have also both targeted higher-
value-added services where the scale of operations is less 
relevant than for contact centres and simple BPO functions. 
Chile has taken a cluster approach to the development of a 
global services industry, which today includes operations 
in shared service centres, software development and 
KPO (see box II.6). Uruguay has been stronger in the 
software product industry but has expanded in services, 
especially since 2005, when TCS established its global 
delivery centre that today employs over 800 people (see 
below). IBM is also in the process of establishing a BPO 
centre for a Spanish client in the banking sector that will 
initially employ 200 people. The exports component of 
Uruguay’s offshoring industry is higher than that of its 
neighbours, although largely concentrated within Latin 
America (CUTI, 2007, González, 2008). 
Box II.6
CHILE: A CLUSTER APPROACH TO HIGHER-VALUE-ADDED GLOBAL SERVICES
At the end of the 1990s, Chile was 
shortlisted, along with Costa Rica and 
others, for a major investment by Intel. As 
mentioned above, Costa Rica won the bid, 
but the experience was positive for Chile 
in two ways. First, it gave the country a 
sense of its potential as a destination for 
investment in high-tech industries; and 
secondly, it highlighted the need for an 
active and strategically-oriented investment 
promotion policy for these industries. Since 
then, Chile has gone through a process 
to assess its advantages, shortcomings 
and opportunities and has identified key, 
high-potential, segments, on which to 
focus its promotion efforts. 
The relatively small size of Chile’s 
population limits its attractiveness for 
services requiring high-volume, low-cost, 
operations. The country does host a number 
of call centres with export operations. It is 
estimated that approximately 20-25% of 
call centre operators in companies such 
as Teleperformance, Konecta, Atento 
and Transcom cater to the export market, 
particularly Spain, while companies such 
as Air France and Delta have their regional 
contact centres in Chile. Nonetheless, in 
its policy efforts, rather than high-volume 
operations, Chile has targeted segments 
where higher value added can be reaped 
through lower-volume operations. 
In 2000, the country began implementing 
measures to develop the global services 
industry. In efforts to diversify Chile’s 
economy away from natural resources and 
towards high-growth industries intensive in 
technology, human capital and innovation, 
the country selected global services as 
one among a group of five target clusters. 
Exploring first-comer advantages within the 
region, policies were developed through 
a collaborative institutional framework 
involving public and private entities and 
academia. This framework included the 
National Innovation Council and the Council 
of Ministers on Innovation, and a strategic 
council that includes government entities, 
local entrepreneurial associations, 
executives of major TNCs established 
in the country and representatives 
of universities and technical training 
institutes. The Chilean Production 
Development Corporation, CORFO, 
put specific FDI attraction policies into 
place inspired by the experiences of 
Ireland, Singapore and Costa Rica. These 
policies targeted activities such as software 
development, IT and KPO services, as 
well as niche services geared at specific 
industries, such as finance and innovation 
activities in natural resource industries (mining 
and biotechnology, for example). Financial 
incentives were established, investments 
were made in human resources development 
and infrastructure (including the building of 
facilities), and immigration procedures were 
streamlined. A set of incentives is now in place 
for FDI in high-tech industries in particular. 
These include grants for pre-investment 
studies and setting-up costs, investment 
support services, training, investment in 
fixed assets and real-estate leases. CORFO 
provides office space at subsidized rates 
for a set period at its facilities in Curauma, 
close to Valparaíso.
In 2007, Chile exported over US$ 
400 million in services (well in excess of 
the target established in 2000), through 
50 service centres. Most of these 
exports refer to engineering services 
rather than to contact centre or BPO 
functions. Global business services 
were the first non-natural-resource-
based industry to generate a similar 
volume of exports. There are currently 
12,000 people employed in the global 
services industry, of which two thirds 
are specialized technical staff and one 
third are professionals holding university 
degrees. The country has managed to 
attract leading firms that have had a 
strong signalling effect on the industry 
(see table II.A-1). Policy efforts have 
also been directed at the development 
of the local industry within the global 
services cluster.
Some of the main challenges that 
remain are to generate sufficient numbers 
of English-proficient, skilled professionals 
to meet the demands of companies 
interested in investing in Chile without 
compromising the operations of those 
already established or local firms. The 
first signs of saturation have appeared, 
as newly established companies have had 
to draw heavily from other companies in 
the global services cluster to staff their 
service centres. Measures in course 
include specific programmes to improve 
English skills among IT professionals 
and at the secondary-school level, 
the revision of university engineering 
curricula to adapt them to the needs 
of an industry characterized by a high 
rate of technological change, and the 
strengthening of professional institutes. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of interviews to the companies; documents presented at the Seminar on offshore 
business services in Latin America and the Caribbean, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 18 November 
2008 and Boston Consulting Group (BCG), “Estudios de competitividad en clusters de la economía chilena. Informe final” [online] http://www.economia.cl/1540/
articles-187159_recurso_1.pdf, 2007.
Colombia hosts business service companies in 
different segments, from contact centres to BPO to 
software development. It has promoted its advantages as 
a nearshore destination that can offer a large contingent 
of professionals in IT industries, flexible labour 
legislation and low costs. There are an estimated 55,000 
employees in the IT and IT-enabled services industries 
in Colombia, but a large share of these caters to the 
local market and to other regional markets (Proexport, 
2008a, 2008b). 
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2.  Latin America and the Caribbean in the corporate strategies  
 of major players
The growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean 
is visible in the strategies of some of the major TNCs that 
offshore operations. Although some companies run in-house 
offshore centres, this section focuses on the experiences 
in the region of some of the major outsourcing players, 
for whom offshoring is a core element of competitive 
strategies (see box II.7). 
Box II.7
OUTSOURCING VENDORS IN IT AND IT-ENABLED SERVICES: THE MAIN PLAYERS
The IT and IT-enabled services market is 
highly diversified, and companies provide 
different combinations of services that 
overlap in certain segments and industries 
but not in others. Contracts with customers 
often involve a package of bundled 
services (and sometimes hardware). It 
is therefore difficult to rank and segment 
the main players.
The players in the contact centre 
services market can be more easily set 
apart from the others, although many 
companies also provide certain BPO 
services. The market is highly fragmented, 
with the top four players accounting for less 
than 12% of the outsourced contact centre 
market. In 2007, the largest players were 
West (United States), Teleperformance 
(France), Convergys (United States), 
Sitel (Canada) and Atento (part of Grupo 
Telefónica of Spain). 
There has been a significant merging 
of BPO and IT services as companies 
initially specializing in one have expanded 
into the other, and companies originating 
in the manufacturing industry, such as 
IBM and HP, have shifted into services. 
Software development is an important 
component of the activities of several 
of these firms. They must, however, be 
MAJOR BPO AND IT OUTSOURCING VENDORS a
Company Revenues (millions of dollars) Employees
IBM Global Services (United States) 54 100 190 000
Accenture (United States) 23 387 186 000
HP Services (including EDS) (United States) 22 397 210 000  
(140 000 from EDS)
CapGemini (France) 12 809 88 000
ACS (United States) 6 160 60 000
Tata Consulting (India) 5 722 116 000
Wipro (India) 4 933 96 426
Infosys (India) 4 176 103 078
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from 
Hoovers [online] http://www.hoovers.com; Computer Business Review [online] http://www.cbronline.com 
and company websites.
a 
 Figures refer to the most recent information available as of February 2008.
considered separately from packaged 
software companies such as Microsoft, 
Adobe and SAP, because, unlike in the 
case of the latter, their services are 
customer-specific. Also, they typically 
have larger offshore operations and 
more employees per dollar of revenue 
than packaged software firms (Tigre and 
Silveira Marques, 2007).a Table below the 
main players, ranked by revenues. The 
majority of these companies, which will 
henceforth be referred to as “integrated 
outsourcing companies”, are either 
from the United States or, increasingly, 
from India. 
Finally, KPO services are provided 
either by companies that specialize in KPO 
or as part of the package of services offered 
by integrated outsourcing companies. 
Although there is a trend towards greater 
outsourcing of knowledge processing 
functions, there are certain services 
which will tend to remain under captive 
operations. Major KPO specialists include 
Evalueserve, Amba Research, Irenva, 
Copal Partners and Inductis. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Atento, Annual Report, 2007, 2008; Evalueserve, “The 
future of knowledge process outsourcing. Make or buy in KPO”, EVS White Paper, 18 April 2007; Hoovers [online] http://www.hoovers.com; Computer Business 
Review [online] http://www.cbronline.com and company websites.
a
 It should be mentioned, however, that the packaged software firms have resorted significantly to offshoring for the development of applications for their software and by 
setting up in-house back-office or shared service centres. Offshoring in software has taken place in two other groups of software firms: software operations in non-software 
firms (Agilent Technologies, Citicorp); and software-intensive high-tech startups (Hellosoft, Netscaler and Ketera) (Aggarwal and others, 2006).
In regard to the offshore operations of major outsourcing 
companies in Latin America and the Caribbean, section a 
focuses on the contact centre companies Teleperformance 
and Digitex. Section b looks at companies —referred to 
as “integrated outsourcing companies”— that provide 
combinations of BPO and IT services. Whereas some 
also span the lower-skill contact centre functions (ACS), 
others have included KPO in their portfolios (TCS, IBM). 
Sections c and d discuss the regional experiences of two 
individual companies: Evalueserve, which specializes in 
KPO, and Softtek, a Mexican BPO/IT player. Table II.2 
illustrates the service mix of these companies.
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Table II.2
RANGE OF SERVICES OF SELECTED TRANSNATIONAL AND REGIONAL CORPORATIONS a




ACS, EDS, an HP Company
Digitex
Teleperformance
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 Shaded area indicates the services offered.
(a) Contact centres:  exploring nearshore 
advantages and a growing Spanish-language 
market worldwide
As mentioned, contact centres and simple BPO 
functions are the main offshoring segments in the English-
speaking Caribbean States and most of Central America and 
the Dominican Republic. They also represent a significant 
share of offshoring of business functions in the other 
countries in the region (see table II.A-1). All the main 
cross-industry contact centre companies have operations 
in Latin America and the Caribbean, and most are present 
in multiple destinations (see table II.3). Companies have 
approached the region in two different ways. 
Table II.3
FOOTPRINT OF THE MAJOR CONTACT CENTRE COMPANIES (OFFSHORE SITES OR GLOBAL DELIVERY CENTRES)  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2007
Call centre Location of operations in the region 
1 West (United States) Guatemala, Jamaica 
2 Teleperformance (France) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica, Mexico 
3 Convergys (United States) Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
4 SITEL (Canada) Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Panama
5 Atento (Spain) a Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay 
6 TeleTech (United States) Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Mexico
7 ICT Group (United States) Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico
8 Sykes (United States) Brazil, El Salvador
9 24/7 Customer (India) Guatemala
10 Stream (United States) Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from “The 2007 Black Book of Outsourcing” [online] http://
theblackbookofoutsourcing.com/vendors-research-market-2007.htm; Atento, Annual Report, 2007, 2008; company websites and interviews.
a 
 Locations presented here for Atento are not necessarily offshore operations.
In the smaller countries, particularly in the English-
speaking Caribbean and in Central America, investments 
have been mainly export-oriented. The principal advantages 
of these countries are low costs (when the cost savings 
associated with geographical and time-zone proximity are 
considered), and the availability of people who are fluent in 
English and Spanish, the languages spoken most commonly in 
the major market, the United States. Central America and the 
Caribbean offer comparable costs to India and the Philippines 
at the more basic level of contact centres and data entry. 
Another asset is that operators from these countries usually 
have neutral accents, an asset that is increasingly valued by 
customers. On a smaller scale, multilingual services have 
also started to be provided from the region.
In the larger countries of South America and in 
Mexico, companies have entered with a combination of 
export-oriented and market-seeking strategies, diluting 
the fixed costs of an offshore operation by catering to 
large volumes of local customers. In many cases, the 
offshore component of operations is small, but still 
amounts to a significant number of employees and 
substantial revenues when considered in absolute terms. 
For example, approximately 20% of Mexican contact 
services are exported, which, assuming even revenues 
per employee, represents the output of 72,000 workers, 
roughly equivalent to the number of people employed in 
this industry in all of the Caribbean and Central America 
put together (IMT, 2008). 
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For the purpose of this analysis, the strategies of two 
companies are considered: Teleperformance and Digitex. 
Teleperformance is one of the largest contact centre 
companies in the world and one with the most extensive 
footprint in Latin America and the Caribbean. Unlike 
some of its competitors, which have chosen to expand 
into BPO and IT services, Teleperformance has focused 
on contact centres as its core business and made only small 
incursions into other segments. Digitex, on the other hand, 
is not among the largest companies in the industry, but is 
an interesting example of a company that specializes in 
Spanish-speaking services, a market in regard to which 
Latin America is uniquely positioned. 
Teleperformance
Established in 1978, Teleperformance is based in 
France and has 83,000 employees in 46 countries. It 
provides services in 66 languages and dialects through a 
combination of onshore and offshore facilities. Offshore 
centres are situated in 15 countries, seven of which are in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. These include dedicated 
offshore facilities (such as those in the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Jamaica and some of its centres 
in Mexico) and others that combine offshore functions 
and local operations (in Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the 
remaining Mexican operations) (see table II.4).
Table II.4
TELEPERFORMANCE: OFFSHORE LOCATIONS
Nearshore/Offshore Location Markets Served Dedicated offshore facility/shared facilities Languages supported
Argentina United States Hispanic market, Latin 
America, Spain
Shared English, Spanish
Brazil United States Shared English, Portuguese
Canada United States Shared English, French
Chile Spain, Argentina Shared Spanish
Dominican Republic United States Hispanic market Dedicated English, Spanish
El Salvador United States Hispanic market, 
Mexico
Dedicated English, Spanish
India United States Dedicated English
Jamaica United States Dedicated English
Mexico United States and United States 
Hispanic market
Dedicated and shared English, Spanish
Philippines United States Shared English
Portugal Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, 
Spain, Switzerland 
Shared German, Spanish, French, Greek, 
English
South Africa United Kingdom Dedicated English
Tunisia France Dedicated French
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Teleperformance [online] http://www.teleperformance.com.
Teleperformance’s internationalization strategy began 
with the penetration of Europe in the 1980s, followed by 
the United States in the early 1990s. Its incursions into 
developing countries, including in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, began in the second half of the 1990s. 
The company’s offshore operations in the region consist 
of two main systems, one that revolves around its base 
in Mexico, and the other that revolves around its base 
in Argentina. 
The Mexican operation began in 1996, catering to the 
local market. It soon started providing a combination of 
local market services and bilingual services to the United 
States. In 2002, it acquired Merkafon, a customer relations 
management, telemarketing and teleservices provider 
serving Mexican and Hispanic American clients, with 
workstations in Monterrey and Mexico City in Mexico, 
and Plano, Texas in the United States. These service 
centres, which employed over 1,600 people at the time 
of the acquisition, fit into Teleperformance’s strategy of 
combining onshore and offshore services to its United 
States clients. In addition to the Spanish and bilingual 
services it already provided, in 2006 Teleperformance 
started providing English-only services from its centres in 
Chihuahua. Its Mexican operations were further expanded 
in 2007 through the acquisition of Hispanic Teleservices 
Corporation, which has over 1,800 employees and facilities 
in Monterrey and Guadalajara. 
The El Salvador centre, established in 2004, is a 
lower-cost complement to the Mexican Spanish-language 
operations for the United States market and also provides 
services to Mexican banks and financial institutions. 
Teleperformance’s employees in Mexico and 
El Salvador who cater to the United States market 
together number approximately 10,000. Along with the 
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operations based out of the United States, this means that 
Teleperformance has over 26,000 employees catering 
to the English-speaking and bilingual markets in the 
United States.
The company’s first centre in Argentina was set up 
in 1998 and now has 3,500 employees and offers services 
in five different languages. Approximately 60% of the 
services provided in Argentina are for export to the United 
States, Latin America and Europe. Teleperformance 
also owns Software del Plata, which provides technical 
support, help desk, IT outsourcing and consulting services 
to the local and Latin American markets. The Chilean 
operation was established in 2006 as an expansion of the 
Argentinean programme. 
Teleperformance’s operations in the Caribbean 
also cater to offshore customers but with more focused 
objectives. They function independently of the two Latin 
American systems (Mexico-El Salvador; Argentina-Chile). 
The Dominican Republic centre, established in 2002, 
supports the company’s United States subsidiary Americall 
Group in outbound telemarketing services for the Hispanic 
market in the United States. The Jamaican operation was 
acquired through Teleperformance’s purchase of United 
States company AllianceOne, in 2007, and specializes in 
accounts receivable management (debt collection).
The Brazilian operations were set up at the same 
time as the Argentinean ones, in 1998, and successively 
expanded, but with a greater focus on the local market. 
Teleperformance is the third largest contact centre 
company in the country, with 20,000 employees working 
in 13 service centres. The Brazilian centres export their 
services, essentially to the United States, but unlike the 
Mexican and Argentinean hubs, they do not cater to the 
Hispanic market.
Therefore, contrasting with its centres in the 
Philippines and India, which provide English-only 
services to the United States, Teleperformance’s Latin 
American and Caribbean offshore operations provide 
a combination of English and Spanish services to the 
United States and to Spain. Also unlike in the two Asian 
countries, the regional market plays an important part in 
Teleperformance’s strategy in Latin American and the 
Caribbean. The company’s growing interest in the region 
is evident in the substantial investments made after 2002, 
and especially after 2007. 
Digitex
Digitex is not among the largest players in the industry, 
but it is one of the leaders in Spanish-language services 
and as such has a significant share of its operations in Latin 
America. The company employs 8,500 people worldwide, 
with just over 4,000 employees in Latin America and the 
rest in Spain. The company provides contact centre services, 
BPO, and IT services (software factory)16 and specializes 
in catering to companies in the telecommunications, 
banking, finance and utilities sectors. 
Digitex was founded in 1988, in Spain, and initially 
focused on the Spanish market. In 1999, it established a 
Chilean subsidiary, its first international operation, with 
the specific mission of providing support for the Y2K 
procedures. A year later, the company set up a subsidiary 
in Argentina to target the local market there. Both of these 
have since been discontinued. 
The company’s second wave of internationalization 
was undertaken after an experience with the remote 
provision of services through second-tier cities within 
Spain. From its hub in Madrid, starting in 2001, Digitex 
began a “national offshoring strategy”, opening a centre 
in León, followed by La Carolina in 2003, Aranda de 
Duero in 2004, and later other destinations. The concept 
behind this national expansion strategy was to operate out 
of multiple platforms situated in provinces with higher-
than-average unemployment rates and few professional 
opportunities for local residents. While for these areas 
the presence of Digitex service centres was welcome 
and generated significant social and economic benefits, 
for the company it has meant relatively lower costs, an 
eager workforce and low attrition rates. 
Based on the success of this national expansion 
and on specific requests from clients to explore Latin 
America’s potential as an offshore destination, a second 
international expansion phase started in 2005. Rather than 
the specific missions that had characterized the initial 
international moves in the late 1990s, this time the concept 
was to explore, in parallel, the Latin American market 
(including transnational and particularly Spanish clients 
situated in the region) and the Hispanic market in the 
United States. Digitex entered a joint venture with Altra 
Inversiones, a Colombian venture capital firm, supported, 
among others, by the Santo Domingo Group, with the 
purpose of expanding within Latin America. While Digitex 
contributed its know-how in establishing and developing 
customer service platforms and its relationship with the 
Spanish multinationals, Altra contributed its knowledge 
of, and experience in, the regional business environment. 
The initial growth strategy was based on the acquisition 
of local companies and alliances with leading companies 
providing local services. Company headquarters were set 
up in Mexico, and a joint venture was established with a 
United States company to penetrate the Hispanic market 
in that country. 
16
 The term “software factory” refers to the assembly of software 
components and the development of software applications according 
to client specifications.
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Currently the company’s operations in Latin America 
are grouped into three main areas: Central America, the 
Andean Community and Mexico. The Mexico office 
functions essentially as a commercial office. The Central 
American offshore operations are anchored in Guatemala. 
The base there has 650 positions covered by 1,000 
employees and caters to the United States and Spanish 
market in addition to performing regional inbound and 
outbound contact centre services (including technical 
support, help desks, customer service, order response, 
financial services, information services, collections, 
payment reminders, up-selling and cross-selling) and 
BPO functions. In terms of the service mix, the strategy 
followed by the company has been to first provide the 
simpler functions initially and, if successful, gradually 
evolve towards a second generation of services that 
would include, for instance, software factory services. 
Although the focus is still on Spanish-language services, 
the English-language market is increasingly being 
catered to.
The base in El Salvador has 250 positions, which 
provides customer services and BPO essentially to local 
clients and provides redundancy or back-up capacity in 
cases where operations are unexpectedly interrupted or 
capacity is insufficient to meet demand for the Guatemala 
base. In Nicaragua and Panama, the company provides 
services to major locally-established clients. 
In the Andean countries, Digitex has been operating 
in Colombia since 2005 and in Peru since 2006. Following 
the Spanish offshoring strategy pursued earlier in the 
decade, in the Andean region, the strategy has been to 
move towards medium-sized cities to find motivated human 
resources at low costs and with low attrition rates. The 
requirements for these second-tier destinations are the 
presence of universities, a significant number of qualified 
human resources and adequate telecommunications and 
transportation logistics. Although the centre of operations 
in Colombia is in Bogota, the largest operation is in 
Manizales, where the company has 1,200 positions to 
provide both local services and offshore services to 
Spain. The centre the company recently inaugurated in 
Ibagué, a city of approximately 500,000 inhabitants, 
has 1,000 positions. In Peru, which is a relatively 
unexplored territory as far as offshore business services 
are concerned, the first operations were set up in Lima 
in 2006, but from the outset, there have been plans to 
expand into smaller urban centres such as Trujillo and 
Tacna (Peru.com, 2008). 
Thus, two characteristics of Digitex’s presence 
in Latin America are noteworthy: it has combined 
operations geared towards local markets with offshoring 
operations; and it has used its experience in expanding 
to peripheral areas in Spain to explore the advantages 
of medium-sized cities, such as Manizales in Colombia, 
and of countries that are relatively new to the offshore 
business services industry among their neighbours, 
such as Guatemala and Peru. As in the case of ACS, 
Digitex’s decision to expand into offshore services in 
Latin America and the Caribbean was influenced by 
requests from clients.
The experience of these two companies reflects 
characteristics that apply to contact centre companies 
in the region in general. These companies have used the 
region as a nearshore base for Spanish- and English-
speaking customers, catering mostly to the United States 
market (including its promising Hispanic component), 
but also to Latin American markets and to Europe. Asia 
remains difficult to compete with in segments that rely 
more heavily on labour costs. However, as companies 
start offering more targeted services that require more 
frequent interaction with clients situated in the United 
States or direct contact with customers, Latin America 
and the Caribbean has unique advantages. Latin America 
is a natural choice for Spanish companies whose main 
market is Spanish-speaking. In their strategies for the 
region, operations are almost exclusively export oriented 
in the smaller countries of the Caribbean and Central 
America, but in the larger countries, they provide 
a combination of local-market and export services. 
Finally, the fact that clients have specifically requested 
that outsourcing vendors locate their service centres in 
the region is an element to be taken into account when 
drafting regional or country promotion strategies (see 
section D). 
(b) Integrated outsourcing firms: exploring skills and 
markets in BPO and IT
For their global delivery operation centres, integrated 
outsourcing firms require large numbers of skilled 
professionals. This is part of the reason why in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the offshore centres of the 
integrated outsourcing companies, unlike the contact 
centre companies, are located mostly in the larger markets 
(see table II.5). 
Many of the United States companies have decades’ 
long histories in the region, especially in the largest 
markets, owing to their links with the manufacturing 
industry. IBM manufactured IT hardware in Argentina, 
Mexico and Brazil before it shifted its core activities 
from hardware to services. The same goes for HP, which 
acquired Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in 2008. EDS, 
in turn, was owned between 1985 and 1996 by General 
Motors, which also has plants in these three countries 
and was subsequently an outsourcing provider to 
the company. 
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Table II.5
FOOTPRINT OF MAJOR INTEGRATED BPO/IT COMPANIES (OFFSHORE SITES OR GLOBAL DELIVERY CENTRES)  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
Company Countries
IBM Global Services (United States) Argentina, Brazil, Mexico 
Accenture (United States) Brazil
HP Services (including EDS) (United States) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico
CapGemini (France) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Guatemala, Mexico
ACS (United States) Brazil, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Jamaica, Mexico
Tata Consulting (India) Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay 
Wipro (India) Brazil, Mexico
Infosys (India) Mexico
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Hoovers [online] http://www.hoovers.com; Computer Business 
Review [online] http://www.cbronline.com and company websites.
transcription and contact centre services. Hence its larger 
footprint in Central America and the Caribbean than the other 
companies listed in table II.5. However, the company’s service 
mix has recently started to diversify and move towards higher-
value-added services. The company’s regional strategies are 
shifting away from pure efficiency-seeking ventures towards 
a hybrid efficiency-, market- and strategic-asset-seeking 
approach, especially in South America.
Today, ACS has approximately 26,000 employees 
outside the United States, of which 2,500 are in the 
Caribbean, 12,000 in Latin America, 5,000 in India and 
2,500 in the Philippines (see table II.6). The region thus 
plays an important role in the company’s structure. In 
fact, its first operations outside the United States were in 
Mexico —initially Monterrey, then Hermosillo— followed 
by Guatemala, all in the mid-1990s. The purpose of these 
initial investments was to explore the nearshore advantages 
of Mexico and Central America, a novel concept at the 
time. At first, the services provided included transaction 
processing or data entry services. Over the years, however, 
changes in the make-up of the company’s global offshore 
workforce affected the company’s Latin American operations. 
These took place in two successive movements.
The entry of Indian companies is more recent. TCS 
is the company with the longest history in the region, 
having made its first investments in the 1990s. However, 
the major export-oriented investments of TCS were only 
undertaken in 2005. Other Indian companies followed: 
Wipro invested in Brazil and Mexico, Infosys in Mexico, 
and Satyam in Brazil, between 2006 and 2007.
The following paragraphs describe the strategies 
of ACS, EDS - an HP company, IBM and TCS in using 
Latin America as an offshore destination.
ACS
Affiliated Computer Services (ACS) is a United States 
company with US$ 6.2 billion in annual revenues and almost 
70,000 employees. The business strategy of ACS focuses 
on serving vertical markets where it has subject matter 
expertise in a wide range of services, including data entry and 
transcription, contact centre, BPO and IT services. It stands 
out among the other companies in this section in that it has 
made greater use of Latin America and the Caribbean as a 
low-cost, nearshore base for its United States customers in 
lower-value-added BPO services, including data entry and 
Table II.6
ACS: OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, 2008 a
City Date established Types of services Client industries Employees
Monterrey, Mexico 1995, second 
facility in 2008
Call centre, transaction processing, IT, 
finance and accounting
International delivery companies, health 
insurance, electronic manufacturing clients
800
Hermosillo, Mexico 1996 Transaction processing, IT support Financial services, international delivery, 
health care
360
Guatemala City 1998 Transaction processing, IT, finance and 
accounting 
Financial services, health care, insurance 650
Montego Bay, 
Jamaica
2001 Transaction processing, human resources, 
call centre support, finance and accounting 
Communications, education, financial 





2001 Transaction processing, call centre, 
finance and accounting, mail-room 
3 500
in five facilities
Mexico City 2004 Transaction processing, call centre, IT Health care and technology 100
São Paulo, Brazil 2004 Human resources, finance and accounting Communications, manufacturing (mostly 
United States and other international 




1987 BPO services: billing, payroll processing, 
human resources, call centre 
Health care and financial services 480
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from ACS [online] http://www.acs-inc.com.
a 
 Prior to the acquisition of Grupo Multivoice in December 2008.
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First, as competition increased, ACS started searching 
for lower-cost markets, particularly for its lower-skill 
functions. The company therefore invested in Asia, 
especially India and the Philippines, and even scaled 
back its operations in Latin America up until the mid-
2000s. In the second movement, ACS adopted a different 
approach towards the region. In addition to lower costs, 
the company saw potential in the region’s nearshore 
advantages, especially for higher-value-added services 
(within the contact centre category and in BPO and 
software development). This motivated new investments 
in Guatemala and Mexico and later in the Caribbean. ACS 
entered Jamaica in 2001 and, in 2008, announced plans to 
establish a new facility in Montego Bay (Josephs, 2008). 
This second movement, which was strongly influenced by 
the express interest of clients, did not mean transferring 
jobs back from Asia, but exploring new opportunities in 
nearshore capabilities. 
In South America, the Brazilian operations were 
inaugurated in 2004 and geared at transnational corporations 
operating in Brazil. These operations are relatively small 
compared to the other regional centres. However, ACS made 
another significant move in South America late in 2008, when 
it acquired Grupo Multivoice, based in Córdoba, Argentina. 
The company owned a network of service centres in Chile, 
Colombia, and Peru and employed 6,000 people, roughly 
10% of the workforce at ACS prior to the acquisition. The 
purpose of the acquisition was twofold: to explore regional 
growth in South America and to expand capacity to cater 
to offshore clients. Multivoice’s assets will enable ACS to 
strengthen its services to Europe and its bilingual (English 
and Spanish) services to the United States (ACS, 2008). 
Since 2004, ACS has therefore renewed its interest in 
the region and begun to tap nearshore advantages in Mexico, 
Central America and the Caribbean, and, in South America, 
to explore a combination of regional market growth and the 
availability of skills to cater to the European and United 
States markets. 
EDS, an HP Company
Like other original equipment manufacturers in the 
IT hardware manufacturing industry, HP has increased the 
services component of its business in the last few years. Its 
acquisition of Electronic Data Systems (EDS) in 2008 for 
US$ 13.9 billion reflects that strategy and is expected to more 
than double the services revenue of HP. Since the buy-out, 
EDS has been rebranded as “EDS, an HP Company”. 
HP itself is an important offshore player, not only 
in providing services to global clients but in offshoring 
its own back-office operations. In Latin America, its 
operations in Costa Rica are among the largest. Initially 
established to service Procter & Gamble (see Martínez, 
Padilla and Schatan, 2008), HP Costa Rica now provides 
services to other global customers and has its own in-house 
back-office and global customer service operations in 
the country, where it employs 6,500 people. HP also has 
offshore operations in Mexico, Panama and Brazil (on the 
Mexican operation, see Mullan and others, 2008). 
Whereas the service operations of HP have historically 
been anchored to technology and the client relationships 
the company had developed initially through its hardware 
business, EDS has always been a services company. EDS 
was one of the first firms to provide outsourced business 
and IT services and was founded in 1962 by Ross Perot 
and acquired in 1985 by General Motors to carry out its 
information management functions. The company’s first 
incursions into Latin America were in Mexico during that 
year, precisely to service the General Motors operation 
in that country. In 1989, EDS began providing services 
to external clients in Mexico.
In 1996, EDS became an independent company again, 
focusing on its role as a BPO and IT service outsourcing 
vendor. The company started exploring low-cost offshore 
options later than its more aggressive competitors. A major 
step was taken in 2004, when it acquired the Indian company 
MPhasis. In Latin America, the first attempts at offshoring 
were in IT applications, maintaining and developing software 
in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, for customers in the United States. 
EDS had between 500 and 700 people engaged in offshore-
only services at this operation until 2005. 
In 2006, the company decided to strengthen its offshore 
component, and Latin America, alongside Eastern Europe 
and China, were considered as alternatives to India. 
Among other reasons, this was influenced by customers, 
who started requesting more familiar accents or wished to 
diversify the location of their service providers to cover 
political or natural contingencies. Moreover, the Indian 
market started presenting attrition problems that in turn 
generated high costs, particularly in training. That year, 
a decision was made to make a major offshore-oriented 
investment in Latin America. 
Up until then, EDS locations in Latin America had 
been strongly determined by the location of the plants of its 
former owner, General Motors. This had led to excessive 
fragmentation of service centres for a company that was 
now an outsourcing company catering to multiple clients 
and set within an industry that was exploring IT to take 
maximum advantage of scale economies. The concept of 
global service delivery centres was instituted, which meant 
identifying sites where it would be possible to concentrate 
between 1,500 and 5,000 professionals in countries that 
provided competitive offshore cost conditions. Like other 
companies, EDS favoured sites outside capital cities that 
nonetheless offered abundant human resources through 
proximity to academic centres and the availability of 
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campus-type areas. Three types of services were to be 
provided: IT infrastructure, applications development/
software maintenance and BPO (including call centre, 
procurement and back-office functions). 
Several alternatives were considered in Brazil, where 
EDS already had important operations, but currency 
appreciation made costs too high. So the company 
decided to integrate the existing Brazilian operations in 
a campus outside the city of São Paulo. This operation 
was set up to provide mainly local services but also has 
approximately 200 employees dedicated to offshore 
operations, as well as others filling in offshore demand 
when necessary. The offshore services provided by 
EDS in Brazil involve specific applications for which 
qualified professionals are scarce in Argentina, the 
location that was eventually selected for the global 
delivery service centre.
The Argentine city of Córdoba was chosen because 
it offered a combination of cost advantages and qualified 
personnel, met the company’s requirements in terms 
of adequate infrastructure and was a second-tier city. 
In fact, Argentina had become particularly attractive 
as a destination for offshore business services since 
the devaluation of the peso in 2002, which added to 
the advantages of a highly-educated and numerous 
workforce (the country has the region’s highest rate of 
annual enrolment in tertiary education) and government 
incentives. In Córdoba, the company found adequate 
office space in an industrial park, close to the airport, 
with world class technology and connectivity, as well 
as strong support from the provincial government. The 
Córdoba government was actively promoting investment 
in this industry with tax rebates and a direct subsidy per 
employee. The office was operational by January 2007 
and had 750 employees by 2008. Offshore operations 
were also undertaken from the company’s offices in 
Buenos Aires. 
Thus, when EDS decided to strengthen the offshore 
component of its operations, Latin America was considered 
because it offered nearshore advantages (including ease 
of communication with clients in the United States) and 
lower saturation (and lower attrition rates) than India, could 
complement the company’s India-centred offshore operations 
and would help diversify the location of its operations. 
At the time of the acquisition by HP, EDS had 2,300 
employees in Argentina, 2,000 in Mexico, and over 8,000 
in Brazil and smaller centres in Chile and Colombia. 
Offices dedicated to relationships with single clients were 
present in other countries. 
IBM
IBM first entered the services market in the 1990s 
when it started facing strong competition in the hardware 
industry. Two key steps in that direction were the acquisition 
of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ global business consulting 
and technology services unit, PwC Consulting, in 2002, 
and the divestment of the PC manufacturing division to 
Lenovo in 2004 (EIU, 2006). Within the services industry, 
IBM has focused on high-growth, high-value segments. 
Its Global Services business is divided into two main 
divisions: Global Technology Services and Global Business 
Services (see table II.7). These interact with software, 
systems and financing branches of the company. Like HP, 
and unlike Accenture and EDS (prior to its acquisition 
by HP), IBM provides both services and systems (the 
hardware infrastructure related to those services).
IBM is the largest company in its category worldwide 
and in Latin America and the Caribbean (see chapter I). 
It has had manufacturing facilities in Brazil and Mexico 
for over 80 years. As the company shifted into services, 
it established service centres in countries in which it had 
previously manufactured and in those with relatively 
strong export-oriented IT industries.
Table II.7
IBM GLOBAL SERVICES




IT infrastructure and 
business processes
Strategic outsourcing services. Comprehensive IT services integrated with business 
knowledge, working with clients to reduce costs and improve productivity through the 
outsourcing of processes and operations
Business transformation outsourcing. A range of offerings from standardized 
processing platforms and BPO through transformational offerings that delivers 
improved business results to clients through the strategic change and/or operation of 
the client’s business processes, applications and infrastructure
Integrated technology services. Services offerings that help clients access, manage 
and support their technology infrastructures through a combination of skilled 
resources, software and the knowledge IBM has of business processes
Maintenance. Support services from product maintenance through solution support 






Professional services and 
application outsourcing 
Consulting and systems integration. Consulting services for client-relationship 
management, financial management, human-capital management, business strategy 
and change and supply-chain management
Application management services 
Possibility of leveraging 
industry and business 
process expertise
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from IBM, Annual Report, 2007, 2008.
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In Brazil and Mexico, IBM took advantage of its 
infrastructure, its professionals and a base of local clients to 
ensure minimum efficient scale in its operations. In Brazil, 
between 2004 and 2006, the company spent US$ 70 million 
in the development of the Hortolândia hub, in the State of 
São Paulo, where it had manufactured IT hardware since the 
1970s. The centre now hosts over 7,000 employees, 80% 
of which are dedicated to export services to over 60 global 
customers in seven different languages. In fact, although 
the lack of English-language skills is often mentioned as 
a major limitation for the expansion of offshore business 
services in Brazil, in this relatively high-per-capita-income 
area, thanks to the large concentration of universities and 
research institutions, English skills are common among 
university graduates, and a significant number of professionals 
have had educational experiences in other countries and 
are proficient in third languages. Service exports by IBM 
in Brazil have grown continuously since the beginning of 
operations (see figure II.3) (Valor econômico, 2008). In 2008, 
new investments were made in service and data centres. 
Figure II.3














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data provided by IBM.
In Mexico, IBM started converting manufacturing 
facilities to services centres in the late 1990s. In 2005, 
the IBM centre in Guadalajara became one of the first 
in Mexico to obtain CMMI certification,17 and by 2006, 
IBM had 1,200 program developers working there. Today, 
IBM Global Services accounts for 50% of IBM revenues 
in Mexico, and its computer programs account for another 
25% (Mullan and others, 2008). In 2008, IBM established 
a new centre of excellence in Guadalajara, Mexico, to 
provide innovation services for the retail market. 
17
 Based on a process improvement model, Capability Maturity 
Model Integration (CMMI) certification is granted by the Software 
Engineering Institute (SEI), operated by Carnegie Mellon University, 
based on two main criteria: product or system quality and the 
maturity of the organization in software development. 
In Argentina, Costa Rica, and Uruguay, IBM operations 
are more export-oriented. In Argentina, the company’s 
global delivery centres started expanding significantly 
in 2004: the number of employees performing offshore 
functions rose from 70 in 2004 to approximately 2,600 by 
the third quarter of 2008. In October 2008, the company 
announced the creation of three new global delivery 
centres, entailing investments of US$ 60 million over 
10 years, to provide more than 20 countries with server, 
database, network and storage monitoring and support 
services. IBM has an in-house operation in Costa Rica, as 
well as a centre dedicated to P&G, and is in the process 
of establishing an offshore BPO operation in Uruguay to 
cater to a specific client. Other operations in the region 
are more oriented towards local clients.
In short, the operations of IBM in Latin America have 
followed two main patterns. One draws on the link between 
large local markets and industries and competitiveness as 
a global delivery centre. In Mexico and Brazil, IBM had 
strong portfolios of local clients and local subsidiaries of 
transnational clients, which gave it a safe base to build 
on for its expansion into global offshore services. The 
combination of offshore and local market operations 
allows service centres to operate at a minimum efficient 
scale, which compensates for higher costs than in the 
main Asian locations. Moreover, through its own IT 
manufacturing business, IBM had accumulated knowledge 
on local business environments and owned infrastructure 
that it converted to service provision (ECLAC, 2008a). 
Finally, the existence of an IT manufacturing industry 
countrywide, in the case of Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, 
helped create a pool of engineers and other professionals 
employable in the IT services industry. The other pattern 
refers to the company’s smaller investments that have 
actively targeted technology-intensive services sectors in 
the region, including those in Costa Rica and Uruguay.
TCS 
Founded in 1968 within the Tata Group in India, 
TCS started out developing software for other companies. 
Initially, it sold the hours of engineers and maintenance 
and support personnel. In time, this model evolved into 
providing solutions, which enabled the company to provide 
outsourcing services for an increasing range of IT and 
technology functions that were no longer core activities 
for its clients. The company went public in 2004.
TCS first ventured into Latin America when its clients 
started expanding in the region. It was the first of the 
Indian offshore business service companies to establish 
operations in Latin America, entering Brazil in the 1990s. 
Later it established operations in Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay in 2002 and 2003 and made another major 
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acquisition in Chile in 2005. Its global service centre in 
Uruguay was established in 2005 in Zonamerica, a free 
trade zone technology park. This was the first centre in 
South America to obtain CMMI Level 5 certification 
(the highest standard under the CMMI model). Today the 
company has offices in 12 countries in Latin America, 
global delivery centres in Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay and 
Argentina, and BPO centres in Chile and Ecuador. Of a 
total of 111,000 employees worldwide, approximately 
5,000 are in Latin America.
TCS conceived a three-pronged strategy for its 
operations in Latin America: catering to local markets 
(including global clients of TCS in the region); applying 
the same low-cost offshore concept used in India to provide 
services to other regions, while exploring the region’s 
nearshore advantages; and taking advantage of aspects that 
complemented the Indian operations, including opposite 
time zones (allowing for 24/7 services). The region had 
an important role to play in the the company’s global 
delivery network model, which consists of a worldwide 
network of linked service centres using common standard 
processes and drawing from complementary capabilities 
worldwide. Under this model, India is the major offshore 
destination; operations in China and Brazil are mostly 
for local clients, but there are prospects for gradually 
developing their offshore capacity; and Mexico, Uruguay 
and Chile function as nearshore sites for the United States 
market (as Hungary and Morocco do for the European 
market). All this is complemented by onshore locations 
in Australia, Europe, Japan and the United States.
In fact, there is a marked distinction between the 
operations in Uruguay and to a certain extent Mexico, 
and those in the rest of the region. In Uruguay, exports 
account for 90% of revenues. Today the Uruguay centre 
has over 800 people providing nearshore IT services in 
Spanish, Portuguese, English, French, Italian, German 
and other European languages. The presence of TCS has 
had a significant impact on the local employment rate in 
this industry. Mexico is becoming another strong export 
base for TCS because of its proximity to the United States 
and the large number of skilled professionals it has who 
are proficient in English. A global delivery centre was 
set up in 2007 with 500 employees and there are plans 
for expansion.
With the exception of these two countries, however, 
the export-oriented operations in the region have not grown 
as fast as initially predicted, and roughly 80% of services 
provided in the regional centres are for local markets. 
High costs compared to its home-country operations 
and difficulties in hiring sufficient numbers of skilled 
professionals have been among the main hurdles TCS 
has encountered in its efforts to expand the services it 
exports from the region.
In sum, the higher the skill-intensity of the services 
being offshored, the greater the role that professionals 
with engineering or other specialized skills play as key 
assets in investment decisions. As companies like ACS 
move towards higher-value-added functions, they start 
investing in countries that do not necessarily offer the 
lowest labour costs, but concentrate significant volumes of 
skilled professionals and, in some cases, have large markets 
that can help dilute the costs of the offshore component of 
operations. In fact, the operations of companies that have 
traditionally operated in higher-value-added segments 
(for example, EDS - an HP company, IBM and TCS) 
have therefore been concentrated in the larger countries 
in the region and in those with higher tertiary education 
enrolment rates. The integrated outsourcing companies 
are strongly concentrated in Mexico and Brazil, where 
they combine market- and efficiency-seeking strategies, 
although they have also invested in Argentina, Chile, 
Costa Rica and Uruguay. These countries, in which the 
export component of operations tends to be larger, offer 
a combination of active promotion policies, a significant 
pool of IT and engineering professionals and strong local 
IT industries.
(c) KPO: Evalueserve in Chile
Several companies offer KPO functions from 
the region, although in most cases these are in-house 
R&D functions performed by large corporations in the 
automobile, electronics, mining and other industries, 
or a component of the package of services provided by 
integrated outsourcing companies. 
Evalueserve is one of few dedicated KPO companies 
with service centres in the region. Founded in 2000 in 
India, it provides market and business research, investment 
research, intellectual property and legal process services, 
marketing and sales support, knowledge management 
solutions and industry-specific expertise. It has a sales 
network spread out over several countries, but service 
operations are concentrated in India, with three additional 
research locations: China (since 2005), Chile (since 2006) 
and Romania (since 2008). 
Although Evalueserve’s business model is based on 
the offshoring concept and the provision of high-quality 
services at competitive costs, what has led it to invest in 
offshore sites outside of India is not cost but the need to 
complement its Indian operations with other, strategic 
assets, such as time zone complementarity and different 
types of skills. 
The decision to invest in Chile was first and foremost 
a decision to invest in Latin America. Having a service 
centre in the region was important for three main reasons. 
First, many Evalueserve clients, especially investment 
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banks in the United States, needed same-time-zone 
services. Secondly, by combining operations in Latin 
America, India and China (having already planned the 
Eastern European location), the company could form a 
24/5 delivery cycle without implementing night shifts. This 
is critical for projects where a product’s “time to market” 
can determine success or failure. Thirdly, Evalueserve 
had taken a decision to strengthen its presence in, and 
knowledge of, emerging markets. Asia was covered by 
the Indian and Chinese locations, Romania would cover 
Eastern Europe, and a location in Latin America would 
be critical for conducting research on Latin American 
markets and catering to local clients. 
Within Latin America, five locations were initially 
considered: Mexico City, San José in Costa Rica, São 
Paulo in Brazil, Buenos Aires in Argentina and Santiago in 
Chile. The parameters considered were the availability of 
people, cost and the overall business environment. Chile’s 
main advantage was in the latter aspect. In terms of human 
resources, despite the existence of good universities, Chile 
was limited by the size of its skills base in comparison 
with other destinations in the region. Evalueserve saw, 
however, that it would be possible to complement local 
talent with foreign talent, as the country’s immigration 
policy and procedures were perceived as straightforward 
and simple. This ability to draw from a global talent pool 
has been a major asset for the company’s operations in 
Chile. Roughly a third of Evalueserve’s 150 employees 
in Chile today are foreigners. 
Costs in Chile, although lower than those of Mexico 
and Brazil, were higher than Argentina and Costa Rica. 
However, this was compensated by government incentives, 
including grants for training and the provision of office 
space, and by low administrative and opportunity costs due 
to swift regulatory procedures. Rather than Santiago, the 
company established itself in the facilities of the Chilean 
Production Development Corporation (CORFO) located 
close to the city of Valparaíso, which has the characteristics 
of other second-tier cities (a strong university community 
and lower costs and attrition rates) and where the company 
is rated as one of the best employment options for high-
value professional services. 
Evalueserve’s Chilean centre, which accounts for 10% 
of the company’s global sales and 6% of its employees, 
caters to clients based either in North America or Europe 
and to regional offices of TNCs. The centre provides 
mainly business and investment research services, and the 
service mix is gradually expanding to cover other types 
of services currently provided only out of India. These 
include technological research, intellectual property services 
and legal support services. The first major clients for the 
Chilean centre were North American investment banks 
that valued time zone proximity. Other clients include 
consulting firms and Fortune 500 companies from the 
United States and Europe. In addition to global clients, 
the company has started to look at the regional market, 
which currently represents only a small fraction of the 
Chilean subsidiary’s portfolio.
Second-generation offshoring is still scarce in the 
region, although R&D operations within established 
companies and a small number of investments in KPO 
functions have been made. As the skills intensity of 
services increases, the availability of skilled professionals 
and other strategic assets, rather than cost alone, becomes 
increasingly relevant in investment decisions. In the 
experience of Evalueserve, the decision to invest in Latin 
America in these functions was not cost-based; the aim 
was to complement operations in India. The decision to 
invest in Chile, on the other hand, was based on competitive 
costs vis-à-vis its neighbours (considering government 
incentives and the opportunity costs foregone by a friendly 
business climate) as well as the sine qua non condition of 
availability of qualified human resources, which in this 
case included the possibility to easily complement them 
with professionals from third countries. 
(d) Regional transnationals: Softtek
A generation of Latin American companies has 
developed in the BPO and IT markets, reaching several 
thousand employees and multiple transnational clients 
(table II.A-1 in the annex to this chapter lists some of 
the main local firms in the offshoring business). Several 
have undertaken internationalization processes of their 
own to exploit complementary assets within the region 
and in other regions.18
Softtek was the first Latin American company to 
make the Black Book of Outsourcing rankings. Others that 
subsequently appeared were CPM Braxis of Brazil, Neoris 
of Mexico, Globant in Argentina and DBA Engenharia 
de Sistemas (Brazil) (Black Book of Outsourcing, 2008). 
Like others, Softtek has evolved into a transnational 
corporation in its own right.
18
 The companies from the region that make the global rankings 
are concentrated in the largest countries. However, smaller 
companies from smaller countries have also taken advantage of 
the opportunities of offshoring both through bases in their home 
countries and through investments in other countries. There have, 
for example, been significant flows of intra-Caribbean investments 
in this industry. Jamaica-based E-services also operates out of Saint 
Lucia; Saint Kitts and Nevis-based Tropicall also operates out of 
Jamaica; Antiguan-owned International Market Access (IMA) set 
up an operation in Barbados in 2003, later sold to a United States 
company, and invested in Saint Kitts and Nevis (The Sun, 2006). 
Through these investments these companies have explored the 
common Caribbean nearshore advantages while at the same time 
diversifying locations to minimize risk and expanding beyond what 
would be possible within their home countries. 
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In the same way that the Indian companies in this 
industry were “born offshore”, Softtek was born “nearshore”, 
a term it coined in 1997. Created in 1983 by employees 
of Alfa Group, it is the largest Mexican IT company and 
has 6,000 employees. A large share of its sales comes 
from exports, which differentiates it from some of the 
larger Brazilian companies in this industry. Softtek’s main 
operations are in Monterrey and Mexico City, but the 
company has expanded internationally and set up global 
delivery centres in Brazil, Spain and China. The company 
has been known for its strong investments in training and 
certification and for its association with technological 
research and educational institutions, particularly the 
Technological Institute of Monterrey. 
Softtek had concentrated on the Mexican market until 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
came into force and the company started exploiting 
its nearshore advantages for United States clients. The 
company’s trajectory as an international provider can be 
defined in two different stages. 
From 1997 to 2004, it operated on the basis of a 
“Mexico-to-United States” model. During this period, 
the company evolved from promoting location- rather 
than firm-specific attributes of nearshoring (proximity, 
time zone advantages, cultural affinity and ease of doing 
business) to marketing the advantages of long-term 
relationships between client and vendor that, when carried 
out according to a model considering the “total cost of 
engagement” (total expenditures in light of the efficiency 
gains of nearshoring), yielded more efficient results than 
offshoring to Asia, mainly owing to labour arbitrage. It 
closed this period with the acquisition of the 1000-engineer 
Mexico-based IT operations of GE and became the main 
nearshore IT solution provider for GE.
The second stage —the global nearshore model— 
started in 2004 with the inauguration of centres in Brazil and 
Spain. Essentially, the strategy involved opening locations 
outside the “nearshore comfort zones” that would offer 
the company access to different skill sets and scale. Also 
under that framework, in 2007 the company acquired IT 
United, a China-based provider of software development 
and outsourcing services, where it currently has 400 
employees. The network of eight global service delivery 
centres allows the company to provide “follow-the-sun” 
solutions for application-related services, IT infrastructure 
and BPO services, complementing its nearshore base 
while offering clients an alternative to India. 
Softtek has strongly marketed its advantages 
as a nearshore base and has started exploring the 
complementarities between service centres located in 
different countries within the region and between regions. 
These advantages largely coincide with those of Mexico, 
and a parallel can be drawn between the company’s strategy 
of combining nearshore with other offshore capabilities and 
a potential strategy for Mexico and other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries to find complementarities with 
other countries and leverage their domestic advantages 
in providing global services. 
The companies described here are diverse in terms 
of the service mix they provide, their origin, their size 
and the extent of their experience in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. Some are relatively new to the region 
and are still starting to understand it and to track future 
pathways to explore its potential. Others have decades’ 
long experiences in local markets. Each experience has 
been unique, but certain general characteristics of the 
role of Latin America and the Caribbean in the offshoring 
industry emerge from the cases considered.
There has unquestionably been growing interest in the 
region as an offshore base. As the global offshore service 
industry grows, opportunities are being generated all over 
the world based on cost, nearshore advantages or other 
strategic assets that complement global service networks. 
Companies in the more traditional contact-centre and 
BPO functions have looked at Central America and the 
Caribbean as attractive destinations based on the nearshore 
advantages resulting from their geographical and cultural 
proximity to the United States and on the availability of 
both Spanish- and English-language skills. Investment 
promotion policies have been important in attracting 
foreign investors to this industry. While some companies 
have favoured more consolidated markets in the region, 
others have valued less explored markets that offer lower 
costs and lower attrition rates, including countries that are 
only starting to enter this industry and regions within the 
larger countries. These same firms have invested in the 
larger countries in the region with a mix of market- and 
efficiency-seeking investments. Several countries in Latin 
America, including Mexico and Argentina, have benefited 
from the increasing importance of the Hispanic market in 
the United States, through the operations of companies 
such as Teleperformance and Digitex. 
The large integrated outsourcing companies have also 
taken different approaches, investing in predominantly 
export-oriented activities in the smaller countries that have 
substantial specialized skills bases and active policies to 
promote the offshore services industry (Chile, Costa Rica 
and Uruguay) and in the large markets of Brazil and Mexico, 
where they take advantage of local markets and consolidated 
structures. Argentina seems to lie at the interface of these 
two models, sharing some of the characteristics of the 
larger markets and some of the features of the smaller but 
higher-tech markets at competitive costs. 
To a certain degree for the integrated outsourcing 
companies, and to a larger extent for the higher-skilled 
functions, such as KPO, corporate strategies towards Latin 
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America and the Caribbean have aimed at complementing 
services provided from other offshore locations, namely 
India, through access to different skills bases, a combination 
of time zones that allow companies to provide 24/7 services 
and diversification of the location of service centres for 
specific clients. 
The region has accumulated success stories in all 
segments of the offshore services industry, and the record 
of new investments and jobs created in the past few years is 
significant. However, there seems to be a gap between the 
interest of companies in using the region as an offshore base 
and the actual rate of growth of service exports. While there 
is no accurate way to measure foregone investments entirely, 
this gap is suggested by the trajectories of companies that 
established operations to cater to a combination of local 
and export markets but effectively export very little. Latin 
America and the Caribbean is not yet benefiting from the 
industry to its full potential. Section D addresses policy 
challenges that need to be overcome to expand investments 
in offshoring in the region.
D.  Policy: reasons to promote offshoring and  
 policies in place
Much of the literature on offshoring has originated in the 
concern for the loss of jobs in developed countries. The flip 
side of that concern —over which there is debate (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2005)— is the fact that jobs have been 
created in developing countries. Through offshoring, 
information and communication technologies have begun 
to create a more efficient geographical distribution of jobs 
according to labour supply, without the social costs of 
immigration, and for tasks that go beyond the menial and 
provide higher rates of remuneration than other segments 
for similarly skilled personnel.
For Latin America and the Caribbean, the benefits 
are concrete. The number of jobs created by this industry 
is significant, especially for the smaller countries (see 
table II.8). Beyond the number of jobs, however, the 
characteristics of employment in this industry, as reported 
by companies and governments interviewed for this study, 
are particularly attractive from a social development 
perspective (see box II.8). Secondly, the development of 
linkages between local companies and TNCs in offshore 
business services may be a key element for positioning 
them in global markets. Smaller players in this industry 
face important barriers to entry into the global marketplace 
in the form of branding, recognition, and reputation. By 
working through the networks of established TNCs, as 
providers or partners, local firms can tap into global 
services markets where brand and reputation enjoyed by 
the largest firms would otherwise represent significant 
barriers to entry.
Table II.8
SELECTED COUNTRIES: ESTIMATED NUMBER OF JOBS
IN OFFSHORE BUSINESS SERVICES, 2008
Country Estimated jobs
Estimated jobs 
per 100 000 
inhabitants
Barbados 4 000 1 370
Costa Rica 23 500 543
Saint Lucia 632 393
Jamaica 10 000 373
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 365 307
Antigua and Barbuda 230 277
Dominican Republic 22 000 232
Guyana 1 400 189
Belize 450 163
El Salvador 6 800 102
Trinidad and Tobago 1 000 76
Chile 12 000 74
Argentina (call centre functions only) 24 000 62
Guatemala 6 500 51
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of the answers of the countries to the survey on offshore 
business services; Zagada Institute, “Caribbean Contact Center & BPO 
Report 2008 – 2010. Published by Zagada Institute projects Caribbean 
outsourcing talent base surpassing 100,000 by 2010”, Press release, 24 
July 2008; Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Snapshot 
Caribbean: Benchmarking FDI Competitiveness in Caribbean Companies, 
Washington, D.C., Commonwealth Secretariat, June 2007; United Nations, 
“World population prospects: The 2006 revision” [online database] http://
esa.un.org/unpp, 2006; “World urbanization prospects: The 2005 revision” 
[online database] http://esa.un.org/unpp, 2005 and estimated data on call 
centers in Argentina
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Box II.8
CHARACTERISTICS OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE OFFSHORE SERVICES INDUSTRY
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
In addition to the number of direct jobs 
generated by the offshore services industry, 
the characteristics of employment in this 
industry make it very attractive from a 
social development viewpoint.
● Jobs in this industry are relatively 
well remunerated, even in the least-
value-added segments. In many 
countries, a call centre position is 
a career position, and call centre 
companies are considered good 
employers, as evidenced by low 
attrition rates. The same holds true, 
and more significantly, for higher-
value-added segments. 
● The offshoring industry, and particularly 
the contact centre segment, has 
provided jobs to segments of the 
population that often exhibit high 
unemployment rates: inexperienced 
young professionals, students, 
women (who often compose more 
than half the headcount in contact 
centre operations), mid- to late-career 
professionals.
● It has also created jobs in peripheral 
areas. The same reasons that make 
offshoring services to another country 
possible also make it possible to 
relocate outside of large urban 
centres, to areas where employment 
opportunities are fewer. In these 
areas, offshore business service jobs 
are highly valued, and from the point 
of view of companies, among other 
advantages, labour costs and attrition 
rates are low. These characteristics 
have motivated investments in 
second-tier cities worldwide as the 
main service centres start showing 
signs of saturation and as peripheral 
areas develop infrastructure and 
capabilities. Areas with strong 
concentrations of universities and 
other research and educational 
institutions have been particularly 
successful in this trend. In Latin 
America and the Caribbean, there 
are several examples of clusters 
that are being either consolidated 
or starting to be developed outside 
capital cities: Córdoba in Argentina, a 
group of smaller cities on the outskirts 
of São Paulo city in Brazil, Valparaíso 
in Chile, Manizales in Colombia, and 
Santiago de los Caballeros in the 
Dominican Republic. 
● Offshoring jobs have reduced brain 
drain and aided the reabsorption 
of former émigrés, who have acted 
not only as employees but also as 
entrepreneurs, contributing skills, 
technology, entrepreneurship and 
capital and helping to put their home 
countries on the map for offshore 
business services.
● At all levels, companies have offered 
continuous training and developed skills, 
at least some of which are transferable 
to other companies and industries. 
The existence of skilled professionals 
in the local labour pool, who have 
been trained by the world’s largest 
transnational corporations in state-
of-the-art technology and business 
practices, has been an asset for local 
companies. Exposure to technology, 
business practices and corporate 
cultures adopted worldwide have also 
spilled over into local companies and 
the labour pool generally. 
● By catering to foreign customers in 
types of services not available on 
the local market (certain financial 
products, for instance), groups of 
professionals have been able to create 
those markets locally to the benefit of 
local companies and consumers. 
● This industry has created economic 
demand for education, stimulating 
governments to take measures 
to improve educational systems 
and practices at all levels: primary, 
secondary, technical and university. 
Public-private initiatives have been 
undertaken and have potential to 
produce positive changes and make 
sure local educational capacity is up 
to date with global standards. 
● For each direct job in offshoring, 
multiple indirect jobs are created. It 
is estimated that in the Dominican 
Republic, four indirect jobs are created 
for every direct job in the offshore 
business services industry. Similar 
ratios have been mentioned for other 
destinations. Income received by 
employees has spurred local markets 
for consumer goods and services, and 
investments made by the companies 
themselves have created markets 
for other goods and services, such 
as hardware and software products, 
office furniture and construction.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the answers of the investment promotion agencies to the survey on offshore 
business services.
Thirdly, investment in offshoring may lead to greater, 
more diversified, and higher-value-added exports in 
an activity that involves little material throughput and 
therefore has relatively little environmental impact. 
Offshore services development has been one of the key 
priorities of countries trying to diversify away from the low-
value-added manufacturing activities that are increasingly 
threatened by competition from China (ECLAC, 2008a, 
2008b). Finally, having an export-oriented industry has 
helped make investments in telecommunications and other 
infrastructure financially feasible. This combination of 
characteristics makes the offshoring industry, if adequately 
harnessed, a possible magnet for high-quality FDI.
Most countries in the region have implemented 
strategies to foster the offshore services industry generally, 
and most consider FDI a critical aspect. Alongside 
horizontal business environment policies, country image 
promotion and other initiatives directed at attracting 
FDI, countries have implemented specific measures for 
the offshore business service industry. Table II.A-1 in 
the annex to this chapter provides an overview of policy 
initiatives implemented in the region. The most common 
fall under two categories: 
Tax-related instruments and free zone status: the • 
forms and specific tax-related instruments used 
vary widely and include the waiver of duties 
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on equipment and components and the waiver 
of export taxes, income taxes and VAT. In most 
countries in the region, services can benefit from 
free zone regimes. In many cases single-entity free 
zone status has been granted, whereby companies 
accede to free zone benefits regardless of their 
location. These initiatives have helped improve 
countries’ cost-competitiveness vis-à-vis other 
offshore destinations although the success of these 
policies must also be evaluated against the cost that 
countries incur by granting incentives; and
Skills development: one of the major bottlenecks • 
for the expansion of the offshoring industry in Latin 
America and the Caribbean is in the availability 
of human resources (see box II.9) Responding to 
this, countries have undertaken skills development 
efforts that include English-language training, 
improvement of primary and secondary school 
curricula and specific training and education for 
offshore service functions at all levels:19 
- English-language development: English skills 
are critical both for countries that wish to tap 
into the English-speaking customer services 
market, especially in contact centres, and for 
countries aiming at the higher-value-added 
services for which constant interaction is required 
with both clients and colleagues in other global 
delivery centres within each company. Besides 
strengthening English language programmes in 
public primary- and secondary-school systems 
and universities, countries have implemented 
supplementary English-language programmes and 
have provided scholarships for English lessons 
or on-the-job learning. Chile has implemented 
a specific programme for English development 
among IT professionals and has used a creative 
mix of instruments to expand the base of English 
speakers generally, from immersion programmes
19
 This applies to the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries. In 
the English-speaking Caribbean, initiatives are being implemented 
to increase the number of bilingual (usually English- and Spanish-
speaking) professionals. 
 directed at secondary-school students to volunteer 
programmes for young English teachers. 
Chile and Nicaragua have also implemented 
programmes to make their English-speakers 
known, through testing and inclusion in a roster 
that is made available to companies interested 
in hiring. Chile, furthermore, has implemented 
an innovative programme for volunteers from 
abroad to help overcome the scarcity of English 
teachers. In Colombia, a partnership between 
the government and the British Council aims at 
ensuring that by 2019 all high school graduates 
attain at least intermediary level certification in 
English according to the Common European 
Framework of Reference for Languages.20
- Education: several countries have, or are in the 
process of, revising primary school, secondary 
school, technical and university curricula in 
order to ensure that graduates at all levels are 
prepared for the job market. These reforms have 
included strengthened mathematics programmes 
and greater access to IT. Companies report that 
there is room for improvement in analytical and 
problem-solving skills.
- Technical skills: initiatives vary as widely as the 
targeted sectors, from training programmes for 
specific technical careers (such as the Call Center 
Institute of the Americas in the Dominican Republic 
or training in medical terminology) and efforts to 
increase the numbers of qualified engineers and of 
certified IT professionals. The interaction between 
companies and universities has yielded interesting 
results on both parts, but, in some countries, 
companies report that university curricula are 
still excessively detached from the demands of 
the job market and particularly of this industry. In 
some countries, the government provides grants 
for companies to undertake on-the-job training.
20
 Some countries have begun to include other languages in their 
programmes in addition to English.
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Box II.9
THE HUMAN RESOURCES BOTTLENECK
It is paradoxical that high unemployment 
rates coexist with companies that are 
eager to invest and employ but run up 
against limitations regarding the scale of 
the workforce. This is a natural limitation 
for smaller countries, but the bottleneck in 
Latin America and the Caribbean has not 
been in population size so much as in the 
size of the educated population, in small 
and large countries alike. The paradox is 
explained by shortcomings in access to 
education and the poor quality of educational 
systems in the region. Even among trained 
professionals, only a fraction is employable 
for the offshoring industry (see table below). 
India has similar shortcomings, but a wider 
base from which to draw.
Companies interviewed for this report 
consider that the main limitations of Latin 
America and the Caribbean in terms of 
human resources are the following:
●	 Outside the English-speaking 
Caribbean, English-language skills 
were identified by many companies 
as more of a bottleneck than technical 
skills. One major challenge is to 
break through from knowledge of 
the English language to functional 
proficiency, fluency and familiarity with 
commercial and technical English.
● Skills acquired in primary and secondary 
education, such as mathematical 
reasoning, critical analysis, reading 
and listening comprehension and 
written and verbal fluidity all affect the 
performance of professionals, whether 
they deal with customers or work in 
software development, but they are 
especially important if a country is to 
upgrade its services industry to the 
higher-value-added segments. Lags 
in these skills are corroborated by 
different studies (Dutta, Lopez-Claros 
and Mia 2006; OECD, 2006);
● The development of technical skills and 
science and engineering capacity are 
a moving target. Aspects specifically 
mentioned by companies interviewed 
for this report as areas of opportunity 
for improvement include strengthening 
of post-secondary technical training, 
greater involvement of the private 
sector in the design of technical 
university curricula, particularly in 
engineering degree courses, and 
the promotion of higher rates of 
certification in software processes. 
Engagement of public and private 
actors in these efforts, not only through 
financing but through hands-on 
involvement, is crucial (EIU, 2008).
● Another factor that can affect the 
scale of the available talent pool for 
prospective investors is the flexibility 
of labour mobility policies. Interviewed 
companies have expressed that 
more flexible immigration policies 
may enhance the attractiveness 
of the region as a competitive FDI 
destination in this industry. The 
comparison of the labour pools 
of even the largest markets in the 
region, Mexico and Brazil, to those 
of India and China suggests that the 
integration of labour markets within 
the region would contribute to the
 region’s attractiveness as an offshore 
service destination (see figure below).
The limitation in the size of the labour 
pool is a problem not only in attracting new 
companies. With a growing industry and 
a stagnant workforce or one that grows 
at insufficient rates, as investor interest 
rises, companies are forced to draw on 
each other’s employees, increasing attrition 
rates and costs and undermining the 
competitiveness of the industry. Moreover, 
a limited skills base prevents companies 
from upgrading their service mixes in each 
country and thus restricts the potential role 
of transnational corporations in country 
strategies for technological upgrading 
through services.
BRAZIL, MEXICO, INDIA AND CHINA: SHARE OF SUITABLE PROFESSIONALS FOR OFFSHORING 
FUNCTIONS IN THE TOTAL POOL OF PROFESSIONALS, SELECTED CATEGORIES
(Percentages)
Engineers Analysts a Generalists b Finance and accounting professionals
Brazil 13 10 8 13
Mexico 22 20 11 24
India 25 15 10 15
China 10 10 3 15
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of McKinsey Global 
Institute, “Interactive exhibit. Overview of global supply and demand of offshoring services” [online] http://
www.mckinsey.com/mgi/rp/offshoring/, 2008.
a 
 Analysts: positions that require strong analytical skills. These professionals hold university degrees in mathematics, 
physics or statistics and are employed in market research, software R&D and some back-office functions.
b 
 Generalists: positions that do not require any specific training but require a university degree. Employees hold 
university degrees in other categories than those of the analysts as defined here. They are employed in sales 
and marketing, administrative functions and customer service positions.
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Finance and administration professionals
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of McKinsey Global 
Institute, “Interactive exhibit. Overview of global supply and demand of offshoring services” [online] http://
www.mckinsey.com/mgi/rp/offshoring/, 2008.
a 
 Analysts: positions that require strong analytical skills. These professionals hold university degrees in mathematics, 
physics or statistics and are employed in market research, software R&D and some back-office functions.
b 
 Generalists: positions that do not require any specific training but require a university degree. Employees hold 
university degrees in other categories than those of the analysts as defined here. They are employed in sales 
and marketing, administrative functions and customer service positions.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of the company interviews, the answers of the countries to the survey on 
offshore business services; McKinsey Global Institute, “Interactive exhibit. Overview of global supply and demand of offshoring services” [online] http://www.
mckinsey.com/mgi/rp/offshoring/, 2008 and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “In search of business sustainability: Latin American education and the role of the 
private sector” [online] www.eiu.com, 2008.
Foreign Direct Investment in Latin America and the Caribbean • 2008 91
Other initiatives include the establishment of technology 
parks and grants for pre-investment assessments and for 
setting-up costs. In both cases, and in addition to the 
cross-industry FDI attraction and after-care policies, these 
initiatives aim at the development of industry clusters that at 
a critical threshold will be sustainable without government 
support. Regulatory reform of the telecommunications 
industry and IT infrastructure improvement programmes 
are advancing. These do not necessarily target the offshore 
services industry specifically, but will benefit this industry 
to a greater extent than those that do not have IT at their 
core. These measures all point to overcoming the major 
bottlenecks pointed out by companies (limited human 
resources and cost competitiveness). However, challenges 
remain to fully tap the region’s potential as a host for new 
investments and to maximize the benefits of the industry 
for local development.
Despite the policies in place, if the industry is to 
fulfil its potential, stronger policy action will be required 
to overcome the region’s main bottlenecks, including the 
availability of human resources with adequate technical 
and language skills. Five main groups of policy actions 
have been stressed as necessary by both local and foreign 
companies and by industry specialists and governments 
that are already engaged in promoting this industry in their 
respective countries. Within all these measures, there is 
room for intra-regional cooperation.
(i) Expand and improve the skills base. Further 
expansion of the skills base requires action on 
different fronts. Stronger primary and secondary 
education, including improved mathematical, 
logical and reading-comprehension skills, as well 
as early English-language education in non English-
language speaking countries, together with increased 
interaction between the public and private sectors 
and academia in the design and deployment of 
technical and university curricula will help develop 
each country’s workforce. Making labour mobility 
policies more flexible within the region could also 
increase the attractiveness of the region as a whole 
for service offshoring as it would enable countries 
to host higher-volume operations than the size of 
their respective workforces would otherwise allow. 
Finally, countries with significantly large diasporas 
may benefit from programmes that encourage return 
through jobs in the offshore business services industry 
or as entrepreneurs. The diaspora aspect, which, 
albeit with very different characteristics, was very 
important in India, is being considered by a number 
of Caribbean and Central American countries and by 
companies. As part of the efforts to round up human 
resources for these centres, IBM implemented a 
specific programme under the slogan “Volvé a casa” 
(come back home) directed at attracting Argentine 
IT professionals currently working abroad. Specific 
strategies to attract residents abroad to this industry 
have been taken by Guyana. 
(ii) Make strategic choices. With Latin America and 
the Caribbean on the map of potential investment 
destinations, countries must find and develop their 
unique assets and explore ways in which they can 
be more successfully inserted into the regional and 
global markets and service delivery structures of 
transnational corporations. This will help them target 
their policy responses more effectively. Many countries 
are already doing so: Chile’s focus on higher-end 
functions such as KPO has been mentioned (see 
box II.6). Antigua and Barbuda has concentrated on 
medical informatics, which does not require large 
scale operations but does require language proficiency 
to ensure accuracy and needs low attrition rates 
because of high training costs. Moreover, medical 
informatics is a segment that is likely to grow due 
to the ageing population in developed countries 
and offers the possibility of upgrading from simple 
transcription services to higher-value-added services. 
Uruguay, like Chile, is limited in its potential to host 
high-volume operations and has therefore focused its 
policy efforts on the higher-value-added IT industry 
and KPO. Large countries like Brazil and Mexico, 
while hosting companies in all segments of the 
industry, have identified the need for specific policies 
to promote the development of higher-value-added 
sectors, particularly in IT services and have relied 
on both TNCs and strong local companies to develop 
these industries (see table II.A-1). There may be a 
case for specialization by subnational entities (states 
and municipalities) within those countries.
(iii) Act collectively to promote the region. Countries in the 
region should consider exploring complementarities 
with each other, both through flexibility in the movement 
of labour and through common regional marketing 
strategies, at the same time as they develop and actively 
promote their unique advantages. Competition among 
countries in the offshore business service industry is 
rife, and Latin American and Caribbean countries face 
established giants such as India, as well as a multitude 
of emerging destinations in Eastern Europe, Asia and 
Africa. The decision by a company on where to set up 
a service centre can be motivated by its own desire to 
tap into the advantages of a particular destination or 
a request from a particular client. In both cases, the 
first location decision is usually whether to choose 
Latin America and the Caribbean or another region. 
There is therefore a case to be made for the active 
and coordinated promotion of the advantages the 
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region offers (geographical proximity to the United 
States, time zone advantages, more familiar accents 
and cultural identification), as well as of the ways in 
which it can complement India and other countries 
(for example, with opposite time zones that allow for 
follow-the-sun delivery models that global clients may 
be interested in and as an alternative destination for 
companies seeking to diversify their risks). Knowledge 
of the market and of the main investors allows for a 
more targeted approach.
 Also, South-South investment flows are generally 
on the rise in FDI and this is particularly true in the 
offshore business services industry, where the Indian 
giants and even the smaller Indian niche players 
dominate the rankings and, like other offshore service 
companies, are searching for sites that complement 
their Indian bases.
(iv) Ensure positive spillovers and upgrading through the 
development of local companies. Despite its many 
potential benefits, the concrete spillovers of FDI in the 
offshore business services industry on local economies 
depend on the local entrepreneurial fabric. When TNCs 
find adequate local partners with which to integrate 
upstream, the beneficial impacts of FDI on local 
economies and development are magnified in the form 
of revenue, employment and the spillover of skills and 
technology. Inversely, when local providers are not up 
to date in terms of technological and other skills and 
capabilities, foreign providers will fill the gap, which 
will grant the country the benefits of additional FDI but 
not of the linkages that would ideally be formed with 
local business and that characterize high-quality FDI. 
 Second, despite its potential benefits for development, 
this industry’s relatively low sunk costs also make it 
particularly footloose. The withdrawal of a company 
may signify sizeable social and economic damages. 
Minimizing the risk of withdrawal requires the creation 
of linkages between transnational corporations and 
local service providers, so that the company’s roots 
in the country go beyond fragile cost arbitration 
(ECLAC, 2008b). 
 Third, for TNCs to fulfill the role of agents of productive 
upgrading, they need a solid base of providers at all 
levels. In addition to its intrinsic value —yielding 
greater revenues and stronger technological and skills 
spillovers— upgrading within the offshore business 
services industry contributes to minimizing the risk of 
withdrawal. The higher the complexity of the service 
functions being performed, the less likely it will be that 
the operation depends on costs alone, and hence the less 
vulnerable it will be to the appearance of alternative 
destinations. Policy initiatives may be necessary to 
provide incentives and ensure local capabilities for 
established companies to provide broader service 
mixes and to attract other companies in higher-value-
added segments. Local companies benefit from the 
same upgrading of the human resources base and from 
country and regional marketing as TNCs do. Access 
to financing may be a critical factor in enabling the 
development of local firms.
(v)  Promote the development of competitive and reliable 
telecommunications infrastructure. Although significant 
advances have been made in telecommunications 
infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean 
over the past decade, many countries in the region 
still suffer from infrastructure that is insufficient 
to meet the offshore business services industry’s 
requirements of reliability, quality, and low cost. 
Countries stand to benefit from improvements in 
telecommunications infrastructure providing that, 
among other action, they ensure competition under 
an adequate regulatory framework.
If these challenges are adequately addressed, the 
offshore business services industry may present significant 
opportunities for the countries of the Latin American 
and Caribbean region to advance towards a number 
of policy goals, including employment and sectoral 
diversification. The current global economic and financial 
crisis provides an opportunity for the region to position 
itself competitively in an industry that stands to gain from 
the search, by companies, for greater efficiency in their 
business processes and analytical functions.
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E. Conclusions
higher-value-added functions opens opportunities for 
the region to receive strategic-asset-seeking investments, 
of which there have historically been very few. When 
FDI is attracted not by low cost but by technological 
capacity and skilled human resources, it may be a 
significant source of technology transfer and thus provide 
a channel through which to tap into global technological 
developments. In other words, in a virtuous circle, with 
the development of human resources, there are greater 
incentives for transnational companies to transfer more 
knowledge-intensive export service functions to the 
region. Local professionals, in turn, develop greater 
capacity to absorb the knowledge that is transferred, 
and this strengthens the capacity of local economies to 
develop human capital, in itself one of the key aspects 
of development. 
Transnational corporations have made sizeable 
investments in offshoring operations in the region, and 
many governments have implemented specific policies 
directed at this industry. However, substantial challenges 
remain, particularly in the development of human capital. 
Successful initiatives on that front will contribute to ensuring 
that offshoring fulfils its potential both qualitatively and 
in terms of scale.
By overcoming geographical barriers, ICT have generated 
employment and business opportunities worldwide and in 
developing countries in particular. In the past few years, 
there has been greater recognition of the potential of Latin 
America and the Caribbean as an offshore destination, 
and new factors have arisen that have generated stronger 
motivation on the part of many companies to invest in the 
region. This has materialized in new investments from 
the largest to the smallest countries, not only in capital 
cities, but also in smaller towns previously not on the map 
for major transnational corporations. By linking workers 
in the region to the global labour market, investments in 
offshore services have generated new sources of income, 
jobs and exports that are a welcome addition in economies 
that are heavily based on natural resources or on low-
value-added manufacturing. 
A large share of investments —and of jobs created 
by those investments— has been in relatively low-skilled 
contact centre services in which countries compete 
essentially based on cost or a combination of cost 
and nearshore advantages. In these lower-value-added 
functions, offshoring has generated significant social 
benefits, as described in box II.8. In addition to this, 
however, the expansion of offshoring in higher-skilled, 
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Chapter III
Integrated hotel and real estate complexes: 
investments and business strategies
A. Introduction
Tourism has grown strongly in recent decades and has become an important activity for 
increasing numbers of developed and developing countries alike. Many different branches 
of the economy, involving firms of varying sizes and complexity, interact in the tourism 
industry, which gives it huge potential to contribute to national development. It is also 
a difficult industry to categorize, however, which makes it complicated to quantify its 
importance and impact.
Recently, changes have been coming ever faster in the 
industry, responding to shifts in economic, cultural, 
political, technological and demographic patterns, and the 
sector is becoming increasingly segmented. Accordingly, 
tourism companies have begun to outsource many of 
their activities, which has brought related firms —real 
estate and construction businesses, financial entities and 
so forth— into the sector. As in other service industries, 
the leading firms have been able to hold on to their 
competitive edge by entering into different types of 
contractual arrangements —management, leasing and 
franchising— without having to make conventional 
capital investments to embark on new initiatives. Global 
brands are gaining a growing presence, particularly in 
the hotels sector, thus concealing the real magnitude of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and the importance of 
transnational corporations (TNCs) in tourism.
The tourist industry’s extreme geographical dispersion 
makes it an increasingly globalized activity, which offers 
potential clients (tourists) growing numbers of options. As 
tourists become ever better informed, selective and demanding, 
many countries —especially developing nations— have 
made it a priority to capture FDI and attract global brands 
to gain a foothold in international tourism circuits.
Major changes have occurred in tourism products, 
especially those associated with coastal locations (the type 
commonly known as “sun, sea and sand” tourism), as a 
result of the fragmentation of the value chain, the entry of 
new agents, the heightened value placed on leisure, broader 
access to cross-border travel and the overdevelopment of 
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some traditional destinations, among other factors. There has 
been a proliferation of large, integrated resorts offering hotel 
infrastructure, real estate complexes and multiple entertainment 
facilities such as golf courses and marinas. In Latin America 
and the Caribbean, such resorts are found mostly on the coasts 
of Mexico, Central America (mainly Costa Rica and Panama), 
Brazil and many Caribbean islands, especially the Dominican 
Republic. In the latter months of 2008, the hitherto favourable 
conditions for tourism initiatives began to change rapidly as 
a result of the international financial crisis. 
This chapter offers a general overview of the tourism 
industry and the main agents operating in it, focusing 
on activities in the hotel and real estate segment in 
tropical destinations. It then analyses the situation and 
the development of the industry in Latin America and 
the Caribbean and discusses the role of FDI and TNCs, 
bearing in mind the complexity of business relations 
involved in the establishment of self-contained hotel and 
real estate complexes. Lastly, a number of conclusions 
and policy recommendations are offered.
B.  Overview of the tourism industry
1.  A complex economic activity with interesting potential  
 for development
Tourism is a complex industry.1 It encompasses multiple 
activities ranging from accommodation, transport 
and entertainment to construction, agriculture and 
telecommunications, forming a complex value chain (see 
diagram III.1). This makes it difficult to make headway 
in characterizing the sector, which would help to better 
identify its economic significance in the framework of 
national statistics.2
Tourism —especially for leisure, entertainment or 
vacation— depends, as few other economic activities do, 
on a specific setting, such as a natural environment or a 
location of great cultural interest. Yet the industry is not 
confined to a few places in the world —as the manufacture 
of automobiles is, for example— but encompasses many 
countries regardless of location and size. Its strong 
1
 According to the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), tourism 
is understood to mean all those activities carried out by people who 
travel to and stay in places outside their usual environment for not 
more than one consecutive year for leisure, entertainment, vacation, 
visits to family or friends, business and other purposes. International 
tourism or travel refers to arrivals in a foreign destination by residents 
who stay at least one night and do not engage in earning activities 
in the place visited (UNWTO/SEGIB, 2008, p. 4).
2
 A number of international organizations have attemped to advance in 
this direction. In the early 1990s, the World Tourism Organization drew 
up a set of definitions that enabled international comparison of tourism 
activities, and this was standardized by the United Nations in 1994. 
The World Trade Organization (WTO) and the General Agreement on 
geographical dispersion, in fact, makes the value chain 
truly global. Tourism has thus benefited from globalization 
and has become one of the most internationalized sectors 
of the world economy. 
However, a corollary of this internationalized 
demand is the decentralization of supply, which is 
necessarily associated with the specific location of 
providers of tourist services, which are still mainly local 
firms (OECD, 2008d, p. 12). The sector encompasses 
a broad range of economic agents from TNCs to very 
small firms, which can participate in the industry on 
different scales and at different levels, offering a wide 
array of tourism services around the world. Those features 
give tourism great potential to contribute to countries’ 
economic development.
 Trade in Services (GATS), both established that same year, helped to 
organize trade in tourism services. In 2001, UNWTO proposed a new 
Standard International Classification of Tourism Activities (SICTA), 
which was approved by the United Nations, and developed a standard 
methodology for measuring the economic value of tourism in national 
accounts by means of the Tourism Satellite Account (TSA). The 
World Tourism Organization definitions of tourism became United 
Nations standards after the countries agreed upon a more limited 
definition of tourism within GATS, excluding transport and other 
activities that depend heavily on tourism, such as automobile rentals 
(Bentley, 2005). Some 130 countries, more than for any other sector, 
have now made GATS commitments under the category “Tourism 
and Travel Related Services” (OECD, 2008d, p. 56).
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Diagram III.1
























































































Catering services  
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of James Gollub, Amy Hosier and Grace Woo, Using Cluster-Based Economic Strategy 
to Minimize Tourism Leakages [online] http://www.ibcdtur.org.br/downloads/tourism_leakages.pdf, 2003.
a
 The activities encased within the dotted lines are the sector’s core activities.
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The recent revolution in information and communications 
technologies (ICTs) has helped to make the tourism industry 
more productive and competitive and has made tourist 
services, such as plane and hotel room reservations, more 
accessible to potential travellers. Internet has radically 
changed the international tourism industry by shortening 
the distance between providers of tourist services and 
their clients.3 All this has helped to provide responses 
to travellers’ increasingly complex demands by offering 
options that go beyond packaged solutions. At the same 
time, financial innovations, such as credit cards and 
general access to automatic teller machines (ATMs), 
have facilitated travel and access to cash abroad, thereby 
reducing transaction costs and simplifying currency 
exchange (OECD, 2008d, p. 22). 
Tourism has thus become one of the greatest socio-
economic phenomena of the second half of the twentieth 
century and the start of the twenty-first (Vogeler, 2007, 
p. 18). The growing prosperity of the Western economies 
enabled their inhabitants to devote greater resources to 
entertainment and leisure and this, combined with the 
introduction of paid vacation time, gave rise to mass 
tourism (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 9). Accompanying this 
trend was powerful development of transport services, 
which helped to shorten distances and reduced the time 
and expense associated with travel. Recently, the tourism 
industry has been growing one and a half times faster 
than any other sector (Harrison, 2004). Today tourism 
is considered the world’s largest industry and one of its 
fastest growing (OECD, 2008d, p. 57). In 2008, tourism 
represented almost 10% of world GDP and its long-term 
growth trend appeared to be stable (WTTC, 2008c, p. 6).4 
Indeed, despite the occurrence of political and economic 
conflicts, epidemics and natural disasters in different 
parts of the globe, the sector has shown a notable ability 
to expand and resilience to adverse conditions.
In this context, international travel has developed 
explosively, increasing from 25 million arrivals in 1950 
to over 920 million in 2008 (see figure III.1) (UNWTO, 
3
 There are two main dimensions to this shift. First, all categories of 
firms, large and small, from anywhere in the value chain, can now 
communicate directly with their end customers. Second, whereas 
consumers used to be outside the value chain, they are now at the 
heart of it. Just as suppliers can reach consumers directly, so clients 
have direct access to the supply side. Unlike in other industries, 
the customer can chose different routes towards the final product. 
Hence, the consumer is the one who wields strong control over the 
value chain (OECD, 2008d, p. 34). 
4
 Growth in the tourism industry, and hence in international travel, 
has been interrupted only three times since the end of the Second 
World War. Once in 1982, as a result of the second oil crisis; once in 
2001, as a consequence of the attacks of 11 September in the United 
States; and again two years later, owing to the combined effect of 
the war in Iraq and avian influenza in Asia. The industry may now 
face another downturn as a result of the global financial crisis.
2009). The rise of new and alternative tourism destinations, 
particularly in emerging economies, has made it possible 
to expand the industry’s potential benefits on practically a 
global scale (UNWTO, 2003, p. 129).5 Although the main 
traditional destinations (France, Spain, the United States, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany) have held their 
ground, some emerging economies have benefited from 
market transformations and come to occupy important 
positions, especially China, Malaysia and Thailand in 
Asia and Mexico in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region (see figure III.2). A number of these economies 
are also among the world’s fastest growing, giving the 
emerging middle classes the wherewithal to push up 
demand for both local and international tourism services 
(Bardham and others, 2008, pp. 28-29). This is particularly 
interesting, given that the great majority of international 
tourists still come from a few industrialized countries in 
Europe, North America and Asia. Today, over 55% of 
international tourist arrivals originate in Europe, with 
France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Germany being 
the main origin markets (UNWTO, 2008e, p. 63).
Figure III.1
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
It has been estimated that only about 10% of total 
tourist movements are international (UNCTAD, 2007, p 14). 
Nevertheless, cross-border travel is on the increase and 
continental and intercontinental markets are growing fast, 
while domestic tourism markets in the developed nations 
are beginning to stagnate (OECD, 2008d, p. 12). In this 
context, most international travel is short-distance and takes 
place within the same region. In fact, interregional arrivals 
represent a little over 10% of inbound tourism in Europe 
5
 In the early 1950s, just over a dozen countries received almost all 
of the 25 million international tourists. Today, over 70 countries, 
many of them developing nations, each welcome over 1 million 
international visitors per year.
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and just over 20% on the American continent and in Asia 
(UNWTO, 2008e, p. 70).6 The largest flow of interregional 
tourists is between Europe and the American continent.
Figure III.2
MAIN TOURISM DESTINATIONS, BY INTERNATIONAL ARRIVALS, 
1995-2007
(Millions of visitors)














Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
Recent trends show the importance of demographic 
changes occurring in many industrialized countries, particularly 
the increase in the retired population and the implications of 
the baby boomer generation approaching retirement.7 These 
new patterns in markets of origin undoubtedly open up major 
opportunities for tourism- and leisure-related real estate 
development (Bardham and others, 2008, p. 46). In particular, 
high prices in the real estate market in the United States have 
acted as strong drivers of such development in Mexico and 
some Central American and Caribbean countries.
For many countries, tourism is important because it is 
labour intensive and thus a major source of employment 
for semi-skilled workers in rural areas.8 Globally, tourism 
accounts for one of every 12 jobs (8.4% of world employment), 
6
 Almost two thirds of visitors to the United States are from 
Canada, Mexico and the rest of the Latin American and Caribbean 
region. Meanwhile, over 70% of visitors to Japan come from 
other parts of Asia and the Pacific (Bardham and others, 2008, 
p. 24).
7
 After the Second World War, between 1946 and 1964, a number 
of countries, such as Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and 
United States experienced an unusual surge in the number of live-
born children. This phenomenon came to be known as the “baby 
boom” and those born during that period as “baby boomers”. In the 
United States, baby boomers represent almost 20% of the population 
and they will significantly swell the ranks of retirees in the coming 
decades. In Europe those aged 65 years and over will account for 
25% of the population in 2015 and many of these people will be 
looking for places to live, with choices being driven in particular 
by the existence of warm climates, sun and sea, golf courses and 
retail centres.
8
 This may be of particular interest to developing countries that have 
benefited from the commodities boom but have not been able to 
increase job creation significantly.
which makes it the largest single employer in the world 
(WTTC, 2008, p. 6). 
International tourism also has a strong impact on 
trade in services and inflows of foreign exchange. The 
expenditures of foreign visitors in tourism destinations, 
even on buying a soft drink or a haircut, are classified as 
exports and have multiplier effects that can influence the 
host country’s level of development. Tourism is a major 
export category for many developed and developing 
countries alike. It is the main export of almost a third of 
developing countries and is among the main exports for 
over 80% (PPT, 2004, p. 2). The industry has also become 
a main source of foreign exchange for almost all the less 
developed countries, particularly for a number of small 
island economies (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 4). For example, 
services account for the bulk of exports in most Caribbean 
countries and territories and two thirds of those services are 
tourism-related (ECLAC, 2008d, p. 120). In 2007, inflows 
of foreign exchange from tourism stood at US$ 856 billion, 
close to a third of the total value of global services trade 
(UNWTO, 2008b). Tourism thus has great potential to 
act as a redistributive mechanism by transferring wealth 
between rich and poor countries. 
The liberalization of trade in services and, more 
specifically, the agreements on free access and equal treatment 
for cross-border provision of tourism services signed in the 
framework of the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS) have been crucial in this regard (Ramón Rodríguez, 
2002c, p. 32). The gradual opening of air transport services 
and the implementation of open skies policies and measures 
to stimulate competition have helped to lower prices and 
create the conditions for the start-up of charter companies 
and low-cost airlines, all of which has aided the international 
development of the tourism industry. 
Lastly, because tourism is such a crosscutting industry, 
it has great potential —even more than other sectors of 
the economy— to create spillovers into further investment 
because of its multiple interactions with different economic 
activities (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 5; ECLAC, 2008d, p. 219). 
The shift of consumers to the places where tourist services 
are located —such as hotels— has further increased 
the potential for production linkages within the host 
country.9 In the absence of such linkages, tourism risks 
becoming an enclave activity with no links to the rest of 
the domestic economy.
9
 For example, in hotel services, backward linkages result from the 
demand for inputs from other industries, including a wide array 
of agricultural products, meat and dairy products, beverages and 
multiple manufactures, as well as a large number of services, such as 
construction, telecommunications, power and water and sewerage. 
When they are locally generated, these products and services can 
have a powerful impact on the host country’s value added (Gollub, 
Hosier and Woo, 2003, p. 29). Forward linkages are created when 
services are provided to other sectors.
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For all these reasons, most countries view tourism as 
a source of economic growth.10 Given the high standards 
required by potential visitors, however, there are a 
number of obstacles to the development of the industry. 
Local attractions can be catalysts for the development 
of a tourism industry, but to realize their full economic 
potential they need investment in infrastructure (transport, 
telecommunications, electric power and sewerage systems), 
appropriate support services and human resource training. 
Only then can countries attract tourists, whose spending 
will help to increase local employment and income (OECD, 
2008d, p. 20). It is therefore natural that many developing 
countries lacking capital, know-how, technology and 
access to international networks of tourism marketing see 
FDI as a means of compensating for those disadvantages. 
Indeed, tourism is one of the main activities into which 
developing countries now seek to attract FDI.
The resolution of infrastructure and access issues 
is not enough to cover all the challenges involved in the 
tourism industry, however. Some of the greatest challenges
10
 For some small countries with few resources and capabilities, 
tourism has become the main development strategy. For larger 
countries it is an additional source of economic diversification 
and a way to develop regions that have seemingly little to offer 
other than natural beauty and a favourable climate (UNCTAD, 
2007, p. 9).
have to do with legal differences between countries and 
price factors (from the exchange rate to energy costs). 
Security issues, which are becoming increasingly 
important, especially after the events of 11 September 
2001, can also add to the uncertainty faced by tourism 
and real estate activities (Bardham and others 2008, 
p. 49). It is crucial to ensure that the positive impact of the 
industry does not threaten the sustainability of the local 
economy, the environment, social traditions or cultural 
resources. Tourism can have negative impacts on the 
local communities it most directly affects, through the 
degradation of traditional values, cultural heritage and 
the environment, or the emergence of illicit activities and 
unforeseen migratory movements (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 9). 
In some cases, even the physical landscape has changed 
and the massive inflow of tourists has put a strain on the 
resources that formed the location’s comparative advantage 
in the first place. Moreover, the current global financial 
crisis has shown how vulnerable tourism destinations are 
to international conditions.
2.  Business trends: towards the fragmentation of the value chain
Not only has tourism grown strongly, it has also undergone 
constant diversification and differentiation.11 From 
being an activity aimed at providing services to a small, 
affluent elite, the industry has grown to encompass mass, 
standardized markets, giving the main supply-side agents 
(such as tour operators, airlines, hotel chains) a huge 
role, finally evolving into a highly segmented industry 
in which demand —the tourist— has taken the lead (see 
table III.1). 
The development of the industry today is based on the 
growing sophistication of related services and mounting 
global competition among the different destinations sought 
11
 In the past few decades, international tourism has tended to be 
concentrated spatially (coastal areas), seasonally (summer) and by 
motivation (recreation and rest), and was associated mainly with 
sun and sea tourism.
by international tourists. On the one hand, potential 
tourists have an increasing number of destinations and 
an ever broader range of products and services to chose 
from. On the other, destinations have had to offer more 
than the comparative advantages associated with location 
(geographical distance between the supply of tourist 
services and the demand for them), accessibility and price 
and provide more sophisticated and exclusive services in 
order to stand up to the fierce competition. This problem 
is particularly difficult for sun, sea and sand tourism, 
which is a very important segment for many of the Latin 
American and Caribbean economies.
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Table III.1
EVOLUTION OF THE TOURISM INDUSTRY
1950s 1960s-1990s 1990s to the present
Elite tourism Mass tourism Segmented tourism
-  Luxury hotels in large cities
- Luxury restaurants
- Excursions with private guides
- Travel to cold beaches in northern
 Europe
-  Low-price standardized tour
 packages
- Tourist class hotels
- Charter flights
- Guided bus tours
- Large beach hotel resorts
- All-inclusive hotel offer




- Variety of tourism products
- Lodging typical of destination
- Hotel resorts with real estate developments
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
This trend is especially clear in the hotel sector. In the 
last few years, the main chains have gradually abandoned 
their vertical integration strategies and begun to focus on 
core management services, often moving away from the 
real estate aspects of the operation (Bardham and others, 
2008, p. 29). In general, the large hotel groups have their 
own brands and their growth strategy revolves around 
signing management, leasing and franchise agreements. 
In fact, very few of the world’s largest chains own a 
majority share in the buildings where their hotels operate. 
On the contrary, the hotel groups supply the brand and 
management services, while the ownership of the property 
is a totally separate operation led by different firms.
In the last few decades, franchises have figured strongly 
in the growth strategies of services firms, and hotels 
have been no exception to this (Contractor and Kundu, 
1998). In this regard, branding strategies are becoming 
increasingly important.12 In fact, the pursuit of segmented 
branding strategies as a means to target different groups 
of consumers has become one of the main comparative 
advantages of the large global chains, particularly when the 
differentiation between destinations begins to blur (Ramón 
Rodríguez, 2002c, p. 40). The consolidation of the hotels 
market through mergers and acquisitions has also led to 
the concentration of the main industry brands in the hands 
of a small number of owners, who manage them without 
consumers being aware of the changes (UNWTO, 2002, 
p. 55). Hotel rooms operating under the brand names of 
the 10 leading international hotel chains represent almost 
20% of global supply today (Bardham, Begley, Kroll and 
George, 2008, p. 33). In this context, certain intangible assets, 
such as knowledge of customer’s needs, access to booking 
systems, brands and forms of business organization, have 
become the key competitive advantages underpinning the 
growth strategies of the largest hotel chains, particularly the 
United States ones (Johnson and Vanetti, 2005, p. 1,094).
12
 Branding is a marketing term which refers to the process of building 
up a brand name through strategic management of the full array of 
assets linked to the name or symbol (icon) that identifies it.
There has been an increasing tendency towards the 
formation of large corporate groupings on the supply 
side of the tourism industry (OECD, 2008d, p. 16). In 
most of the origin markets, the industry is dominated 
by large corporations, as a result of the consolidation 
and concentration of the leading firms in the different 
segments of the industry, particularly airlines, tour 
operators and hotel chains (UNWTO, 2002, p. 2). In 
destination countries, there has been a proliferation of 
SMEs devoted to looking after visitors during their stay, 
especially firms providing accommodation and catering 
services. Generally speaking, the size of these firms 
is no impediment to high standards and commercial 
excellence. Although they are very different in nature, 
these two groups are not disconnected from each other, 
but interact in the tourism industry’s value chain (see 
diagram III.1). 
Both types of business organization have their strengths 
and weaknesses. The TNCs have tapped the potential of 
local tourism destinations by means of standardized products 
and global strategies. This has enabled them to benefit 
from economies of scale, develop new markets, reduce 
costs and offer attractive services at highly competitive 
prices. SMEs have more flexibility to tailor and personalize 
their services to the needs of the individual visitor. 
They are also able to adapt to rapidly changing market 
requirements. With ever more exacting markets of origin, 
these abilities represent a major comparative advantage, 
since many customers do not want standardized products 
and prefer to adapt their vacation to their own needs and 
tastes. However, personalized tourism and quality-based 
competition can result in high prices.
Tourism has undergone major structural changes 
recently. A large number of firms that have historically 
been associated with the industry have outsourced many 
of their activities and firms in peripheral areas (such as 
construction and banking) are moving into tourism-related 
sectors. In fact, the ownership of tourist services is becoming 
increasingly fragmented, which is creating the flexibility 
for different agents to enter the industry.
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With hotel management moving out of the real 
estate business, other economic agents of various kinds 
have begun to gain importance. Among these are real 
estate investment trusts (REITs),13 many of which have 
acquired hotel properties. This has occurred particularly 
in the United States, where hotel chains operate in the 
mass market through franchises and the actual property 
assets are owned by a fairly broad range of investors, 
including REITs. Following the success of these trusts 
in the United States, the mechanism began to be used in 
other developed countries as well — Australia, Canada, 
France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom— and in a number of emerging economies, 
including Brazil, Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region of China, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. There 
are few examples of cross-border hotel REITs, however. 
Those that exist include Host Hotels & Resorts, which 
has urban hotel concerns in Mexico City and Santiago, 
and Strategic Hotels & Resorts, which has the Four 
Seasons Resort Punta Mita in Nayarit (Mexico) and the 
Four Seasons in Mexico City. Amid the capital market 
effervescence and volatility of the 2000s, REITs have had 
a mixed reception. On the one hand, their stock market 
performance has been rather inconclusive yet, on the 
other, they have been considered very safe instruments
13
 Real estate investment trusts (REITs) first arose in the United States 
in the 1960s. They were designed to provide a structure similar 
to that of mutual funds for share investment, but in this case for 
investment in real estate. In general, REITs are corporations that 
trade on the stock market and are obliged to distribute up to 90% 
of their profits as dividends. They invest in different types of real 
estate or immovable and related assets, such as shopping malls, office 
buildings, hotels and mortgages. In the last five years, however, the 
supply of REITs in the United States has decreased. One possible 
reason for this is the tight restrictions on leverage (capped at 60%) 
and equity reinvestment, since the required payouts prevent REITs 
from applying the capital-intensive management strategies that 
are generally needed in the hotel industry to remain competitive 
(Bardham and others, 2008, p. 36). 
during periods of instability (UNWTO, 2002, p. 27). Also 
during this period, as a result of a number of mergers 
and acquisitions, a small number of investment funds 
came to own multiple hotel properties within diversified 
portfolios of brands. 
The blurring of borders in the tourism industry 
(particularly in the hotel segment) and the real estate 
business has helped to make viable larger projects that 
can build up the capacities of the agents involved. This 
occurs with hotel and real estate complexes that combine 
hotel infrastructure, real estate developments and a range 
of entertainment and leisure facilities, such as golf courses, 
marinas, horse-riding clubs and so on. Where such large 
complexes have developed, they have involved different 
types of local and foreign enterprises, ranging from 
hotel chains to real estate firms, construction companies, 
financial institutions and investment funds.
The profound changes that have occurred within the 
sector make it particularly difficult to analyse business patterns, 
because of the complex ownership structure underlying the 
major tourism projects and the interaction of the different 
firms that make up the value chain. What is even more 
challenging is to look at this behaviour at a global level and 
to identify the ways in which the various agents are putting 
their international expansion strategies into practice.
3.  Internationalization of the tourism industry
(a) Mechanisms of international expansion: the decline 
of foreign direct investment
Tourism companies have invested abroad for decades, 
and much more so in the last few years. This has been 
driven by the search for economies of scale, productive 
and geographical diversification and lower costs, or by 
the need to defend or strengthen a domestic-economy 
position against new competitors (Ramón Rodríguez, 
2002c, p. 31). In the second half of the 1990s, foreign 
investment by tour companies increased mainly through 
mergers and acquisitions (UNWTO, 2002, p. 2).
The business has not only become increasingly 
internationalized, but has done so in ways that are constantly 
changing. In addition to traditional forms of international 
expansion, such as FDI, tour companies have increasingly 
turned to other ways of engaging in cross-border activities, 
such as management, leasing or franchise contracts and 
other types of commercial arrangements.14 
The mechanism a cross-border enterprise will adopt 
to establish a presence in a given country will depend 
on its own comparative advantages, as well as the 
14
 Franchises confer the right to use brand name and know-how, 
and to receive technical, commercial and financial assistance. A 
tour company whose strategic asset is a global booking system 
might broaden its international presence by creating a network of 
franchises, for example. Management contracts separate ownership 
of the tourism assets from their management, and this helps to 
fragment the value chain. 
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absorptive capacity of local markets and availability of 
local resources.15 In general, transnational corporations 
combine these mechanisms in order to match their interests 
to the conditions in the recipient country (Endo, 2006, 
p. 602). In the last few years, tourism firms, especially 
hotel companies, have opted principally for mechanisms 
that do not involve trading equity. Underlying this strategy 
are a number of factors. 
Some of the critical competitive advantages of • 
tourism companies, especially in the hotel industry, 
are based on intangible assets such as global brand 
recognition, access to and use of global booking 
systems and business know-how. 
Most of these intangible assets are separable from • 
tangible assets —such as property— and can be 
protected through contracts or other legal means. 
This has made it possible to set up management, 
leasing and franchise agreements without the need 
to own a stake in real estate outside a company’s 
home country.
These mechanisms help to manage the relatively high • 
equity-to-debt ratio typical in the hotel industry by 
separating management risk from investment risk. 
In the hotel sector, these modalities substantially 
reduce the onerous burden of capital investment 
in land, buildings and equipment. This dynamic 
has also been driven by the entry into the tourism 
industry of firms from other sectors —construction 
companies, financial entities and real estate firms— 
as financial partners attracted by its profitability 
(Ramón Rodríguez, 2002c, p. 34).
Generally speaking, contracts in the tourism business • 
can be sufficiently detailed to cover the key aspects 
of an operation. In the hotel industry, for example, 
contracts can specify particular elements associated 
with a brand, as well as the design, style and layout 
of a hotel, the size and equipment of rooms, and the 
details of additional facilities such as swimming 
pools or car parks, gymnasiums, golf courses and 
marinas. These contractual clauses can ensure that 
the value and reputation of a brand is protected 
whoever owns the property where the particular 
hotel operates (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 37).
Lastly, the more liberal a country’s national • 
regulations, the more choice of modes of entry a 
company will have.16 
15
 Factors that influence the choice of ownership structure or 
contractual relation include quality control, capacity to coordinate 
with headquarters, the recipient country’s FDI policy and political 
and economic stability (Dunning and Kundu, 1995).
16
 In the past, many developing countries had a strong preference for 
control of assets, including hotels. They therefore preferred local 
ownership or the formation of joint ventures with foreign investors.
FDI in the tourism industry has one very particular 
trait: control can be separated from ownership of real 
estate assets. The industry therefore has unique features in 
comparison with manufacturing, since firms can reap the 
benefits of internationalization without having to invest 
directly in physical assets like land, buildings and other 
facilities (Dunning and McQueen, 1993, p. 268). Once the 
location is chosen, the competitive advantage for tourism 
TNCs comes from factors that are distinct from real estate, 
such as intangible assets and logistics skills that reduce 
the transaction cost of entry into a new market; experience 
with known groups of customers and suppliers; and links 
with related activities, such as reservation systems and 
airlines (Bardham and others, 2008, p. 7). This occurs in 
the case of different hotels around the world that operate 
under the name of international chains: only a small fraction 
of the plant belongs to the TNC that owns the brand. In 
fact, a local investor, with or without experience in the 
hotel sector, can buy land and build a hotel complex for 
a foreign company to manage. 
There is no clear mapping of the extent of FDI in 
tourism, even though it is one of the world’s largest 
industries. Little is known about the full economic dynamics 
of tourism and there are large gaps in understanding of 
its patterns and effects (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 7). To make 
matters worse, there is a shortage of statistical information 
and even less is known about the tourism industry’s impacts 
in the form of linkages and spillovers.17 
The statistical problems fall into two main categories. 
The first is the wide range of activities that tourism covers 
(transportation, hotels and restaurants, tour operators, travel 
agents, financial services, among others), which makes it 
almost impossible to compile standardized FDI statistics 
in tourism at the international level (Endo, 2006, p. 600). 
In reality, international statistics on FDI in tourism do 
not generally exist and such statistics as are available are 
incomplete or not comparable. The second is that, since 
TNCs prefer non-equity mechanisms for international 
expansion, the official statistics do not record their 
international ventures as FDI, which leads to underestimation 
of foreign investment and tourism-related activities in 
recipient economies. TNCs can actually acquire a high 
degree of control or influence over local firms through 
non-equity mechanisms, and this aspect should be taken 
into account when analysing FDI in the industry. 
Despite these difficulties, there are a number of 
stylized facts that may help to define the basic trends in 
tourism-related FDI and TNCs.
17
 There have been efforts to create a common analytical framework, such 
as the development of Tourism Satellite Accounts, for measuring the 
impact of tourism-related activities in different countries. However, 
these efforts are unlikely to solve the problems of generating and 
comparing FDI data in the industry.
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In many countries, tourism is the largest industry, yet • 
one of the least globalized. Rather counterintuitively, 
FDI in tourism is quite small, especially compared 
with that in other economic activities. Although 
tourism-related FDI has increased significantly in 
the last few years, direct investment abroad in the 
industry accounts for less than 2% of total outward 
investment stock for most developed countries, 
where these resources largely originate.18
FDI tends to be found in only a small number of • 
activities in the tourism industry’s large value chain, 
mainly in the hotel segment (Endo, 2006, p. 605). 
Little FDI is seen in other major activities, such as 
those relating to tour operators, booking systems 
and airline companies.19 
FDI in tourism has gone mainly to developed • 
countries. In fact, almost 90% of hotel TNCs are 
located in developed countries, with only a very 
small proportion of their operations in emerging 
economies (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 14). 
Nevertheless, tourism-related FDI in developing • 
countries is on the rise. Recently, the emerging 
economies have been capturing close to 90% of FDI 
in the industry (OECD, 2008c, p.13). The significance 
of FDI inflows in tourism remains marginal for 
many countries, as do tourism-related outflows from 
developed countries (Endo, 2006, p. 610).
Among the developing countries, tourism investors • 
are tending to prefer those in Asia and Latin America 
and the Caribbean.20 In the next few years, Asia may 
gain in significance in this regard since it accounts 
for over 80% of resources devoted to expansion 
plans (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 27).
As in the industrialized economies, most tourism • 
FDI inflows into developing countries go to the 
hotel segment (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 22).
These findings are particularly interesting because they 
help to dispel the myth that FDI in tourism is a widespread 
phenomenon that is making the industry highly globalized. 
This perception has been spread by the broad presence of 
international hotel brand names in practically every country 
in the world. The reality, however, is that tourism-related 
TNCs are not as global as those in other industries (Endo, 
2006, p. 601). There are no hotel chains among the 100 
largest TNCs (UNCTAD, 2008, pp. 220-222). In fact, even 
18
 Globally, the United Kingdom and the United States are the largest 
originators of tourism FDI. These activities represent a tiny fraction of 
both countries’ total outward FDI stock, however: just 2.7% in the United 
Kingdom and 1.2% in the United States (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 19). 
19
 Although these activities have a large impact, they rarely involve FDI or 
the physical presence of a TNC. In addition, in many countries, foreign 
firms are not allowed to own stakes in the air transport industry.
20
 The main international hotel chains with activities in developing 
countries have most of their operations in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, followed by Asia-Pacific and the transition economies 
in Europe and North Africa.
when non-equity mechanisms —management and leasing 
contracts and franchises— are included, transnational 
firms have a fairly minor presence in tourism (UNCTAD, 
2007, p. 14). Instead, in most cases, the tourism industry 
is dominated by local investors, including SMEs.
Nevertheless, FDI in tourism may be relatively low, 
but this does not means that tourism-related TNCs are 
unimportant. Almost 80% of the global mass tourism 
market is handled in some way by transnational firms 
(Schulte, 2003, p. 22). And the related FDI inflows may 
be crucial for many developing countries, regardless of 
the absolute volume of those resources.
In short, in tourism-related activities, since it appears to 
be relatively easy to protect competitive advantages through 
contracts, non-equity mechanisms are more prominent 
in TNC activities than conventional capital investments. 
The relatively small amounts of FDI in tourism do not 
mean, however, that those flows are not important. In fact, 
FDI could have a major impact on recipient economies, 
particularly in small countries. It must also be borne in mind 
that the information available probably understates quite 
significantly the true extent of TNC activities in the tourism 
industry. This FDI is especially important since TNCs could 
help the recipient countries to integrate into international 
tourism networks, increase the flow of foreign visitors and 
generate income from tourism-related activities.
(b) Hotel strategies: the heart of the value chain
The analysis of the tourism industry’s internationalization 
will focus on the performance of the hotel chains. There 
are two main reasons for this: their importance in the 
industry’s value chain and the fact that they represent the 
segment in which TNCs have the greatest presence.
In the last few decades the hotel industry has seen 
strong international expansion and rapid concentration, 
largely resulting from the dominance of the United States 
chains (see table III.2). Hotel companies in the United 
States were in fact the first to engage in major activities 
outside their home market, strongly underpinned by the 
development of commercial air travel connecting the 
world’s major capital cities (UNCTC, 1982, p. 8). Later, 
technological progress in booking centres, liberalization of 
air transport, mounting capital market pressure —through 
REITs income— on the industry to increase profits, and 
a domestic market with great growth potential, helped 
to consolidate the global leadership of the United States 
chains. The success of the United States firms’ strategy was 
based on broad recognition of the brand name, first locally 
then internationally, as they managed to attract customers 
and secure their loyalty (Ramón Rodríguez, 2007c, p. 39). 
In developing countries, especially in Latin America and 
the Caribbean, they took a similar route, focusing on the 
corporate segment in major cities then diversifying gradually 
into the vacation business.
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Overall, the leading hotel chains have gained a major 
international presence (see figure III.3). Yet this presence 
is not as significant as might be supposed. In fact, these 
firms represent little more than a fifth of the global hotel 
offer. In other words, the industry remains quite fragmented 
and small independent hotels continue to account for a 
very considerable part of it (Endo, 2006, p. 603).
Figure III.3
INTERNATIONAL PRESENCE OF SOME OF THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST HOTEL CHAINS, 2007
(Number of countries)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information provided by the companies.
At the same time as urban hotel services were 
developing, mass tourism was springing up thanks to 
the advent of charter flights and the establishment of 
regular medium- and long-haul air routes to sun, sea 
and sand destinations in the Mediterranean and, later, 
in the Caribbean, as well as the lower cost of air travel. 
At first, this new segment was of little interest to the 
international hotel chains and this gave emerging tour 
operators the opportunity, jointly with local investors who 
were relatively inexperienced in the hotel business, to 
compete successfully to provide accommodation services 
in holiday destinations. The industry developed quickly, 
using standardization and economies of scale to structure 
sun, sea and sand tourism services into low-cost packages 
and, ultimately, to develop the all-inclusive model (Lillo, 
Ramón and Sevilla, 2007, p. 49). This is the background 
to the emergence of the world’s best known vacation 
chain, the French company Club Méditerranée, or Club 
Med (see box III.1).
Initially, high entry barriers meant that the holiday 
segment was much more fragmented than that of urban 
business hotels, with a great number of small and 
medium-sized hotel operators. But as new destinations 
emerged and markets opened up, especially in Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean, the picture began to 
change. The holiday segment underwent a rapid process 
of consolidation and concentration, spearheaded by 
hotel companies from countries that were already 
leaders in sun, sea and sand tourism, such as Spain. This 
concentration was then intensified by these companies’ 
active international expansion strategies, particularly in 
Mexico and the Caribbean (see box III.2). Some of the 
leading companies in this process have been Sol Meliá, 
Barceló Hotels & Resorts, RIU Hotels, Iberostar and 
Occidental Hotels. Sol Meliá, which currently occupies 
fifteenth place in the ranking of the largest chains (see 
table III.2), has become the world’s largest holiday hotel 
group (Álvarez, Cardoza and Díaz, 2005, p. 107). 
Table III.2
WORLD’S LARGEST HOTEL CHAINS, BY NUMBER OF ROOMS, 2007
Firm Country of origin Number of rooms Number of hotels Percentage of hotels abroad
1 InterContinental Hotels Group (IHG) United Kingdom 585 094 3 949 …
2 Wyndham Hotel Group United States 550 576 6 544 14.0
3 Marriott International United States 537 249 2 999 14.0
4 Hilton Hotels Corp. United States 502 116 3 000 19.5
5 Accor France 461 698 3 871 64.4
6 Choice Hotels International United States 452 027 5 570 20.2
7 Best Western International United States 308 636 4 035 56.3
8 Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide United States 274 535 897 48.2
9 Carlson Hotels Worldwide United States 146 600 969 …
10 Global Hyatt Corp. United States 135 001 721 …
11 Westmont Hospitality Group United States 108 503 703 …
12 Golden Tulip Hospitality Group Netherlands 86 585 944 …
13 TUI AG / TUI Hotels & Resorts Germany 83 192 288 …
14 Extended Stay Hotels United States 76 384 686 …
15 Sol Meliá S.A. Spain 75 022 301 53.7
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of Hotels Magazine, Corporate 300 Ranking, July 2008 [online] www.hotelsmag.com, 
and information provided by the companies.
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Box III.1
CLUB MED: THE ORIGIN OF A BUSINESS MODEL
Club Méditerranée, or Club Med, pioneered 
the modern-day concept of large all-inclusive 
hotel resorts. In the 1950s, two French 
entrepreneurs introduced the vacation club 
concept on the island of Corsica, and they 
later replicated it in the Balearic Islands of 
Spain and in Greece. From the beginning, 
the company introduced major innovations, 
such as original bar-consumption payment 
methods. 
In 1968, Club Med opened its first 
resort on the island of Guadeloupe, which 
allowed it to attract customers from the 
United States. In the 1970s, the company 
expanded to Asia (Malaysia), Australia, 
South Africa and South America and 
inaugurated a resort on the Brazilian 
island of Itaparica. Subsequently, its 
operations expanded continually. By the 
late 1990s, Club Med faced increasingly 
stiff competition from other hotel chains 
that had replicated and refined its original 
model. In response, and in an attempt to 
expand its presence in the vacation-package 
market, it acquired France’s fourth largest 
tour operator, Jet Tours. 
In 2004, France’s largest hotel chain, 
Accor, acquired a 29% stake in Club Med, 
becoming its largest shareholder, in an 
effort to generate synergies between the 
two companies. However, this plan was 
unsuccessful and two years later Accor 
sold much of its interest in Club Med. Accor 
currently has a 6% stake, through which it is 
party to a shareholders’ agreement with Caisse 
de Dépôts et de Gestion du Maroc and Air 
France-KLM, which have a 10% and a 2% 
stake, respectively (Club Med, 2008, p. 13). 
During this period, Club Med attempted to 
reposition itself in the highest market segment, 
with an all-inclusive arrangement in the high-
end, guest-friendly and multicultural sector. 
To this end, it made important divestitures, 
particularly in Europe, in order to improve 
its financial position and Club Med sold Jet 
Tours to Thomas Cook for 70 million euros. 
In addition, the company embarked on a 
process to upgrade its existing resorts and, 
in late 2008, announced that it would invest 
some US$ 530 million to remodel its facilities 
throughout the world. 
Club Med currently has 80 resorts 
in close to 40 countries in Europe, Asia, 
Latin America and the Caribbean, as well 
as the United States, all operated under 
the same brand (ClubMed, 2008, p. 21). 
The company’s growth has been based 
primarily on direct investments, since it has 
financial control of most of its properties 
(34% of which it owns, while it leases 57%, 
with the remaining 9% operated under 
management contracts). 
In Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Club Med has one resort in the Bahamas, 
three in Brazil, two in Mexico, one in the 
Dominican Republic and one in the Turks 
and Caicos Islands. In late 2008, after 
investing more than US$ 65 million, Club 
Med reopened its complex in Punta Cana, the 
Dominican Republic, which had been known 
as one of the world’s leading family tourist 
resorts since it first opened in 1982. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
Box III.2
SPANISH HOTEL CHAINS: PIONEERS IN “SUN, SEA AND SAND” PACKAGES  
IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
At the first sign of saturation of the domestic 
tourism market, Spanish hotel chains 
began to invest outside their country so 
as to diversify their range of products. This 
initially involved a small group of companies 
that focused on the vacation segment 
and relied primarily on the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) model to gain access to 
new markets. Starting in the mid-1990s, 
the favourable economic situation and 
competitive position of these groundbreaking 
companies prompted other hotel chains to 
follow suit. The range of products continued 
to revolve mainly around vacation packages, 
preferably through management contracts. 
Especially important was the “all-inclusive” 
concept, promoted mainly by the leading 
international tour operators, which clearly 
preferred Latin American destinations. Since 
2000, following the example of other Spanish 
companies with a strong presence in Latin 
America, the hotel companies ventured 
into investments in Europe and the United 
States, mainly through the acquisition of 
local chains of city hotels, allowing them to 
further diversify and reduce dependence 
on the vacation segment. 
Spanish chains have expanded 
internationally mainly to increase their 
bargaining power with tour operators. Indeed, 
one of the hallmarks of mass sun, sea and 
sand tourism is the solid partnerships hotel 
chains have formed with tour operators. 
Hence, the strong consolidation of the 
package-tour retail market, along with 
the pressure this placed on providers of 
vacation-accommodation services to be 
competitive, forced Spanish companies to 
expand their international presence (Ramón 
Rodríguez, 2002c, p. 39).
When vacation hotel chains first 
set about expanding their international 
presence, they focused on a small number 
of destinations in order to increase their 
penetration and thereby build synergies 
between their familiarity with the market 
and their marketing effor ts. As the 
internationalization process moved forward, 
these hotels began to diversify their services 
geographically, enabling them to strengthen 
their position vis-à-vis tour operators and 
reduce their reliance on the performance of 
a given destination. In addition, hotel chains 
began to expand their existing facilities 
and to build new, large-scale complexes, 
with a variety of hotels targeting different 
market segments. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Shortly afterwards, some of the main domestic sun, 
sea and sand tour operators also embarked on active 
international expansion plans. These included Pestana 
and Vila Galé of Portugal (ECLAC, 2007a, p.179), the 
Mexican group Posadas and the Jamaican firms SuperClubs 
and Sandals.
The company’s or investor’s country of origin 
strongly influences where and how foreign investment 
in tourism occurs (Bardham and others, 2008, p. 8). In 
Latin America and the Caribbean there has been a strong 
geographical specialization. Spanish firms have preferred 
the Spanish-speaking Caribbean countries (Cuba and 
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the Dominican Republic) and Mexico; Portuguese and 
Mexican firms have opted for different segments of the 
Brazilian market;21 Jamaican companies have invested in 
other Caribbean islands; and United States companies have 
targeted the Pacific coast of Mexico and some Caribbean 
islands, including Aruba, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico and 
Saint Kitts and Nevis. After consolidating their position 
in those markets, these companies then set their sights on 
other destinations, which has blurred the strong original 
specialization.
In general, investors in the hotel segment have 
opted to base their international expansion plans on 
management, leasing and franchise contracts, sometimes 
combined with minority capital shares.22 The decision 
to invest equity in tangible assets —properties— has 
often been taken basically to secure a unique property in 
an exceptional location, providing that there is a strong 
legal system to protect property rights (UNCTAD, 2007, 
p. 39). The extent to which investors use a particular 
modality also depends on the origin of the hotel 
chain. United States firms are much more likely to use 
franchises than European ones, for example, which has 
contributed to the supremacy of the United States chains 
in the global hotel industry (Hjalager, 2007, p. 446) (see 
figure III.4).23 The large United States chains, which 
target the urban segment, have built up vast franchising 
experience, first in their home market, where they 
achieved broad brand recognition, then internationally. 
In emerging markets, the United States brands have 
shown greater profitability than domestic providers 
(Bardham and others, 2008, p. 9). When they first started 
to expand abroad, European chains preferred to have 
an equity stake in their foreign subsidiaries, especially 
in developed countries (Dunning and McQueen, 1993, 
p. 256). Later, they began to use non-equity means of 
broadening their international presence.24
21
 The Mexican group Posadas has focused on the corporate segment, 
with six hotels in Sao Paulo, two in Rio de Janeiro and two in Belo 
Horizonte, under the brand names Caesar Park Hotels & Resorts 
and Caesar Business Hotels.
22
 In the hotel industry, management contracts are the closest 
arrangement to a shareholder agreement in which the foreign 
firm has control of local operation. The hotel TNC has less 
influence in cases where a local investor with experience in 
the sector holds a franchise. Even where franchises are used, 
however, there are mechanisms —such as access to the Global 
Distribution System (GDS), which gives investors access to the 
international tourism market— that increase the international 
hotel chain’s control over the local investor’s behaviour 
and performance.
23
 In 2007, over 85% of the hotels in the United States chains Wyndham 
Hotel Group, Hilton Hotels Corp., Marriott International and Choice 
Hotels International and the British chain InterContinental Hotels Group 
operated under franchise schemes (Hotels Magazine, 2008).
24
 In the early 2000s, more than three quarters of hotel establishments 
in North America operated under franchise agreements, while 12%
Figure III.4
OWNERSHIP MECHANISMS OF SOME OF THE MAJOR 
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CHAINS, 2007
(Percentages)











Ownership Rental Franchise Management contract
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the companies.
Holiday hotel chains typically use franchising 
arrangements less than the chains that target urban and 
business segments (see table III.3). This distinction 
is particularly evident among the Spanish hotel 
companies. The Spanish holiday chains have found 
it more difficult to use franchises, since they have 
been unable to position such solid brands as the urban 
chains have. As well, due to the volume of activities 
 —basically entertainment- and leisure-related— in holiday 
complexes, parent companies have found quality control 
more problematic there than in business-oriented hotels 
(Ramón Rodríguez, 2002c, p. 40).
In the light of these considerations, the growing 
presence of “global hotel brands” could be rather 
misleading, especially as regards the magnitude and 
significance of FDI in the industry. It is estimated, in 
fact, that only 20% of hotel TNCs have an equity stake 
in their subsidiary hotels abroad, of which approximately 
half are joint ventures (UNCTAD, 2007, p. 35). 
Nevertheless, the capital contribution and popularity of 
the large hotel chains act as economic leverage for other 
investors, guarantee projects a certain degree of viability 
and arouse interest in related activities that can help to 
enhance the tourism product (UNWTO, 2002, p. 83). 
The entry of those firms helps to create the conditions 
for new business opportunities for smaller firms, which 
can expand by integrating some kind of related product 
into their activities.
 
 operated under management contracts and 12% were operator-
owned. In Europe, the distribution is more even: 42% are franchised, 
33% owner-operated and 25% run under management contracts. 
In Asia, management contracts are the most common, with 54%, 
followed by owner-operation (35%) and franchises (11%) (Ramón 
Rodríguez, 2002c, p. 43).
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Table III.3
CHAINS OF CITY OR BUSINESS HOTELS AND VACATION HOTELS: DIFFERENCES  
IN INTERNATIONAL EXPANSION PROCESSES
Chains of city or business hotels Chains of vacation hotels
Tracking of local customers Tracking of customers in the main origin markets of Europe and the 
United States
Emergence of new business centres Consolidation of distribution structure of organized tours
Increase in business travel Maturity of vacation packages (all-inclusive scheme) and 
deseasonalization of the activity
Heightened importance of brand image Strengthening of business position vis-à-vis tour operators
Marketing through the Global Distribution System (GDS) and Computer 
Reservation Systems (CRS)
Marketing through tour operators
Extensive franchising as means of international expansion Little use of franchises for international expansion
Location strategy targeting major world capitals Location strategy in sun, sea and sand destinations with suitable access 
infrastructure
Aggressive marketing and customer loyalty campaigns Marketing and promotion strategies led by tour operators
Horizontal integration strategies through productive segmentation or 
branding
Growing vertical integration
Growth through mergers and acquisitions Little mergers and acquisitions activity
Trading on stock markets Little stock market presence; capital raised through financial partners
Intensive international competition Sector internationally fragmented and segmented; increasing use of 
niche strategies
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of A. Ramón Rodríguez, “Principales determinantes de la internacionalización hotelera 
española”, document presented at the round table on impacts of the internationalization of the Spanish hotel companies on the competitiveness of local destinations, held 
during the eleventh International Tourism Forum, Benidorm, 13 and 14 March 2007.
up and integrated hotel and real estate complexes are 
becoming a more and more common alternative. 
This sort of hotel and real estate venture is especially 
attractive for real estate developers and investors. First of 
all, such projects diversify income sources by combining 
inflows from property management (hotels) and from 
real estate sales (vacation homes). This formula is also 
a good way to lower the capital investment and recoup 
it more quickly. Association with a prestigious luxury 
hotel brand also adds a premium to the selling price 
of the residential property. Second, the project master 
planners have a great deal of flexibility for structuring 
the business. They can create joint ventures or offer land 
parcels, usually known as mega-plots, to other developers 
or investors. Third, a well-designed master plan with 
high-quality basic infrastructure allows the project to 
be rolled out in stages, bringing in new investors or 
increasing the capacity of the facilities as and when the 
demand arises. Lastly, increasing government support 
—particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean— for 
these mega-projects confers high levels of legal certainty 
and statutory benefits, especially for investors, real estate 
developments and individual buyers.
Integrated hotel and real estate developments are 
also one of the more explicit manifestations of today’s 
segmented tourism industry, in which tourists and 
buyers have major benefits. First, such developments 
offer environments with levels of security and privacy 
that individual residential complexes cannot readily 
match. Second, they offer a broad array of leisure 
In the 1990s, this model went into crisis, as traditional 
sun, sea and sand destinations reached maturity and 
overdevelopment and excessively price-driven strategies 
led to infrastructure deterioration and environmental 
degradation. Another factor was increasingly sophisticated 
and exacting demand from customers. In addition, the 
liberalization of air transport brought down airfares and 
facilitated access to new, more distant locations. Sun, sea 
and sand markets came to be seen as unviable in the long 
term, particularly among the European destinations in the 
Mediterranean (Knowles and Curtis, 1999).
The tourism market has thus become increasingly 
segmented as firms have attempted to satisfy the 
diverse needs and interests of consumers. With demand 
growing more sophisticated and income levels rising, 
less standardized vacation options are becoming more 
common, as firms seek to cater to different segments 
for whom environmental and safety considerations are 
of mounting importance. A key driver of this trend has 
been the integration of new technologies, such as the 
Internet, into the tourism industry, as well as the active 
role being played by new entrants such as construction 
companies, real estate firms and financial entities.25 
Thus, new tourism developments are beginning to spring 
25
 For United States real estate firms specializing in the hotel 
industry, foreign operations are beginning to be as attractive or 
more attractive than those in the home market. The reasons for this 
include domestic market saturation, the sharp increase in property 
prices and the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and 
the need to diversify risk (Bardham and Kroll, 2007, p. 11).
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and entertainment facilities within a particular area, 
including beach activities, water sports, golf courses26 
and marinas, as well as health and wellness services. 
Residents also have access to hotel facilities and 
services. Third, these developments supply quality 
infrastructure such as drainage systems, water treatment 
plants, access roads and underground cabling, that
26
 Golf is one of the most promising products because of its direct 
impact on income and its contribution to the development of 
high-end tourism. It also helps to diversify and deseasonalize the 
tourism offer. There are some 60 million affiliated golfers in the 
world, of whom 32 million are in the United States. Over 40% of 
United States players travel more the nine times per year to play, 
normally in spring and autumn, in other words outside the traditional 
high season. For United States golfers, almost 30% of these trips 
are international. 
gives property owners a degree of independence from 
local utility providers. 
In short real estate or residential tourism can have 
massive potential for the host economy, since it can 
drive such activities as construction, agro-industry and 
manufacturing, as well as tourism-related services. It can 
also be a major source of foreign exchange.
C.  Latin America and the Caribbean: phased development
The tourism industry is configured in many different 
ways in Latin America and the Caribbean, especially 
in sun, sea and sand destinations. On the one hand, 
Mexico has built up a robust tourism industry based 
on its proximity to the United States and a rich array 
of geographical and cultural alternatives. With strong 
government support, early on Mexico became the region’s 
main destination for foreign visitors and investors and 
produced powerful homegrown groups (see figure 
III.5). On the other hand, the natural landscapes of 
many Caribbean countries and territories have become 
a magnet for international tourism. The larger islands 
hosted a multitude of all-inclusive-type developments 
aimed at mass tourism, while the smaller islands became 
more exclusive destinations. Lastly, Central America 
and Brazil have recently swelled the Latin American 
tourism offer with new initiatives in coastal areas, 
focused on high-income visitors. 
All these destinations have different types of hotel 
offer, from small hotels and inns to exclusive luxury 
hotels, passing through various sorts of all-inclusive 
models. Recently, though, a new and growing phenomenon 
has been attracting much of the investment effort of 
the different agents involved in one way or another in 
tourism: projects that combine hotel infrastructure, real 
estate developments and related leisure facilities, such 
as golf courses. In this segment, the hotel chains have 
combined local and external sources to mobilize great 
volumes of financial resources. Seeking to move away 
from mass tourism and ease pressure on the natural 
environment, developers have opted for low urban 
density and low environmental impact projects, aiming 
at a high-end, developed-country market, basically in 
the United States and Canada and, to a lesser extent, 
Europe. A number of the internationally prestigious 
hotel chains have been attracted to the region by these 
developments, and all-inclusive chains have set about 
upgrading their facilities and incorporating some of the 
services that more demanding potential visitors may 
require (see table III.4).
Figure III.5
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Brazil Other South American countries
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
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Table III.4
MAIN SUN, SEA AND SAND HOTEL CHAINS WITH A PRESENCE IN LATIN AMERICA  
AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY SEGMENT, 2007 a
(Number of establishments)
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42 31 4 38 21 11 11 41 199
Club 
Méditerranée
France 2 1 2 3 8
Sol Meliá Spain 10 5 26 4 20 65
Barceló Spain 11 10 3 6 30
Iberostar Spain 8 5 1 5 1 3 23
RIU Hotels & 
Resorts








SuperClubs Jamaica 1 2 10 2 1 2 18
Sandals Jamaica 7 5 12
Total 56 37 5 38 22 27 14 41 239
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information provided by the companies.
a The shaded sections show where the different hotel chains’ operations are largely concentrated.
b Subsidiaries of Marriott International.
c Subsidiaries of Starwood Hotels & Resorts.
The following pages will look at how these new 
hotel and real estate complexes have been formed. In 
view of information the constraints that arise from the 
complexity of the different combinations of economic 
agents involved and the coexistence of different models 
within countries and across the region, the analysis 
will focus on the hubs where this phenomenon is 
unfolding. 
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1.  Mexico: a new destination for high-income baby boomers
Mexico is one of the world’s 10 main tourism destinations 
and the largest market in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
with over 21 million international visitors in 2007 
(UNWTO, 2008c) (see figure III.5). The hotel offer of 
the major tourism centres has more than doubled in the 
last 20 years, from 155,000 rooms in 1990 to 323,000 in 
2008 (see figure III.6). In the last decade, however, the 
Mexican tourism industry has shown some signs of losing 
competitiveness, slipping down the table of the world’s 
top tourism destinations. In 2007 Mexico was in tenth 
place, down from seventh in 2000.
Figure III.6
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
The loss of momentum in the Mexican tourism industry 
has been caused by multiple factors, including its heavy 
dependence on the United States market and the impact 
on that market of the terrorist attacks of 11 September 
2001 and the recent economic downturn. Other important 
factors are the frequency of hurricanes in the Caribbean 
region and certain indications of overdevelopment in 
some of the main Mexican tourism centres, which could 
be discouraging potential visitors and turning them to 
other destinations in the Caribbean and Asia.
Tourism has been one of the key drivers of Mexico’s 
domestic economy in recent years. Today the industry 
generates almost 8% of GDP and 5% of employment, as 
well as being the country’s third largest source of foreign 
exchange after oil and remittances from Mexicans residing 
abroad. In 2007, Mexico received US$ 12.9 billion dollars 
in tourism-related income, which places it seventeenth in 
the world in this indicator (UNWTO, 2008c). Tourism has 
also helped to even out the balance of payments situation 
in the wake of the voluminous negative balances produced 
by manufacturing. For all these reasons, the federal 
government continues to promote tourism energetically, 
in an effort to make up for the loss of market share of the 
last few years.27 In this regard, the National Development 
Plan 2007-2012 is aimed at broadening and diversifying the 
sun, sea and sand tourism product by upgrading existing 
resorts and developing new ones. 
Mexico has three main groups of sun and sea tourism 
destinations. First are its master-planned resorts, which 
were developed by different federal and local government 
bodies to stimulate local and regional development. In the 
1970s, the National Trust Fund for Tourism Development 
(FONATUR) began to spearhead large-scale tourism projects 
in little-developed areas of Mexico in order to capture a 
share of the growing international mass tourism market.28 
The first of these initiatives was developed in Cancun, 
followed by others at Huatulco, Ixtapa, Loreto and Los 
Cabos (see map III.I). Other master-planned resorts have 
been built more recently at Nayarit and Teacapan, as well 
as the Costa Maya development, which was planned to 
cater essentially to high-income visitors.29 Second are those 
destinations viewed as more traditional, which grew up 
relatively spontaneously and were not created or planned 
by government agencies, although the federal government 
has supported and contributed to the development of 
some of them. This group includes a number of Pacific 
coast resorts, such as Acapulco, Puerto Vallarta, La Paz, 
Manzanillo, Mazatlan and the port of Veracruz on the 
Gulf of Mexico. Lastly, Mexico’s tourism offer includes 
other beach locations such as Costalegre, Ensenada and 
27
 The National Tourism Board was created in the early 1960s, and 
the Secretariat of Tourism and the National Trust Fund for Tourism 
Development (FONATUR), the executive arm for planned tourism 
developments, in the mid-1970s. The Mexican Council for the 
Promotion of Tourism was established in 1999. 
28
 In the last 30 years, the main mission of FONATUR has been to 
provide the basic infrastructure and contribute to the legal certainty 
that are crucial for the success of tourism schemes, as well as sourcing 
financial resources for the private investors who have developed them. 
Since it was created, FONATUR has invested over US$ 2.2 billion, 
which has leveraged private investment of over US$ 15 billion. See 
[online] http://www.fonatur.gob.mx/es/fonatur/mensaje.asp.
29
 The creation of the Teacapan master-planned resort in the State 
of Sinaloa was announced in late 2008. The government has 
committed US$ 450 million in public investment to this project, 
which is expected to leverage some US$ 6.6 billion in private 
investment. The capacity of the new resort has been estimated at 
16,850 hotel rooms and 16,350 vacation homes (El Debate, 24 
November 2008).
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Puerto Escondido, also on the Pacific coast. Also part of 
Mexico’s tourism offer are some of its major cities, such 
as Mexico City, Guadalajara and Monterrey, as well as 
some border and interior towns, which possess a rich and 
varied cultural heritage.
Cancun is Mexico’s best known resort today. Its growth 
has stimulated development in neighbouring areas, such 
as Riviera Maya, Cozumel and Isla Mujeres. Combined, 
the surrounding markets have a larger hotel offer than 
Cancun, which is evidence of the success of the policy 
implemented by FONATUR. In fact, government support 
has served as a catalyst for private investment. 
Map III.I
MEXICO: MASTER-PLANNED RESORTS
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information from the National Trust Fund for Tourism 
Development (FONATUR).
Note:  The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement 
or acceptance by the United Nations.
Today, the main sun, sea and sand resorts possess 
a hotel offer of 143,000 rooms, of which the largest 
numbers are located in the master-planned resort of Cancun 
(27,385 rooms), Los Cabos (9,650) and Ixtapa (4,970) 
and the traditional destinations of Acapulco (16,434), 
Puerto Vallarta (10,598), Veracruz (8,866) and Mazatlan 
(8,568) (see figure III.6). There is a clear difference 
among resorts as regards domestic and international 
visitors. Domestic visitors show a preference for the 
traditional tourism centres in the States of Guerrero and 
Jalisco (Acapulco and Puerto Vallarta), foreign visitors 
for the new destinations in the States of Quintana Roo 
(Cancun and Riviera Maya), the Los Cabos corridor 
(Baja California Sur and Sonora) and Nayarit (Nuevo 
Vallarta, Punta Mita) (see figure III.7). United States 
tourists form the majority, although a greater diversity 
is beginning to be seen on the Caribbean coast, with 
larger numbers of European and Latin American tourists. 
The differences between domestic and international 
tourism are driven by geographical proximity, access 
to infrastructure (airports and roads), the larger supply 
of hotel facilities and price.
In the last few years, Mexico’s offer of tourism-related 
real estate has seen major growth and diversification. To 
the traditional vacation hotels, many of which operate 
as all-inclusive schemes, have been added integrated 
multipurpose hotel and real estate mega-projects, which 
may include luxury hotels, condominiums, timeshare 
complexes, vacation homes, marinas, golf courses, wellness 
centres, haute cuisine restaurants and shopping centres. 
The more exclusive destinations even have private airfields. 
Recently, much of the investment in tourism-related real 
estate in sun, sea and sand destinations has gone to this 
type of development. 
Figure III.7
MEXICO: PROPORTION OF FOREIGN TOURISTS IN TOTAL HOTEL 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
The attraction of natural landscapes, climate and 
culture, lower land prices and cost of living, the geographical 
proximity to the western, southern and central parts of the 
United States, good infrastructure and services provision 
and greater guarantees for foreign buyers30 have positioned 
Mexico very well. In addition, baby boomers, mainly from 
the United States, are acting as key drivers of demand for 
these high-end tourism destinations.31 Apprehension over 
30
 Legislation on real estate and foreign investment protection has 
undergone major reform. Foreigners are now allowed to buy real 
estate within particular areas  —a strip within 50 kilometres of the 
beach and another 100 kilometres from the borders— through a 
trust set up by a Mexican bank. Under the Foreign Investment Act 
of 1994, such trusts have a life of 50 years and can be renewed at 
any point upon request. The legislation also allows the sale, transfer 
or lease of the property at any time. Mortgage loans are available 
for foreign buyers, as is property title insurance issued by United 
States firms. 
31
  The first of the 80 million baby boomers in the United States turned 
62 in 2008. Many of them will be making plans for their retirement, 
including moving to another area, buying a second home or simply 
travelling more often. In fact, according to the United States real 
estate company Del Webb Corporation, over 50% of baby boomers 
are planning to move when they retire.
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long-distance travel following the events of 11 September 
2001 has also contributed to this trend (NotiTur, 2007a, 
p. 16). Baby boomers who, until a few years ago, would 
tend to have bought homes in Florida or California, have 
been pushed by the overpopulation and steady rise in real 
estate prices in those States to seek other alternatives, and 
Mexico is an obvious choice. Over a million United States 
citizens are estimated to have acquired a second home in 
Mexico, either through a timeshare scheme or by buying 
it outright (El Economista, 1 October 2007). In 2008, for 
the second year running, Mexico was ranked the best 
retirement location in the world for United States citizens 
(International Living Magazine, 31 August 2008).
As a result, multiple large-scale projects are changing 
the landscape of Mexico’s coasts (see table III.5). The 
interest of investors in the industry is shifting from mass 
tourism developments to real estate ventures for a high-end 
market, in other words, a type of tourism adapted to the 
needs of the traveller. In this context and given the sheer 
scale of these undertakings, new actors have begun to 
displace the international hotel chains from the lead role 
they played in the past, particularly in terms of financial 
commitment. Real estate and construction companies, 
various sorts of financial entities and institutional and 
individual investors are becoming the main links in these 
mega-projects, of which a good example is the Mayakoba 
development in Riviera Maya (see box III.3). In order to 
facilitate this process, the Mexican authorities created 
an instrument called Infrastructure and Real Estate 
Trusts (known by the Spanish acronym FIBRAS). These 
instruments are inspired by the REITs in the United 
States market and are designed to capture venture capital 
to fund large-scale real estate projects in tourist areas.32 
The ownership of many of these large developments is 
thus quite spread out, which makes it difficult to identify 
individual investors. 
32
 The FIBRAS scheme raises funds through the issue of real estate 
participation certificates on the Mexican stock exchange.
Table III.5
MEXICO: MAIN HOTEL AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS IN OPERATION, 2008
Location/project Main features
Cancun / Riviera Maya
Mayakoba 5 luxury hotels: Fairmont, Rosewood, Banyan Tree, Viceroy and Raffles (649 rooms)
197 homes
18-hole golf course
Playacar 18 hotels: 3 hotels (RIU, Iberostar and Holiday Inn), 2 Wyndham hotels (5,186 rooms)
Vacation homes
18-hole golf course
Puerto Aventuras 5 hotels: Omni, Sunscape, Catalonia, 2 Porto Bello (2,899 rooms)
900 homes
18-hole golf course





Palmilla 1 luxury hotel (One and Only) (172 rooms)
1,300 homes
27-hole golf course
Cabo del Sol 2 hotels (537 rooms)
1,700 homes
2 18-hole golf courses
Punta Ballena Luxury hotel (50 rooms)
137 homes
El Dorado 192 homes
18-hole golf course
Querencia 172 homes
2 18-hole golf courses
Pacific coast
Punta Mita 2 luxury hotels: Four Seasons and Saint Regis (293 rooms)
350 homes
2 18-hole golf courses
Nuevo Vallarta 15 hotels (RIU, Occidental, among others) (3,228 rooms)
1,500 homes
2 18-hole golf courses 
Marina
Flamingos Riviera Nayarit Multiple hotels
2,934 homes
18-hole golf course
Tamarindo Costa Careyes Luxury hotel: El Tamarindo Beach and Golf Resort (32 rooms)
150 homes
18-hole golf course
Isla Navidad Manzanillo 2 hotels: Wyndham and Grand Bay Hotel (210 rooms)
450 homes
18-hole golf course 
Marina
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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Box III.3
MAYAKOBA: A NEW GENERATION OF INTEGRATED HOTEL AND  
REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS IN MEXICO
The area known as Riviera Maya —from 
Cancun to Tulum— has traditionally offered 
a fairly standardized product with large 
(500-room) beachfront hotels, none of 
which are associated with luxury brands. 
These hotels operate under the all-inclusive 
model and charge an average nightly rate 
of US$ 100 per person. But 40 kilometres 
south of Cancun airport, one of the most 
interesting projects of Mexico’s new, 
segmented and differentiated tourism has 
sprung up: Mayakoba.
This project arose almost unplanned 
in the wake of the merger of the Spanish 
construction companies Obrascón, Huarte 
and Lain to form the company now known 
as OHL. After nearly a decade of sitting 
idle, a 600-ha, difficult-to-develop land 
parcel, including two kilometres along 
the beach, originally owned by Huarte, 
became a lynchpin of the merged company’s 
internationalization and diversification 
strategy. In addition, its peculiar trait 
—its mangroves— which in principle made 
it difficult to turn to commercial use, became 
one of its main distinguishing features. 
The starting point was the opportunity 
arising from the buying power of baby 
boomers, in combination with their 
propensity to acquire second homes, and 
United States investors’ preference for real 
estate assets at the top-end segment. 
To tap into this potential, the company 
set about designing a project that would 
stand out from the existing offer in Riviera 
Maya —and, in general, in Mexico— and 
would cater to the quality tourism market 
for high-income United States customers.a 
The master plan of the project showed 
internationally renowned, prestigious 
hotel brands located in the most exclusive 
segment; low building density; incorporation 
of and respect for the natural setting; and a 
canal-based internal transportation system. 
To conserve the beach environment, most 
of the infrastructure was placed behind 
the mangroves and the sand dunes, 500 
metres from the shore —an innovative 
design for the Mexican coast. In addition 
to the sun, sea and sand product, it was 
essential to include a broad variety of 
alternative activities, most notably golf 
and health and wellness facilities. With 
these features and the support of a plan to 
market to clients directly —independently 
from tour operators— it was hoped to 
generate annual average hotel rates of 
over US$ 300 per day.
OHL sought hotel operators positioned 
in the high-end segment to bring the 
project to fruition. The management of 
the six hotels has been assigned to two 
chains from the United States (Rosewood 
and Viceroy), two from Canada (Fairmont 
and its subsidiary Raffles) and one from 
Singapore (Banyan Tree), with one still left 
to assign. By the end of 2008, Rosewood’s 
and Fairmont’s facilities were operating, 
while Banyan Tree, Viceroy and Raffles 
are expected to open their doors between 
2009 and 2011. In addition, the construction 
of the El Camaleon 18-hole golf course 
was completed, and the Professional 
Golfers’ Association (PGA) has held a 
yearly tournament there since 2007. The 
result is a resort surrounded by green 
areas and canals, with the hotel facilities 
extending inland and hidden by water 
and lush vegetation. Once construction 
has been completed, OHL will keep 
somewhat less than 50% of the equity 
in the establishments and will leave the 
management to specialized partners.
Although hotel activity is the core of the 
business, the venture envisions major real 
estate developments. Each hotel complex 
built by OHL will have dozens of vacation 
homes that will be put up for sale. In the 
environs of the Rosewood, Fairmont and 
Viceroy hotels, 40, 50 and 60 homes have 
been built, respectively, whose prices will 
be well over US$ 1 million (Cinco Días, 5 
March 2008).
The total investment is expected to 
exceed US$ 1.6 billion, of which nearly 
half has now been made. In principle, a 
sixth hotel is planned, possibly to be run by 
the Canadian chain Four Seasons. Much 
emphasis will also be placed on developing 
commercial areas, and more top-end 
vacation homes might be contemplated, in 
addition to the construction of two new golf 
courses. Hence, Mayakoba has positioned 
itself as one of the top hotel and real estate 
developments in Mexico.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based on information provided by OHL.
a 
 In general, for high-income customers, brand image is an important factor when choosing a vacation destination. In addition, tourists in this category are typically strongly 
loyal to a destination and spend high average amounts during their stays. 
Unquestionably, jointly owned property development 
is now one of the main drivers of tourism-related real estate 
in Mexico (NotiTur, 2007b, p. 21). Moreover, as well as 
hotels and vacation homes, other formulas are helping to 
broaden the tourism and real estate offer.
The timeshare concept has been popular in the United 
States market for some 30 years. It has evolved to include 
fractional ownership, condohotels and private residence 
clubs.33 In Mexico, such projects are found mainly on the 
Pacific coast, particularly in Los Cabos, Puerto Vallarta, 
33
 In the fractional ownership model, a group of investors acquire 
a property jointly, with each obtaining the contractual option of 
using the property during pre-established periods. In the condohotel 
model, investors buy hotel rooms either to use themselves or to 
entrust to a specialized administration to generate an income, or 
both. Private residence clubs are boutique fractional ownership 
schemes for high-end segments, usually located within or adjacent 
to luxury hotels.
Ensenada and Rosarito, and on the Caribbean coast of 
Cancun and Riviera Maya. Acapulco continues to be a 
market with major potential for domestic tourism, with 
easy road access from the main interior cities. 
International luxury hotel chains have also realized 
the potential of this type of venture. For example, 
the Canadian chain Fairmont has given its name to a 
private residential club in Acapulco, and the United 
States firm Ritz Carlton, a subsidiary of Marriott, has 
done likewise in Los Cabos. This new mechanism of 
alliances between luxury hotel brands and real estate 
development has proven particularly successful, since 
it gives greater credibility to projects and factors in 
quality hotel services, which usually results in higher 
sale prices and a quicker turnover of properties. In fact, 
for investors and real estate developers, this formula is 
a good way to reduce the capital investment and recoup 
it within a shorter period.
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With all these new ventures, private investment in the 
Mexican tourism sector has grown steadily in the 2000s, and 
coastal destinations have become increasingly prominent 
(see figure III.8). The bulk of this new investment has 
gone into developing large integrated hotel and real estate 
projects and building and remodelling hotels (SECTUR, 
2006, p. 4). Private sector activity in the hotel and real 
estate segment has been complemented with voluminous 
investment in transport infrastructure (airports, cruise-ship 
docking areas, and roads), telecommunications, utilities and 
tourist facilities (golf courses, marinas and theme parks).
Figure III.8
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
The geopolitical divisions where the main beach 
destinations are located —both master-planned resorts 
and traditional locations— account for the bulk of private 
investment in tourism. In fact, over 60% of investment goes 
to projects in just four States: Quintana Roo, Guerrero, 
Nayarit and Baja California. Cancun, the most successful 
master-planned resort and the main catalyst for this type 
of investment, is situated in the State of Quintana Roo. 
In addition, recent efforts to diversify the tourism offer 
towards higher-income segments with low-density integrated 
hotel and real estate developments have shifted the focus 
of private investment towards states such as Nayarit and 
Baja California Sur (see figure III.9).
Although the foreign investment component has 
become more significant, domestic investment continues to 
drive local tourism. Almost 70% of cumulative investment 
in 2001-2008 corresponds to Mexican capital (see figure 
III.10). This merely confirms the existence of a trait that 
is typical of the tourism industry, particularly the hotel 
business, in which infrastructure and real estate are financed 
by local private capital and services are provided under 
international brand names through management, leasing 
or franchise agreements. 
Figure III.9
MEXICO: PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN TOURISM, BY STATE,  
2001-2008
(Millions of dollars)










Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
Figure III.10
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
Foreign investment in Mexico’s tourism industry comes 
almost entirely from the United States and Spain. In the last 
two years (for which period disaggregated information is 
available), Spain contributed 64% of the foreign investment 
in the Mexican tourism business, while the United States 
generated 30%. There is virtually no foreign capital in the 
traditional resorts such as Acapulco and Puerto Vallarta, 
as investments there are made by Mexican businesses. 
Foreign investors are much more active in the resorts aimed 
at international tourism, in Baja California, Quintana Roo 
and, recently, Nayarit. Here, Spanish investors stand out, 
being the majority in Quintana Roo (Cancun), Nayarit, 
Campeche and Baja California Sur (see figure III.11). 
Spanish investors’ initial strong preference for Caribbean 
destinations thus seems to have shifted, as they seek greater 
diversification on the Pacific coast, hence their interest in 
Nayarit (see box III.4). 
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Box III.4
RIVIERA NAYARIT: A NEW HIGH-END TOURISM DESTINATION DRIVEN  
BY FOREIGN INVESTMENT
The brand name Riviera Nayarit was 
coined in March 2007 to refer to a stretch 
of 111 km of shoreline running from 
the municipality of San Blas as far as 
Puerto Vallarta. Since then the federal 
government (through the Mexican Council 
for the Promotion of Tourism), the Nayarit 
state government and private investors 
have embarked on numerous ventures to 
develop this new sun, sea and sand tourist 
destination on Mexico’s Pacific coast. More 
than US$ 3.23 billion in private investment 
is expected in coming years (Expansión 
15-29 September 2008, p. 70). The federal 
government has also pledged over US$ 455 
million though the National Trust Fund for 
Tourism Development (FONATUR) to create 
and maintain infrastructure to support the 
development of tourism in the region (Boletín 
informativo SECTUR No. 5, 19 January 
2007). In mid-2006, spurred by the positive 
outlook for the region, FONATUR launched 
the Nayarit master-planned resort. 
Recently completed real estate 
and hotel complexes are expected to 
position Nayarit as one of Mexico’s leading 
destinations for tourism investments, most 
of which will be aimed at attracting visitor 
with high purchasing power, especially from 
the United States. In late 2008, more than 
90% of visitors and real estate buyers were 
United States citizens. Nayarit currently 
has more than 12,000 hotel rooms, two 
thirds of which are in the four-star to 
super luxury range (Notitur, 2008, April-
June). These efforts have been supported 
by state authorities to avoid the rapid 
overdevelopment that ocurred in other 
Mexican tourism centres. 
The first large-scale development 
began in the late 1990s, when the Mexican 
group Dine undertook an ambitious real 
estate and hotel project in Punta Mita, 
45 km west of Puerto Vallarta. Two luxury 
hotels were built on a 600-ha plot, one run 
by the Canadian chain Four Seasons (173 
rooms) and the other, the recently opened 
Saint Regis, run by the United States chain 
Starwood,a with 120 rooms, 350 vacation 
homes and two golf courses certified by 
Jack Nicklaus. More than US$ 500 million 
is now being invested to build 1,000 new 
residences, each valued at more than 
US$ 1 million. Nearby, the Spanish hotel 
chain RIU recently inaugurated a 445-room 
all-inclusive luxury hotel.
Another major initiative in the region 
is Punta Raza, a project that was tendered 
to C&C Capital, a Mexican consortium 
involved in high-end residential and 
tourism development. At Punta Raza, it 
is planned to build eight four- and five-
star hotels, 1,800 vacation homes, a golf 
course and a marina on a 293-ha plot, 
with an investment of more than US$ 270 
million. The two first hotels, a 400-room 
Gran Hyatt and a 200-room Park Hyatt, 
will require investments of US$ 105 and 
US$ 85 million and are expected to open 
in 2011 (see [online] http://www.nayarit.
gob.mx/notes.asp?id=10514).
A second C&C Capital project, this 
time jointly with The West Paces Hotel 
Group of the United States, involves a 
US$ 450-million investment to build a 
tourism complex on Destiladeras beach, 
in the Nuevo Vallarta-Punta Mita corridor. 
In the first phase, a 100-room luxury hotel, 
under the Capella brand, 120 homes, a 
spa and an 18-hole golf course will be 
built on a two-km stretch of beachfront. 
US$ 255 million will be invested in this 
phase (Excélsior, 17 March 2008).
The Mexican real estate group Rasa 
Land, with financial backing from Goldman 
Sachs and Texas Pacific Group, is planning 
several tourism complexes in the region. The 
first envisions the construction of two luxury 
hotels, a golf course and 600 residences 
on a 300-ha plot. The second, very close 
to Punta Mita, includes the construction 
of a luxury hotel and 150 residences on a 
property of 22 ha. 
From a medium- and long-term 
perspective, the progress in the Nayarit 
master-planned resort merits special 
mention. Under this project, an 865-ha 
property, divided into three areas —Litibú, El 
Capomo and El Peñita— is to be developed 
in phases. The first, Litibú, located 2 km 
north of Punta Mita, is expected to have 
a hotel offer of 4,000 rooms, 910 vacation 
homes, a marina and a golf course, with 
an investment of some US$ 1.1 billion 
dollars (Notitur, April-June 2008 and 
Inmobiliare Magazine, 27 March 2008). 
The hotel plots for the first stage of the 
master-planned resort were sold quickly. 
Prominent among the purchasers were the 
Spanish companies Iberostar and Fadesa, 
which acquired 200 ha for US$ 80 million. In 
early 2008, Fadesa announced that it would 
invest US$ 350 million to build two luxury 
hotels, 320 residences and a golf course. 
However, Fadesa’s recent bankruptcy 
could complicate the realization of this 
portion of the project. In addition, by 2015 
the 268-ha area El Capomo is expected 
to be operational with 2,000 hotel rooms, 
212 residences and a golf course, with 
an investment of about US$ 870 million 
(Notitur, April-June 2008).
These investments have made the 
State of Nayarit one of the leading recipients 
of private tourism investment in Mexico. 
Indeed, by 2008, the State was bested in 
this regard only by Quintana Roo, which 
has been the preferred location of investors 
in recent years. As a result, tourism now 
accounts for nearly 21% of the State’s 
GDP, and has displaced traditional activities 
such as agriculture (80% of the tobacco 
produced in Mexico comes from Nayarit), 
fishing and mining (Expansión, 15-28 
September 2008, p. 70).
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
a
 This hotel is a joint venture with the Rosewood chain and the Mexican real estate groups Dine and Ideurban. 
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Figure III.11
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Secretariat of Tourism of Mexico (SECTUR).
The Mexican real estate market slowed in late 2008, 
owing mainly to greater fiduciary caution and tighter lending 
practices in the United States. The current financial market 
crisis and its effects on investors’ resources and consumer 
confidence will probably have a short-term impact on many 
developments (see table III.6). Unless the global financial 
crisis deepens or the effects of the influenza that broke 
out in March 2009 worsen, however, the outlook for the 
medium and long terms still seems promising. 
In summary, Mexico built up an extensive tourism 
infrastructure with strong government support, which 
helped the country to become the largest international 
tourism destination in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Now seeking to leave behind the stigma of mass tourism 
and its undesired effects, the preference is for large-scale 
projects targeting high-income segments, with emphasis 
on residential tourism.
Table III.6
MEXICO: MAIN HOTEL AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS UNDER WAY, 2008
Cancun / Riviera Maya




In late 2008, the project was facing multiple authorization problems with the State of Quintana Roo
Capella Bahia Maroma Luxury Hotel: Capella Hotels & Resorts (83 independent villas)
127 vacation homes
18-hole golf course
US$ 300 million in investment
Puerto Cancun 5 hotels (4,000 rooms)
2,100 luxury apartments and condominiums
435 single-family residential plots
18-hole golf course designed by Tom Weiskopf
Marina
US$ 2 billion in investment




Puerto Los Cabos Luxury hotel (95 rooms)
100 homes
2 18-hole golf courses designed by Greg Norman and Jack Nicklaus
Marina
US$ 1.2 billion in investment
Chileno Bay Luxury hotel (15 rooms)
725 homes
2 18-hole golf courses
Marina
Cabo San Cristobal 3 luxury hotels (455 rooms)
405 homes (first phase)
2 golf courses
Pacific coast
Litubu 3 hotels (500 rooms)
450 homes, 18-hole golf course
Marina
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
Tourism has grown steadily in the Caribbean subregion in 
the last two decades (see figure III.5). In terms of numbers, 
the main destinations for international visitors are the 
Dominican Republic, Cuba, Jamaica and the Bahamas 
(see figure III.12). 
Tourism is now a significant industry for the great 
majority of the Caribbean islands, especially some of 
the smaller countries and territories (see figure III.13). 
In fact, the foreign visitors received by some small 
islands with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants multiply 
2.  The Caribbean: moving towards niche tourism
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their population several times over. This is the case 
of Antigua and Barbuda, Bermuda, the British Virgin 
Islands, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, where income from international tourism 
is the main driver of the economy. Although the tourism 
industry is bigger in absolute terms in the larger and 
more diversified economies, in relative terms it is more 
significant on the smaller islands.
Figure III.12
THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL TOURIST ARRIVALS, MAIN 
DESTINATION COUNTRIES AND TERRITORIES, 1990-2007
(Thousands of people)













Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
Figure III.13
THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA INCOME FROM  
INTERNATIONAL TOURISM, 2007
(Dollars per inhabitant)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
The subregion depends heavily on the origin markets 
of North America, principally the United States. This 
is particularly true in the English-speaking countries 
and territories (see figure III.14). There is more 
diversification in some of the main tourism destinations 
in the Caribbean (such as Barbados, Cuba and the 
Dominican Republic), for which Europe and a number 
of Latin American countries are more significant origin 
markets. Among other reasons, this pattern reflects 
active marketing campaigns, greater cultural and 
language affinity, rich economic and political relations 
with former colonies, explicit conflicts with the United 
States (for example, the embargo against Cuba) and 
the strong presence of European firms —mainly hotel 
chains closely associated with tour operators— in these 
countries’ tourism industries. 
Figure III.14
THE CARIBBEAN: INTERNATIONAL TOURIST ARRIVALS,  
BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN, 2007
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the Caribbean Tourism Organization (CTO).
The hotel offer in the Caribbean has increased 
considerably in recent decades, especially in the four 
countries that account for two thirds of all rooms in the 
subregion: the Bahamas, Cuba, the Dominican Republic 
and Jamaica (see figure III.15).
Figure III.15
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of information from the Caribbean Tourism Organization, the National 
Statistical Office of Cuba, the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic and 
the National Hotel and Restaurant Association of the Dominican Republic 
(ASONAHORES).
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The hotel offer in the Caribbean is very varied 
today, and includes integrated hotel and real estate 
complexes, full service hotels and all-inclusive resorts, 
timeshare units, vacation clubs, holiday homes and 
apartments and more modest inns and hostels. The 
subregion has adapted very quickly to the new trends 
in international tourism. The first all-inclusive hotels 
appeared in the 1980s in response to the demand from 
leisure travellers, and the system prospered notably in 
Jamaica (Issa and Jayawardena, 2003, p. 168). In the 
1990s, the industry shifted rapidly away from mass 
tourism towards a more discerning type. A change in 
strategy became apparent in most of the Caribbean 
destinations, with promotion and marketing efforts 
focusing on new vacation options that went beyond 
the classic sun, sea and sand variety, aiming at specific 
niches in the tourism market. A broad array of hotel 
establishments began to target different types of 
holiday-makers, such as couples, singles or families, 
generally operating under the all-inclusive scheme.34 
The Jamaican firms SuperClubs and Sandals have been 
extremely important in spearheading the changes that 
have occurred in the industry (see box III.5). The range 
of vacation clubs and timeshare complexes also began 
to increase. This decade, there has been a boom in the 
market for second homes, either in integrated hotel and 
real estate developments or in new coastal urbanizations 
designed specifically for foreigners.
Among the larger countries, such as Cuba, Jamaica 
and the Dominican Republic, the all-inclusive hotel 
offer began to expand rapidly. Despite an incipient 
trend towards specialization in niche markets, much 
of this offer was oriented towards standardized mass 
tourism, in which tour operators played a major role. 
In general, these were beach resorts, where price was 
the crucial factor. Better quality and more extensive 
infrastructure, active national promotion policies and 
cluster economies resulting from the en masse arrival 
of international hotel chains all helped to reduce costs. 
Thus the sun, sea and sand product quickly became 
34
 Some destinations specialized in the wedding and honeymoon 
market, reducing or simplifying procedures for conducting 
marriage ceremonies, and several hotels built wedding reception 
rooms and special accommodation for honeymooners. A number 
of resorts offering all-inclusive services exclusively for couples 
have been very successful in the United States market, where the 
Jamacian firms SuperClub and Sandals have been very active. 
Other successful niches are those linked with golf, water sports, 
diving and family vacations. Some destinations have promoted 
cultural events such as the carnivals in Aruba, Dominica, Jamaica 
and Martinique, and the jazz festivals in Aruba, Barbados, the 
Dominican Republic, Saint Lucia and Trinidad and Tobago 
(ECLAC, 2003, p. 23).
commoditized and this, combined with the large increase 
in hotel capacity, led to a fierce price war which eroded 
the quality of tourism and the benefits it brought to the 
host economies (Perelló, 2007, p. 12).35 Conversely, 
the smaller islands with less developed infrastructure 
focused on more exclusive, sophisticated and, hence, 
costly tourism products. Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, 
Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Martin and 
the United States Virgin Islands were chosen by high-
income tourists looking for peace and quiet, privacy 
and a natural setting, with low building density and 
minimal human intervention. 
The tourism industry expanded rapidly in the Spanish-
speaking Caribbean. In the Dominican Republic, in the 
wake of the success of pioneering initiatives such as Casa 
de Campo,36 close to La Romana, new sun, sea and sand 
developments proliferated all along the coast, including 
Punta Cana and Puerto Plata. Between 1990 and 2007, 
hotel capacity and international visitor arrivals tripled 
and income from tourism increased more than fourfold 
(see figures III.12 and III.15). In Cuba, following the 
loss of the country’s main trading partners —the former 
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe— the 
government banked strongly on the development of tourism 
on the island, especially in the resort of Varadero. Between 
1990 and 2007, the hotel offer in Cuba more than tripled, 
international tourist arrivals multiplied almost sevenfold 
and tourism income increased by a factor of more than 
eight (see figures III.12 and III.15). The diversification 
of origin markets was a key driver of the success of the 
tourism industry in Cuba and the Dominican Republic 
(see figure III.14). Despite the distance involved, Europe 
has become the largest single market of origin for both 
islands. Canada has become especially important for 
Cuba, owing to the travel ban applied to United States 
citizens. Gradually, all-inclusive hotels become increasingly 
significant, coming to represent 47% and 58% of hotel 
capacity in Cuba and the Dominican Republic, respectively 
(Perelló, 2007, p. 21).
35
 Many all-inclusive resorts were built on wetlands, swamps and 
mangroves, taking advantage of the cheapness of this type of land. 
This has had a strong impact on the environment and has made 
coastal areas more vulnerable to natural disasters such as tropical 
storms and hurricanes (Perelló, 2007, p. 19).
36
 In the 1970s, the United States firm Gulf and Western Industries 
abandoned the sugar industry and began to invest in developing 
the Casa de Campo resort, which now consists of a hotel, 1,300 
vacation homes, three golf courses and an international airport.
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Box III.5
THE “ALL-INCLUSIVE” CONCEPT: A JAMAICAN SPECIALITY
The all-inclusive concept first emerged in 
the 1930s in the holiday camps of the United 
Kingdom but was popularized in 1950s by 
the French company Club Méditerranée 
(Club Med). In fact, Club Med was the first 
hotel chain to introduce this concept in warm 
beach destinations (Issa and Jayawardena, 
2003, p. 167).
The idea of all-inclusive service arose 
as a way to cope with the difficult situation 
faced by the tourist industry in the Caribbean 
as a result of the oil crisis in the early 1970s. 
Rather than to increase the hotel supply, 
the need was to offer a different type of 
vacation. The first all-inclusive packages in 
the Caribbean were introduced in Jamaica, 
based on the concept developed by Club Med 
and the cruise industry. The scheme offered 
tourists a combination of prized ingredients: 
including security, entertainment and, above 
all, vacations with no complications or 
surprises, since everything was paid for. In 
1976, John Issa —currently the chairman 
of SuperClubs— opened the Negril Beach 
Village Resort, known today as Hedonism II. 
The young-singles image of the all-inclusive 
concept continued until 1978, when a 
complex for couples opened in Ocho Rios. 
In 1987, Issa founded the first all-inclusive 
family hotel. The success of these resorts 
was quickly reflected in industry trends, 
and many companies copied the various 
concepts (Issa and Jayawardena, 2003, 
p.168). Subsequently, to differentiate itself 
from other all-inclusive companies, especially 
in the more economical and mass-tourism 
segments, SuperClubs introduced the 
“super-inclusive” system. 
At about the same time, Gordon Stewart 
bought a small property in near-ruin in 
Montego Bay, which he transformed into 
the first all-inclusive hotel of the Jamaican 
hotel chain Sandals (Hawkes and Kwortnik, 
2006, p. 370). This chain specialized in the 
couples market, offering vacation services, 
weddings and honeymoons, under the “luxury 
included” system which offered super luxury 
features at all of its facilities. 
In the mid-2000s, SuperClubs and 
Sandals dominated the Jamaican market, 
controlling 40% of rooms under hotel-chain 
management (PWC, 2005, p. 6). Trailing far 
behind were other international operators 
such the Marriott of the United States and 
RIU of Spain.
ALL-INCLUSIVE RESORTS OF THE JAMAICAN 













In the late 1990s, Sandals and 
SuperClubs launched an ambitious 
internationalization strategy within the 
Caribbean, based on the all-inclusive 
model. They rapidly branched out to 
Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Cuba, 
Curaçao, the Dominican Republic and Saint 
Lucia. SuperClubs also began operations 
in Brazil, where it had particularly strong 
success in the promising north-east 
region, and in the buoyant tourism sector 
of Panama, where it will open a new 
hotel in 2009. In Brazil, SuperClubs was 
involved in developing the Costa do Sauípe 
complex, where it has a hotel and manages 
the establishments of the United States 
chain Honesta. In 2007, it inaugurated a 
second all-inclusive resort on the island 
of Santa Luzia, off Aracajú. In late 2008, 
SuperClub acquired a controlling interest 
in the Costa do Sauípe resort. 
In response to strong competition, 
SuperClubs recently began an intensive 
effort to upgrade its facilities and reposition 
its Breezes brand. Once this has been 
achieved, the company plans to have 
14 Breezes hotels with similar features 
in seven countries. Hence, SuperClubs 
has remodelled some of its complexes 
in Jamaica (at a cost of US$ 20 million), 
Bahamas (US$ 10 million) and Curaçao 
(US$ 2 million) (Diario HotelTur Nº 2354, 
27 January 2009).
In sum, SuperClubs and Sandals —two 
companies that began in Jamaica— have 
taken a significant lead in the Caribbean 
market by renovating and remodelling their 
hotel facilities and transforming them into 
luxury resorts for niche markets, such as 
couples, families and single adults, adapting 
the all-inclusive concept to their operations. 
The Jamaican hotel chains are thus the 
leading operators of a model that has 
become widely established and popular 
in the Caribbean. 
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
National governments and FDI have been crucial in 
this process. The Dominican Republic has maintained 
a policy of incentives for tourism and for foreign 
capital investment, coupled with heavy investment in 
infrastructure.37 This has included international airports 
in some of the main tourism areas on the coast —Santo 
Domingo, Punta Cana, La Romana, Puerto Plata and 
Samaná— which have facilitated quick and easy access 
for foreign tourists and have bypassed the island’s road 
infrastructure shortcomings (Hostelmarket, No. 93, May 
37
 Dominican legislation offers facilties for the construction of hotels, 
restaurants, aquariums, leisure parks and golf courses (Law No. 
158 of 2001, modified by Law No. 184 de 2002), and for real estate 
activity (Law No. 108 of 2005) and the promotion of tourism in under-
developed areas (Law No. 198 of 2002). It also encourages pensioners 
and retirees who are interested in setting up residence in the country, 
with tax exemptions of up to 100% (Law No. 171 of 2007).
2007). Cuba thoroughly overhauled its tourism industry by 
creating the first enterprises in the sector (the chains Gran 
Caribe, Horizontes and Isla Azul, and the corporations 
Cubanacan and Gaviota) and a Ministry of Tourism, and 
establishing development hubs that could benefit from 
the hotel and airport infrastructure and ancillary services. 
In the mid-1990s, the Cuban authorities allowed foreign 
investment, which led to a proliferation of mixed-capital 
enterprises, as a way of compensating for the lack of 
specific skills (Pérez, 2003, p. 16).38 
38
 In 1992 a reform to the Constitution, among other things, 
recognized mixed enterprises as a form of ownership. Under the 
Foreign Investment Act of 1995, known as Law No. 77, foreign 
investments can take the form of mixed enterprises, international 
economic partnership agreements or fully foreign-owned firms. 
In 2004, Agreement 5290 established procedures for cooperative 
production contracts (goods and services) and hotel management
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FDI in tourism represented almost 20% of total FDI 
income in the Dominican Republic between 1993 and 2008. 
The sum of this investment and the resources poured into 
real estate make up a third of all inflows (see figure III.16). 
In Cuba, over a third of the more than 300 firms with foreign 
capital are involved in tourism-related activities, mainly in 
the area of hotel management (MINVEC, 2008).39 Spanish 
hotel chains have been the most active investors in the tourism 
industry in both countries (see figure III.17 and box II.2).
Figure III.16
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
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the basis of information from the Central Bank of the Dominican Republic.
 contracts for Cuban firms and foreign natural or legal persons. 
In 2007 Law No. 171 was passed establishing special incentives 
for those receiving pensions or incomes from abroad, in order to 
stimulate the real estate sector.
39
 Hotel management contracts are signed for an initial period of 
five to seven years. The parties may extend them as many times as 
they wish, taking the opportunity upon each renovation to update 
the conditions and operating modules that govern them. These 
partnerships are formed on the principle that the mixed enterprise 
does not own the land it occupies, but receives the right to its 
use, which represents the capital contribution of the local entity 
(Hostelmarket, No. 86, October 2006).
The main Spanish vacation chains have a presence 
on the Spanish-speaking coasts of the Caribbean and have 
specialized strongly in the all-inclusive segment. In 1985, 
Barceló Hotels & Resorts was the first Spanish chain to 
invest in Latin America, choosing a Dominican location 
that at the time was difficult to access: Playa Bávaro, Punta 
Cana.40 In the early 1990s, Sol Meliá of Spain formed the 
first mixed-capital enterprise in Cuba, with the opening 
of Hotel Sol Palmeras in the emerging tourism hub of 
Varadero, 140 km from Havana.41 These ventures were 
highly successful and prompted other international firms 
to invest in the subregion, replicating the experiences 
of Barceló and Sol Meliá. Today, the 14 international 
chains operating in Cuba —mostly Spanish and led by 
Sol Meliá— manage more than half the country’s hotel 
capacity under contract (Buen viaje, 1 September 2008).42 
There are more international chains in the Dominican 
Republic, but the Spanish ones, headed by Barceló and 
RIU (see box III.4) are still very important. The Spanish 
chains currently manage almost 70,000 hotel rooms in 
the Caribbean, or over half the available offer. In the 
Dominican Republic, they encompass some 70% of the 
market (HostelTur, January 2009).
Although the international chains initially competed 
for market share on a price basis, that strategy was quickly 
exhausted. As the competition stiffened, new investments 
were needed to improve the quality and diversity of services 
offered in the all-inclusive schemes, and this was difficult 
given their narrow profit margin. Accordingly, most of 
the chains began to migrate towards higher standards of 
service, that is, to four- and five-star hotels. The idea was 
to retain the all-inclusive scheme but aim it at a market 
segment with greater purchasing power that would be 
less sensitive to market fluctuations.
High-end hotel chains, which had hitherto preferred 
to locate in the smaller, English-speaking Caribbean 
islands, also began to become involved in more 
projects. Shifts in demand patterns and the response of 
all-inclusive chains forced the high-end hotels to more 
40
 Today the Barceló complex at Playa Bávaro has five hotels, a golf 
course, a casino and a convention centre.
41
  Sol Meliá entered Cuba with the creation of Cubacan, an enterprise 
in which the local tourism group Cubanacan and Corporación 
Interinsular Hispana —in which Sol Meliá has a 25% stake— 
had equal shares. Cubacan thus began to venture into new hotel 
establishments, managed under the Sol Meliá brand.
42
 In 2005, Spanish companies managed 40% of Cuban hotel capacity: 
almost half the rooms in Varadero and one in four in Havana. The 
Spanish presence is even greater in other places, such as the area 
of Jardines del Rey and the Cuban Keys —Cayo Coco, Cayo 
Guillermo, Cayo Largo and Cayo Santa María— where the market 
share is as high as 70%, mainly owned by Sol Meliá (Hostelmarket, 
No. 86, October 2006). Sol Meliá now operates 21 hotels in Cuba, 
which represents 20% of all hotel capacity and 50% of the units 
administered by Spanish chains. 
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actively defend or even increase their presence in the 
luxury segment. There are 65 new projects under way 
in the Caribbean subregion at present, of which 28 are 
at the construction stage. Ten of these are located in 
the Dominican Republic, the largest number in a single 
country (Freitag, 2008).43 
Against this backdrop, as well as the upgrading 
of many hotel establishments, new, more sophisticated 
projects began to spring up, incorporating luxury hotel 
infrastructure, real estate, golf courses and other commercial 
and leisure facilities. This new concept, known as real
43
 The countries and territories with the largest numbers of projects 
are the Dominican Republic (10), Turks and Caicos Islands (7), 
the Bahamas (7) and Saint Lucia (5), and the most active hotel 
chains are Marriott, through its brand Ritz-Carlton (4), Radisson
estate tourism, caters to the regular traveller who begins 
to feel attached to a particular destination and consider the 
possibility of investing in it long-term. The companies’ aim 
is to move away from low-cost tourism and all-inclusive 
hotels, capture new high-income customers and contain 
some of the unwanted effects of mass tourism. A number of 
large-scale developments are under way in the Dominican 
Republic at present, including Roko Ki, Cap Cana and some 
new projects in established resorts, such as Casa de Campo 
(Los Altos real estate development) and Punta Cana Resort 
& Club (Los Corales project) (see box III.6). 
 
 Hotels & Resorts (3), Starwoods Hotels & Resorts, with its brands 
Westin (3) and St. Regis (3), Four Seasons (3), Choice Hotels, 
through the brand Comfort Inn (3), and Mandarin Oriental (3) 
(Freitag, 2008).
Box III.6
CAP CANA TOURISM PROJECT: PARADISE IN PERIL
The Cap Cana project, near Punta Cana 
International Airport in the Dominican 
Republic, has positioned itself as the 
leading tourism real estate development 
in the Caribbean. The project envisions 
some 5,000 vacation homes, seven luxury 
hotels, five golf courses (including three 
designed by Jack Nicklaus, the first of which 
was inaugurated in November 2006), and 
a marina for 1,000 boats, in addition to 
shopping and leisure areas. 
This undertaking has been headed 
by the Abrisa group, which is one of the 
largest in the Dominican Republic and also 
has a share in administering six airports, 
which handle 65% of the country’s air 
traffic. Agreements to develop the project 
were signed with various international 
companies and a number of real estate 
schemes have been announced; these 
will gradually materialize in several stages 
over about 15 years. Some of the main real 
estate schemes are described below: 
In 2005, the Spanish hotel chain NH, 
through its real estate company Sotogrande, 
entered into an agreement to develop a 
real estate and hotel complex composed 
of a hotel (managed by NH) and 352 
luxury residences, called “Sotogrande 
at Cap Cana.” The estimated investment 
for this project is US$ 234 million, to be 
contributed in equal shares by Cap Cana 
and NH, and the complex was officially 
launched in January 2009.
In 2005, the Spanish chain Altabella 
Hotels began building two luxury hotels 
in Cap Cana, with an investment of close 
to US$ 300 million (Expansión, 21 May 
2007). In mid-2007, the Hotel Sanctuary 
Cap Cana Golf & Spa was inaugurated, 
followed a few months later by Golden Bear 
Lodge, a complex of condominiums that 
will operate as a boutique hotel.
In early 2007, the United States 
magnate Donald Trump joined the mega-
project, to develop a large real estate 
complex with a luxury hotel, a golf course 
and vacation residences named “Trump at 
Cap Cana,” the value of which is expected 
to reach 1.52 billion euros (Cinco días, 
20 February 2007). The first stage of this 
initiative, Solares del Farallón Trump at Cap 
Cana, was very successful, with US$ 350 
million in properties and over 95% of the 
land sold in the first four hours. 
In late 2007, the United States-based 
hotel chain Marriott, through its Ritz-Carlton 
brand, joined the project with the aim of a 
building a luxury hotel (The Ritz-Carlton Cap 
Cana) and a real estate complex with 194 
private residences, named “Residences at 
The Ritz-Carlton Cap Cana”. This will take an 
investment of close to US$ 1 billion (Clave 
digital, 9 November 2007). The project is 
expected to be inaugurated in early 2010 
(El Economista, 19 September 2007). 
In addition, several independent real 
estate projects have been undertaken, most 
notably the Cap Cana Luxury Retreats with 
apartments facing the marina, and Green 
Village. Cap Cana has also offered other real 
estate projects to the international markets, 
including Ribera Marina Town Homes and 
Villas Las Iguanas. By mid-2008, Cap Cana 
had sold more than US$ 1.24 billion in real 
estate products and invested more than 
US$ 1 billion in the Dominican Republic. 
The project managers have had 
difficulties in maintaining the pace of 
construction and delivery of the urbanized 
plots, condominiums and vacation residences, 
which has significantly reduced cash flow. 
Liquidity problems greatly complicated 
payment and borrowing capacity, and this 
was further exacerbated by the real estate 
and financial crisis in the United States. In 
late 2008, the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
prevented Cap Cana from receiving a US$ 
250-million loan, causing it to default on a 
bridge loan of US$ 100 million from Deutsche 
Bank and Morgan Stanley, and the company 
had difficulties in paying the dividend on 
its US$ 250-million corporate bond issue 
maturing in 2013 (the largest corporate 
debt issue in the history of the Dominican 
Republic). Even though the mega-project 
managers were able to avoid imminent 
bankruptcy by reaching an agreement 
with their main creditors (Clave digital, 9 
December 2008), in the current situation, 
the future does not look straightforward for 
this ambitious business initiative.
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
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In 2007, sales of over US$ 1.5 billion were made in 
the main real estate tourism complexes developed in the 
Dominican Republic (Gestión y competitividad, No. 2, 
May 2008). At the end of 2008, some 4,000 vacation homes 
and apartments had been built and about 2,000 were in 
construction, mostly in the tourist areas of Samará, Punta 
Cana-Playa Bávaro, La Romana, Puerto Plata, Jarabacoa 
and Constanza (Listin Diario, 19 December 2008). As in 
Mexico, some of these projects are being carried out by 
local groups financed from abroad, but foreign investors 
also have a strong presence (financial entities, real estate and 
construction companies and hotel chains, among others). 
This has helped to diversify the sources of investment and 
Spanish firms have been joined by others from Canada, 
the United States and other countries (CEI-DR, 2008a, 
p. 5). These projects target external markets, mainly in the 
United States and Europe. The appreciation of the euro 
has made the Dominican Republic very attractive for the 
European market despite the distance involved. Between 
2004 and 2008, almost US$ 2 billion in FDI flowed into 
the real estate sector of the Dominican Republic (see 
figure III.16).
This prosperity has coincided with the international 
real estate boom, but is also occurring in a context in which 
the all-inclusive model is showing signs of exhaustion. 
However, the current international financial crisis could 
complicate the financing of projects under way (see box 
III.6) and undermine the purchasing power of potential 
United States and European customers and their willingness 
to engage in leisure travel. In fact, in the last few weeks of 
2008, real estate prices fell sharply in the main Caribbean 
vacation hubs, in some cases by as much as 40%. The 
sector may face difficulties in the short term as a result 
of slumping demand for real estate and hotel services in 
the Caribbean but, depending on the duration and depth 
of the international crisis, the medium- and long-term 
outlook should start to brighten and give the industry 
fresh momentum.
In summary, attractive natural settings, combined with 
the proximity of the United States and Canadian markets, 
have made most of the countries and territories of the 
Caribbean into highly attractive and sought-after holiday 
destinations. The subregion first built up a platform for 
mass tourism with a range of all-inclusive formulas tailored 
to the needs of different segments of demand (couples, 
singles and families). The larger countries improved 
access infrastructure (airports) and accommodation and 
entertainment services, which contributed to standardizing 
the tourism offer and heightening competition based 
largely on price. The tourism offer in the smaller island 
territories tended to be more segmented and environmentally 
lower-impact, targeting high-income visitors. When the 
all-inclusive model began to show signs of depletion as 
a result of tight profit margins, over-exploitation of the 
environment, changes in travellers’ preferences and the 
deterioration of hotel facilities, companies began to take 
steps to capture more volatile segments of demand. First, 
the major hotel chains embarked on massive upgrading 
of their facilities. Second, multiple emerging projects 
began to combine luxury hotel infrastructure with real 
estate developments, along with additional facilities such 
as golf courses and marinas. The renewed tourism offer 
thus aimed to capture both sporadic visitors and higher-
income residents. The global real estate and financial 
crisis has reduced international arrivals, caused serious 
difficulties for a number of projects under way and forced 
the postponement of new ventures, freezing the second 
homes markets in much of the Caribbean.
3.  Central America and Panama: leapfrogging the traditional  
 stages of tourism development
New real estate and hotel projects have begun to give 
the tourism industry a new lease of life in a number of 
Central American countries and the subregion’s coasts 
have become a promising destination for the growing 
United States retiree market and for local and foreign 
economic groups willing to invest in tourism (see 
figure III.5). At this early stage in the development of 
the sector, FDI is playing a larger role than in did in 
other countries. Unlike the pattern in Mexico and in 
several Caribbean countries and territories, however, 
the Central American countries have yet to come 
consolidated as destinations.
Political stability and sound economic performance 
have driven local tourism demand and enabled the 
development of tourism industries orientated towards 
long-distance visitors (UNWTO, 2007a, p. 47). The entry 
into force of the Dominican Republic - Central America - 
United States Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA-DR) could 
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facilitate the operation of foreign tourism companies, 
especially hotels, which use large volumes of imported 
inputs. In this context, international tourism arrivals have 
seen substantial and sustained growth, from 4.1 million 
visitors in 2000 to 7.5 million in 2007. Tourism has 
become a major source of income for Central American 
countries, especially Costa Rica, Guatemala and Panama 
(UNWTO, 2008c), the countries where the sector has 
grown the fastest, along with El Salvador. Income from 
international tourism more than doubled between 2000 
and 2007, which has helped to offset the downturn in 
the maquila industry and the difficulties faced by the 
agricultural sector (see figure III.19). In Costa Rica, 
tourism has become the second-largest generator of 
foreign exchange and one of the main poles of attraction 
for FDI (Román, 2007b).
Figure III.18
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Intrasubregional tourism and the North American 
market, especially the United States, are both very 
important for Central America (see figure III.20). In 
Costa Rica, tourists from Canada and the United States 
represent almost 50% of all international arrivals, while 
intrasubregional visitors are the most frequent in the rest 
of Central America, except in Panama, where tourists from 
South America represent a large proportion.
Figure III.20
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of information from the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
The tourism sector has developed in different ways 
within Central America. Given the natural endowments 
of the subregion, much of the tourism industry consists of 
traditional sun, sea and sand resorts and related services. 
Other major attractions are the subregion’s natural 
environment (ecotourism) and archeological and cultural 
heritage. Seeking to build on these innate advantages, the 
governments of the region are treating tourism as a pillar 
of national development and have created institutions and 
legal instruments to support and promote the industry, 
making tourism activities a priority for FDI. 
In most of the Central American countries, the 
tourism industry has developed rapidly and not necessarily 
sequentially.44 In a short period of time, destinations 
that had emerged spontaneously under the management 
of small local companies gave way to more established 
resorts as international chains set up in business. As 
44
 The traditional development cycle of a tourism destination starts when 
it is discovered as a place of interest, but still lacks the infrastructure 
and ancillary support services for visitors. Later, a range of more 
sophisticated services, especially hotel services, are offered to 
stimulate the arrival of tourists. The location is considered to have 
reached maturity with the arrival of international hotel chains. Large 
real estate developments, especially on the coast, begin to appear 
at a later stage, for seasonal leisure use and as second homes for 
overseas retirees. These large real estate complexes usually include 
golf courses and marinas (Román, 2008, p. 7).
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occurred in Mexico, in a few Central American beach 
destinations all-inclusive hotel resorts sprang up with 
few links to the local community (Román, 2008, p. 5). 
Shortly afterwards, real estate developments aimed at 
middle- and high-income buyers, particularly from abroad, 
began to gather momentum, along with the infrastructure 
and services needed to facilitate the arrival and stay of 
temporary residents. The early advent of residential tourism 
represents a certain overlap in the traditional stages of 
tourism development in Central America.
The main sun, sea and sand hotel and real estate 
schemes are found in a few locations in Costa Rica and 
Panama. Costa Rica in particular has managed to position 
itself internationally as a “country brand” associated with 
democracy, peace, security, environmental conservation 
and sustainable management of natural resources which, at 
least initially, appears to have enhanced the natural attributes 
of its coastal areas. Panama has been able to benefit from 
the traditional influence of the United States—thanks to 
the Panama Canal and the use of the dollar as domestic 
currency— to attract foreign visitors and residents.
The Costa Rican province of Guanacaste on the northern 
Pacific coast has become one of the country’s main sun, sea 
and sand tourism centres. The first investments were made 
in the beach areas of Coco and Tamarindo, then shifted to 
the Papagayo Gulf, which became the “Cancun of Central 
America”.45 The hotel and real estate industry, oriented 
mainly towards the high-purchasing-power segment, took 
off in the area with the 2004 opening of a complex with 
a hotel run by the Canadian chain Four Seasons, a golf 
course and vacation homes (La República, 8 June 2007). 
Since then, a number of hotel and real estate complexes, 
run mainly by foreign investors, have started up and are at 
different stages of development. Foreign investment in real 
estate, especially from the United States, has been driven 
basically by the flow of foreign tourists looking for vacation 
locations or interested in investing in a second home in the 
main coastal areas of the Pacific (BCCR, 2008, p. 16).
The projects under development include Monte del 
Barco, Hacienda Pinilla, Rancho Manzanillo and Cacique 
del Mar. The Monte del Barco complex will include a hotel 
run by the United States chain Global Hyatt Corporation, 
600 homes and condominiums, a golf course and a marina, 
with an investment of some US$ 1 billion (El Financiero, 
14 September 2008). The Hacienda Pinilla project will have 
a Marriott hotel, a spa and a convention centre. Rancho 
Manzanillo includes a hotel belonging to the Chinese 
chain Mandarin Oriental, a residential complex and a 
golf course. Lastly, a group of United States investors 
45
 The Costa Rican authorities made over land for use, built access 
roads and took electric power to the start of the peninsula. A number 
of local and foreign groups of investors did the rest.
announced the investment of about US$ 800 million in a 
hotel and real estate mega-project due to start up in Punta 
Cacique in 2010. This venture will offer vacation homes, 
a golf course and other facilities (La Nación, 4 August 
2007). The project has been postponed as a result of the 
real estate crisis in the United States, however (Business 
Information Systems, 1 September 2008). The Spanish 
chain RIU is to open a hotel complex in 2009. Other 
projects correspond to a number of major luxury hotel 
chains, such as Marriott’s Rosewood and Ritz-Carlton 
brands (United States), which have expressed an interest 
in establishing a presence on Costa Rica’s beaches. There 
are also projects for exclusively residential schemes aimed 
at retirees from the United States, and many marinas. In 
fact, there are plans to build over 20 new marinas, which 
would be enough to moor over 5,500 vessels and would 
boost Costa Rica as a tourism and residential destination 
(Román, 2007b, p. 7).
This trend has signified that tourism and real estate 
projects account for almost 30% of FDI stocks in Costa 
Rica between 1997 and 2007, and over half of the 
investment flows received in the last year (see figure 
III.21). Much of this investment corresponds to purchases 
by foreign citizens of housing, land, condominiums and 
commercial properties, mainly in Guanacaste and Punta 
Arenas (BCCR, 2008, p. 16).46
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However, this increasing tourism and real estate activity 
in the coastal areas is occurring in a context of limited public 
capacity for oversight and planning, and identification and 
mitigation of environmental impacts. This can cause problems 
46
 In Punta Arenas, FDI has been driven by the purchase of land and 
acquisition of properties, much of it in the real estate mega-project 
Hacienda El Dorado (BCCR, 2008, p. 17). 
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of land management, natural resources and environmental 
quality, particularly in relation to the management, quality 
and use of drinking water, earth movements, changes in 
land use and production and management of solid waste 
(Román, 2007b, p. 10). In some tourism areas, water quality 
is apparently being affected by increasing population density 
combined with lack of sewerage systems and waste water 
treatment facilities. There have also been major difficulties 
in ensuring a sufficient supply of water (Román, 2007c). In 
addition, 10 more golf courses are planned for Guanacaste 
in the next 20 years, which will demand large stretches of 
land (between 50 and 100 ha) and a huge amount of water 
to maintain them. 
A number of tourism ventures have been undertaken 
in Panama, along both coasts and on some of the islands. 
There are a number of mega-projects on the beaches of 
the Pacific coast, known as the “Panamanian Riviera”, 
where hotel chains are setting up and golf courses and 
luxury condominiums are being built. The most popular 
regions are Chiriquí and Pedasi on the Azuero Peninsula, 
Vista Mar, Coronado and Altos de María, Las Perlas 
Archipelago and Taboga Island, close to Panama City 
and Bocas del Toro on the Caribbean coast (EuroPraxis 
Consulting, 2008). 
The first hotel resorts were built on the Pacific coast, 
where many high-income Panamanian families have their 
beach houses. Two of the largest are the Colombian-
owned hotels Coronado and Royal Decameron, both 
with golf courses and many other facilities. Real estate 
developments built by foreign firms have proliferated in 
the vicinities of these hotels and all along the coast, and 
have been very popular among foreign buyers. One is 
the Tucán Country Club & Resort which is being built 
adjacent to the Panama Canal zone and will have over 
500 residences, a golf course and a boutique hotel. At 
the other end of the country, the coastal area of Bocas 
del Toro has become a favourite among retirees from 
the United States, particularly the Red Frog residential 
complex. The real estate segment has thus become the 
main driver of tourism investment in Panama. Lastly, the 
most ambitious tourism development is being built on 
Viveros island in Las Perlas archipelago. This includes 
several hotels, golf courses designed by Jack Nic klaus, 
luxury homes, condominiums, a marina and an airport, 
with an investment totalling over US$ 500 million (El 
Periódico, 14 November 2006).
Similar initiatives are springing up in other countries 
of the subregion. A prime location in Honduras is the 
Caribbean island of Roatán, especially West End beach. 
Development here began with the construction of hotels 
and real estate projects have gathered momentum more 
recently. A number of United States investors have built 
hotel and residential complexes oriented towards water 
sports, such as the Ma yan Prin cess Beach Re sort and the 
Pa rrot Tree Plan ta tion. Within a few months, the Honduran 
hotel offer could be expanded with Los Micos Beach & 
Resort Center, which is now under construction on the 
Bay of Tela on the Caribbean coast. Los Micos is the 
country’s largest hotel and real estate project and will 
include two luxury hotels, one of which may be run by 
the United States chain Hilton, over 430 vacation homes 
and a golf course. Likewise, local and foreign investors 
are looking into the almost unexplored advantages of 
the beaches of El Salvador. In 2005, the Colombian 
group Decameron opened the country’s first beach hotel 
resort and since then other investors, including some 
local groups, have embarked upon new initiatives, such 
as Costa Real Resort & Villas, Portopongo and Puerto 
Cutuco, as well as real estate developments oriented 
towards foreigners, especially retirees from the United 
States (Baires, 2007).47 
As has occurred with other destinations around 
the Caribbean basin, recent tourism and real estate 
developments in Central America have been hurt by the 
international financial crisis. Prices for some homes and 
condominiums have dropped by as much as 40% from 
the highs seen during the market’s boom period and 
sales fell by at least 30% in the second half of 2008 (see 
[online] http://www.businessleone.com). The problems 
in the banking system severely constrained lending to 
retirees and travellers who would normally have financed 
their second homes by mortgaging their homes in the 
United States.
In summary, before even becoming consolidated 
as mass tourism destinations, the Central American 
countries were able to attract the interest of —mainly 
foreign— investors in developing coastal tourism hubs for 
high-income overseas visitors and residents. Costa Rica 
and Panama have taken the lead with a number of large-
scale projects that combine hotel infrastructure, vacation 
homes and other facilities, especially golf courses.
47
 In fact, it may be that the strong increase in real estate investment 
in El Salvador has to do with the sale of some of the large local 
banks to international entities (Román, 2008, p. 9).
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4.  Brazil: looking to improve access for tourists from the  
 main markets of origin
Although Brazil is the leading recipient of international 
visitors in South America, its capacity to draw in tourists 
is clearly under-utilized. As well as being Latin America’s 
largest economy, the country is privileged in terms of natural 
and cultural diversity, several thousands of kilometres of 
coastline and a climate well-suited to year-round sun, sea 
and sand tourism. Yet Brazil receives only a little over five 
million international tourists per year (see figure III.5).
During the second half of the twentieth century, the 
Brazilian authorities focused their attention on industrial 
development, leaving the tourism industry practically in 
the hands of private enterprise. Rio de Janeiro, with its 
famous beaches, was the main destination, while the rest 
of the country remained isolated from domestic, regional 
and international tourist routes and most efforts to improve 
and expand hotel services were concentrated in large 
cities. The main factors contributing to this equation 
were infrequent international flights to the area, high-cost 
domestic flights, distance from the principal sources of 
tourists (United States and Europe), insufficient support 
infrastructure, limited marketing of Brazil as a tourist 
destination and bureaucratic barriers that complicated 
the arrival of tourists (Neto, 2000). As a result, despite 
its size and tremendous potential, Brazil has had only a 
marginal position in the global tourism industry.
Although the first large resorts were built in the 1970s, 
among them Club Med on the island of Itaparica across from 
Salvador de Bahia (see box III.1), the trend really took hold 
in the 1980s. In 1989 a new Club Med was opened near Rio 
de Janeiro, along with several other locally run resorts. Due, 
in particular, to the success of the Hotel Transamérica Ilha de 
Comandatuba in Bahia,48 great expectations surrounded such 
initiatives at that time in Brazil, particularly in the North-East, 
which had all the conditions necessary to replicate the success 
achieved in the Caribbean (Silveira da Rosa and Mendes 
Tavares, 2002, p. 98). Macroeconomic turmoil delayed the 
completion of other similar projects, however. In time, with 
regained stability and significant government investment in 
infrastructure, institutional investors and international hotel 
chains took a fresh interest in large-scale tourism projects, 
particularly in the North-East. At the end of the 1990s, the 
Caesar Park Cabo de Santo Agostinho in Pernambuco49 
48
 The hotel chain Transamérica is currently controlled by the financial 
group Banco Real.
49
 This resort is controlled by the Brazilian real estate developer 
Foundation of Federal Economists (FUNCEF), managed by the 
Mexican chain Posadas under the brand Caesar Park.
opened and the Brazilian construction company Odebrecht 
embarked on Brazil’s largest integrated resort development on 
Costa do Sauípe, near Salvador de Bahia (Toledo, Marroquin 
and Castroman, 2006, p. 14).50
In 2000, the first phase of the Costa do Sauípe project 
opened. Odebrecht had obtained financial support from the 
Banco do Brazil Pension Fund (PREVI) (Latin America’s 
largest pension fund), which invested nearly US$ 840 
million in the project (Exame, 12 September 2008). The 
venture included five high-end hotels: two managed by 
the French chain Accor, two by Marriott of the United 
States and one by SuperClubs of Jamaica, along with six 
inns run by the Portuguese group Pestana.51 The project 
planners aimed to distinguish Costa do Sauípe from 
other destinations, such as Mexico and the Caribbean, 
by attracting foreign visitors with greater purchasing 
power from Europe and the United States. The project ran 
into accessibility issues, however, and failed to make a 
profit. At the end of 2008, these difficulties led PREVI to 
withdraw from the project and sell its share to a consortium 
led by SuperClubs for close to US$ 112 million (Gazeta 
mercantil, 15 September 2008).
In the early 2000s, the difficulties faced by the large 
Brazilian hotel resorts in attracting foreign visitors and 
generating profits were due to circumstantial factors 
such as the terrorist attacks in the United States and 
the economic crisis in Argentina. Nevertheless, what 
hampered these initiatives’ performance was the distance 
from tourists’ countries of origin and, fundamentally, 
poor access to sun, sea and sand destinations like those 
in the North-East (Silveira da Rosa and Mendes Tavares, 
2002, p. 100). Lastly, Brazil’s size and federal structure 
also conspired against the industry’s development. In 
fact, the incentive wars between States to capture large-
scale projects may have made it difficult to generate 
cluster economies. 
Government authorities and major private entities 
began taking measures to improve this state of affairs, 
50
 Since the early 1980s, Odebrecht had been looking at the possibility 
of building a tourist hub on the land it owned 80 km from Salvador 
de Bahia. In fact, the firm invested US$ 5 million in market and 
viability studies before taking the project to market (Toledo, 
Marroquin and Castroman, 2006, p. 13). 
51
 In 2007, due to differences in forms of payment, which included 
compensation for chains operating at a loss, PREVI decided to 
rescind its contract with Accor and Marriott and began to manage 
the four hotels on its own, before withdrawing from the business 
a few months later (Exame, 12 September 2008). 
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strongly upping the resources used to stimulate the sector. 
They launched international marketing campaigns, plans 
to expand and upgrade infrastructure and systems of 
financial and fiscal incentives for investment in tourism 
and hotels. The number of international flights was 
sharply increased, especially in the North-East, which 
more than doubled the number of foreigners landing at 
the region’s principal airports (see figure III.22).52 All 
this occurred in the context of relatively low land and 
property prices compared with other similar destinations53 
(HVS, 2008, p. 2), steep appreciation of the euro and the 
pound sterling54 and abundant liquidity in international 
capital markets in the period before the crisis. Moreover, 
the beaches of Brazil’s North-East, which are free from 
seasonality issues, began to attract greater attention after 
destinations like Thailand, the Caribbean and the southern 
United States suffered large-scale natural disasters such as 
hurricanes and tsunamis (Exame, 2007). The North-East 
region is thus at the heart of the recent transformation in 
the Brazilian tourist industry. 
Figure III.22
AIR TRAFFIC THROUGH THE MAIN AIRPORTS IN NORTH-EAST 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
on the basis of information from the Brazilian Airport Infrastructure 
Company (INFRAERO).
The picture has not been uniformly positive, however. 
First, local currency appreciation has severely impacted 
demand for these large resorts, as Brazil has become 
more expensive than other similar destinations. Second, 
52
 The Programme for North-East Tourism Development (PRODETUR-
NE) has been especially active in executing infrastructure projects 
to facilitate access for tourists to the region (BSH, 2008, p. 9).
53
 The average price per square metre of luxury vacation home in 
Brazil is US$ 3,000, compared with US$ 65,250 in Monaco, 
US$ 11,850 in Barbados, US$ 4,950 in Mexico and US$ 4,050 in 
the Dominican Republic (HVS, 2008, p. 3).
54
 This lowers Brazil’s costs relative to other markets, not only as regards 
land prices, but also for labour and operation maintenance. 
the recent crisis in the domestic transport system has 
complicated access to tourist areas, particularly the North-
East. Lastly, a surge in supply in recent years has created 
stiffer competition, pushing down prices and seriously 
eroding the profitability of many of these ventures (HVS 
and Newmark Knight Frank, 2008, p. 6).
In the light of these developments, and building on 
past experience, the planners of new projects increasingly 
incorporated real estate components in order to reduce risk 
and gain quicker returns on their investment. Today, some 
50 real estate developments of varying sizes are being 
built in Brazil’s North-East, with the active engagement 
of local and foreign companies. Tourism and real estate 
investments in vacation-home condominiums and resorts 
in the area now border US$ 5 billion (América economía, 
21 January 2009, p. 32). As a result of this boom, nearly 
50,000 homes for foreigners could be built in the next 
eight years, with an investment of roughly 7.5 billion 
euros (Revista Hotéis, 14 May 2008). 
Today, foreign investors, led by Spanish and Portuguese 
firms, are investing close to US$ 2.5 billion in the Brazilian 
real estate market (Revista Pronews, No. 102, August 
2008). Portuguese firms have committed some US$ 1.2 
billion to new tourism developments in Brazil, particularly 
in the North-East, and Spanish firms plan to invest nearly 
US$ 700 million by 2010 (Exame, 2007).
The entry of Portuguese investors reflects cultural, 
linguistic and, in particular, geographical proximity 
between the two countries. In fact, a flight from Lisbon 
to Natal, in Rio Grande do Norte, takes less than six 
hours. There are currently more than 2,500 direct flights 
per year between Portugal and North-East Brazil, with 
no need to connect through Rio de Janeiro or Sao Paulo 
(Exame, 2007). This has made Portugal the third largest 
origin market for Brazilian tourism, after Argentina and 
the United States, and one of the largest foreign investors 
in the country (ECLAC, 2007b, p. 165).
Much of Portuguese investment in Brazil goes to the 
States of Bahia, Ceará and Rio Grande do Norte. Ceará is 
home to the largest Portuguese investment not only in Brazil, 
but in all of Latin America. Near Fortaleza, a consortium led 
by Banco Privado Portugues (BPP) plans to invest US$ 500 
million in the construction of Aquiraz Golf & Beach Villas, 
a complex which will include eight hotels, 600 vacation 
homes and 640 apartments, as well as a golf course and 
other services. It is the boldest project to be carried out in 
the North-East since the construction of Costa do Sauípe. 
Similarly, Vila Galé Group is building Cumbuco Golf Resort, 
with an all-inclusive hotel and, later, a golf course and a 
900-apartment condominium complex (Revista Hotéis, 14 
October 2008), and the Reta Atlântico group built three 
hotels and 184 homes in Reserva Imbassaí. 
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Table III.7
BRAZIL: MAIN HOTEL AND REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS UNDER WAY, 2009




group Origin of capital Opening
Aquiraz Golf & Beach Villas 750 1 400 Consórcio Aquiraz (BPP) Portugal 2009
Complexo Hoteleiro Praia do Forte 620 8 000 Grupo Trusam Spain 2010
Vila Galé Cumbuco Golf Resort 600 2 886 Vila Galé Portugal 2011
Pontal do Camaragibe 420 600 Invest Tur Brazil 2010
Ilha da Barra Velha Resort 225 580 Universal Properties Brasil France 2010
Pestana Resort 210 300 Grupo Pestana Portugal 2009
Iberostar Bahia (Praia do Forte) 184 950 Iberostar Spain 2009
The Reef Club 150 500 Grupo Qualta Resorts Spain 2009
Reserva Imbassaí 150 1 050 Reta Atlântico Portugal 2012
Bahia Beach 150 50 Patrik Axelsson Sweden 2010
Complexo Sol Meliá 100 1 000 Grupo Sol Meliá Spain 2009
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
resorts.55 As has occurred in other destinations in Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the firms managing the 
ventures began to experience liquidity problems as a result 
of the sudden plunge in property sales, which forced them 
to slow the pace of projects already under way. Foreign 
tourist arrivals are expected to slump by at least 20%, 
which will strike a blow to the fledgling hotel industry 
in the country’s North-East. The industry will attempt to 
compensate by attracting Brazilian and Argentine tourists, 
who tend to spend less but could be more likely to return 
(América economía, 21 January 2009, p. 33).
In summary, despite its enormous innate potential, 
Brazil has not been able to lock fully into international 
tourist circuits because of its distance from markets of 
origin, access infrastructure constraints and higher relative 
costs. Recently, however, the North-East has attracted 
the interest of investors and potential visitors, creating 
a significant tourism and real estate boom. Unlike some 
similar destinations, Brazil has been quite successful in 
diversifying its markets of origin for tourism. Thanks to 
hefty investments in airport infrastructure and increased 
flight frequency, Brazil has come onto the radar of the 
European market. As in the rest of the region, however, 
real estate and tourism have been severely hit by the 
international financial crisis in recent months.
55
  Uncertainty in the real estate market has caused multiple delays 
and postponements in the Pontal do Camaragibe complex in the 
State of Alagoas. This project includes the construction of three 
hotels (two managed by the Thai chain Six Senses Resorts & 
Spa and one by local group Invest Tur, which is spearheading the 
initiative) along with 165 vacation homes, with an investment of 
US$ 193 million (América economía, 21 January 2009, p. 33). 
These mega-projects have made Portuguese investors 
pioneers in Brazil as regards the new trends in large hotel 
and real estate ventures, such as those seen in Mexico 
and the Caribbean Basin. Their target markets, however, 
are different: the schemes in Mexico and the Caribbean 
Basin cater to United States baby boomers, whereas the 
Portuguese-built resorts are aimed at Europeans and the 
high-end domestic market.
Spanish investors have largely stayed true to their 
traditional model of all-inclusive resorts, but are slowly 
incorporating the real estate segment into their investments 
in Brazil. The Spanish chain Iberostar recently opened 
a five-star hotel and golf course in Praia do Forte, near 
Salvador de Bahia, to which it will add a 208-residence 
condominium complex with hotel services and infrastructure. 
Trusam Group is building a hotel complex at Praia do 
Forte Norte, with three hotels and a residential and 
commercial area, and Sol Meliá is also planning a resort 
complex. Both projects are located in the area around 
Salvador de Bahia.
This combined formula of hotel and real estate 
ventures is present in most of the projects recently 
announced by local and foreign investors. Although 
the North-East remains the centre of this phenomenon, 
projects with similar features are beginning to be seen 
in other regions too: the Jamaican chain SuperClubs in 
Búzios, near Rio de Janeiro and the Costão do Santinho 
Resort in Florianópolis, Santa Catarina. 
In the latter months of 2008, the financial crisis began 
to impact on the tourism and real estate investments already 
exposed in vacation-home condominium complexes and
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D.  Conclusions
prorate the costs of building and maintaining shared 
leisure facilities, such as golf courses, among the owners 
of the residential units. These mega-projects have been 
highly successful in Mexico and are beginning to spread 
to other countries, such as the Bahamas, Costa Rica and 
the Dominican Republic. In fact, the proliferation of huge 
hotel and real estate projects could reduce the importance 
of the all-inclusive model, which has a very limited impact 
on local economies.
Unlike the boom in mass tourism, during which the 
hotel chains played a large role in real estate investment, 
other agents are driving the major hotel and real estate 
projects being built today. Generally speaking, the investors 
are construction companies, real estate developers and 
financial entities, while the hotel chains contribute their 
business know-how and customer management experience, 
all vouched for by the prestige of their brand names. 
As a result, it is difficult to quantify and measure the 
presence of foreign capital in such developments, and 
even more difficult to delineate the corporate strategies 
of the firms involved.
Finally, investors’ expectations may be severely 
dented by the repercussions of the global economic and 
financial crisis. In fact, sales of several of these real estate 
developments have plummeted in the last few months, 
which has complicated the financial management of these 
mega-projects. 
Competition in the sun, sea and sand tourism industry in 
Latin America and the Caribbean has intensified and the 
price-driven, all-inclusive offer is showing clear signs of 
exhaustion. Over-exploitation of the natural environment 
has eroded the comparative advantages that sustain the 
activity, bringing a range of related problems, including 
issues of waste disposal and beach pollution, difficulties 
with drinking water supply and rising crime. Demand 
has been volatile and sensitive to external shocks (such 
as the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the 
recession in the United States) and this, combined with 
the low profit margins of mass tourism, has hurt the 
companies involved.
In response to this situation, the major companies 
have embarked on massive upgrades of their facilities in 
order to capture higher-income segments of demand. As 
well as generating larger profit margins, this is opening 
up access to a less volatile and more predictable market. 
There are also new ventures on a much larger scale 
involving local and international real estate developers. 
Spurred by the real estate boom in the industrialized 
countries, developers are seeking to offer a high-quality 
product for the second- and retirement-homes market, 
taking advantage of the lower prices prevailing in the 
developing economies. The combination of high-end 
hotels and real estate developments has enabled investors 
to increase their cash flow through home sales and to 
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